

TURKEY, NATO AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Ian Kearns



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Introduction

Over the past three years, there has been a lively debate inside NATO on the future of US non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW) stationed in Europe.¹ On one side of this debate the German government, supported by several others, has been arguing that NATO must take its disarmament obligations seriously and act to have the weapons removed. On the other side, a group of countries including the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, Poland and France have expressed reservations, believing that the weapons still have military and political value and that changes to NATO nuclear posture could destabilise the burden-sharing arrangements of the Alliance, weaken the transatlantic link and undermine NATO cohesion. This group has also argued that any reduction in the number of these weapons must only occur in the context of reciprocal steps taken by Russia.²

The NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, published at the Chicago Summit in June 2012, papered over the fault-lines in this debate with a consensus document that leaves the status quo largely intact. For the time being, therefore, the weapons will stay in Europe, though there is openness to change if reductions in numbers can be achieved in the context of an arrangement with Russia.

The longer-term debate over what to do about these weapons, however, will continue. The very existence of the weapons arguably represents a security risk in Europe, and a number of factors, such as the outcome of pending national elections in Germany, or reluctance by some allies to go ahead with decisions to renew their dual-capable aircraft, might yet bring the debate back to the surface, even in the near term.³ NATO is also moving its internal debate on to preparatory work, considering what kind of reciprocal moves from Russia might be acceptable to Alliance members and what alternatives to NATO's current nuclear-sharing arrangements might be both credible and workable in future, should the US NSNW in Europe eventually be removed. There is still much to play for and, no doubt, to argue over with regard to this protracted issue.

This paper, which is part of an ELN-RUSI series of country case studies exploring national positions in the NATO nuclear policy debate, focuses on Turkey. Turkey has a particularly interesting vantage point, sitting geographically as it does on Russia's southern border, neighbouring Iran, and being directly affected by the conflict in Syria and the wider process of change underway in the Middle East. It is also one of the countries hosting the weapons in dispute. For all of these reasons, Turkey not only brings a unique range of interests and concerns to the debate, but is also central to it.

Turkey has a reputation for being a solid and reliable ally in NATO with generally conservative attitudes on deterrence and defence issues. It has a recognised long-standing commitment to notions of NATO solidarity and burden-sharing, these principles having underpinned its agreement to station US nuclear weapons on its territory since the 1960s.⁴ During the Cold War, the weapons were felt by many in Turkey to have deterrent value against the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War period they have been seen as valuable in dealing with the unconventional military capabilities of Iran, Syria and Iraq and in providing a direct link to the US nuclear deterrent.

Today, given the Iranian nuclear programme, many in Turkey still believe them to constitute a vital and credible deterrent. Some observers even argue that as the Iranian nuclear programme continues to make progress, any withdrawal of US NSNW from Turkey could undermine Turkish confidence in the NATO nuclear guarantee so fundamentally that the country might choose to 'develop or buy nuclear weapons of its own'.⁵ This is an exaggerated concern and there is another side to Turkey's position that has to be considered. Turkey's role and place in the world is undergoing rapid change and this is impacting markedly on its own perceptions of its national interests. This in turn is changing the context within which the country views the debate on NATO nuclear policy.

The remainder of this paper therefore explores some of the reasons as to why the Turkish position needs to be understood today in more balanced and nuanced terms. The next chapter reviews recent changes and developments in Turkey's foreign policy. It includes some consideration of Turkey's relationships with both its allies and some of its neighbours and analyses the underlying interests now driving Turkish policy. It asks whether Turkey is turning away from the West or whether the recently deteriorated security situation in the Middle East means a cautious Turkey is keen to further strengthen ties with its NATO and EU allies. Chapter II reviews Turkey's nuclear diplomacy, including an examination of its approach to global nuclear non-proliferation regimes, its attitude toward the concept of a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East, and its stance in the NATO nuclear debate. Chapter III then uses this background analysis to evaluate the risks to Turkish policy and interests inherent to the debate over the US NSNW forward deployed in Europe. Chapter IV draws on the preceding analysis to offer some conclusions and suggest Turkey's likely preferred approach to the NATO debate in the future.

The paper is based on secondary research and on interviews and conversations conducted by the author, and by other ELN and RUSI colleagues and network members, during the course of two study visits to Turkey (in November 2010 and January 2012). The author benefited from participation in a BASIC-ACA-USAK seminar on NATO nuclear policy in Ankara in November 2010, as well as

from meetings with many senior Turkish government officials. The study visit in January 2012, supported by the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and conducted in partnership with RUSI, included an ELN Leadership Delegation comprising Des Browne, former UK defence secretary; David Owen, former UK foreign secretary; Giorgio La Malfa, former minister for European Union affairs in Italy; and Professor Malcolm Chalmers, research director at RUSI.

The views expressed in this paper reflect some of what was heard on both study visits but ultimately they remain those of the author alone.

Special thanks must also go to Stela Petrova of the ELN for research support during the preparation of the paper.

Notes and References

1. The US Air Force deploys nearly 200 nuclear weapons in Europe, thought to be stationed in five countries, namely Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey. The weapons are free-fall bombs, designed to be dropped from dual-capable (nuclear and conventional capable) aircraft provided by the five host countries. See Hans M Kristensen, 'Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons', Federation of American Scientists, Special Report No. 3, May 2012, pp. 15–22.
2. Estimates of the size of the Russian stockpile of nuclear weapons vary but most assume that Russia has something in the order of 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons. See *ibid*, pp. 45–52.
3. Some of the US nuclear weapons stationed in Europe are allocated for delivery to target by US aircraft and some by allied aircraft from Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Turkey. In several countries, existing aircraft assigned to the nuclear mission are ageing and need either to go through life-extension programmes or to be replaced at some expense to cash-strapped European governments.
4. For a discussion of the history of US nuclear weapons stationed in Turkey see Mustafa Kibaroglu, 'Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey', *Arms Control Today*, June 2010, pp. 8–13.
5. See Franklin Miller, George Robertson and Kori Schake, 'Germany Opens Pandora's Box', Briefing Note, Centre for European Reform, February 2010, p. 3.

I. Turkish Foreign Policy

Turkey's Changing Relationship with its Allies

Most analysts would agree that during the Cold War Turkey's relations with the West and with NATO in particular were founded on a clear and reciprocal security commitment: Turkey was committed to wider European security in the face of the Soviet threat and the rest of NATO was committed to the defence of Turkey.¹ In recent years, however, the certainties of this reciprocal commitment have begun to erode.

In the perception of some analysts, Turkey's value to the Alliance was reduced in the post-Cold War years by the disappearance of the Soviet threat and by the process of NATO enlargement, which meant that Turkey was no longer the only NATO country in the Black Sea region.² At the same time, many of the more recent security challenges on Turkey's Middle Eastern borders have been seen as 'out of area' problems by some of Turkey's more geopolitically sheltered allies in the West.³ While all may pay lip-service to the need to meet threats wherever they arise, in practice some have been more reluctant to engage than others, and differences in the degree of threat perception have become relatively common. These in turn have exposed policy differences in a number of areas between Turkey, the US and other allies in Europe.

On Iraq, for example, the US-led invasion in 2003 destabilised Turkey's neighbour and, from a Turkish perspective, inflamed the Kurdish issue.⁴ The result was that the Turkish parliament refused to allow US land forces to cross Turkish territory to enter Iraq from the north, a decision that caused the worst crisis in Turkish-US relations for decades.⁵

More recently, Turkey and the US have also differed over Afghanistan and Iran. Turkey refused to send additional troops to Afghanistan in 2009, much to US disappointment. On Iran, Turkey has been willing to accept the sanctions imposed by the UN because it believes that Iran has not abided by the legitimate demands of the Security Council, but it also believes that additional US and European Union sanctions are likely to strengthen hardliners in Iran, and therefore does not support them. It also does not support demands that Iran halt all enrichment activity, as it sees this as a violation of Iran's right to pursue the peaceful use of nuclear technology, as enshrined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).⁶ Turkey has instead called for more diplomatic engagement and for a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East as a way of addressing both the Iranian issue and that of Israel's possession of nuclear weapons.

From the Turkish perspective, wider relations with both NATO allies and the European Union have also suffered set-backs in recent years. In both the First Gulf War in 1991 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, several NATO allies

were reluctant to deploy early-warning radar and missile-defence systems to Turkey to help it deal with any potential Iraqi attack.⁷ These developments undermined Turkish confidence in NATO's collective defence guarantees, particularly as these interventions took place against the background of NATO's protracted effort to re-define its role and mission in the post-Cold War world, a process which, according to some, has involved a downplaying of the Alliance's traditional emphasis on territorial defence.⁸

The once promising relationship between Turkey and the EU has done little to help assuage such concerns by solidifying Turkey's engagement with, and sense of belonging to, the West. Turkey's objective of EU membership remains an important one, having been a candidate for full EU membership since 1999. However, as Sebnem Udum has pointed out: 'the accession process has been slowed down by the unresolved issue of Cyprus, the reluctance of some EU states to accept Turkey as a full member, and the diminished domestic attention inside Turkey to the EU integration process.'⁹ There is a lack, moreover, of much-needed wider strategic dialogue between Turkey and the EU as a whole, possibly as a result of the stifling effect of EU accession talks.¹⁰ Although sixteen EU foreign ministers recently issued an open call for renewed momentum in the process of Turkish access to the EU, few now expect Turkish accession to take place before 2020, if at all.¹¹

Turkey's long-standing antagonistic relationship with Greece further clouds the picture. Not only does it sit behind the ongoing dispute over Cyprus, but it has frequently disrupted both internal NATO business and any attempt to improve co-operation between NATO and the EU.

Whether more recent developments – such as question marks over Iraq's long-term stability, Iran's nuclear programme, the civil war in Syria, or the wider process of change in the Arab world – will persuade both Turkey and its NATO and EU allies that it is time to invest new energy in the relationship after a rocky period is as yet unclear. The initial response of some NATO allies to Turkey's request that Patriot missiles be deployed to the Turkish-Syrian border in November 2012 may not augur well, though Turkey itself is treading a fine line regarding Syria, seeking NATO support on the one hand but being very wary of any moves that might draw it into the Syrian civil war on the other.¹² Turkey's recent decision to host elements of the NATO missile defence shield is, however, a sign that, for its part at least, Ankara still values the relationship with NATO as a cornerstone of its security policy.

Nonetheless, Turkey's relationships with its Western allies in the US, the rest of NATO and the EU are clearly far from straightforward.

Turkey's Changing Relationship with its Neighbours

It is this context of less-than-smooth relations with its long-term Western allies that makes the recent changes in Turkey's foreign policy so interesting and, for some in the West, so worrying. Turkey has invested new energy in nurturing closer ties with Russia, Iran, the Kurdish Autonomous Region of northern Iraq (KAR), Armenia, Syria and several countries in the Gulf, and has offered support to transition processes across the Arab world.

It is not the purpose of this paper to review this changed approach in its entirety, but in two areas in particular; namely relations with Russia and Iran, where changes have the potential to influence Turkey's positioning in internal NATO debates.

With regard to relations with Russia, the two countries have historically been enemies, Stalin's aggressive Soviet policy in the early Cold War period being a key factor in Turkey's decision to join NATO in 1952.¹³ In the last ten to twelve years however, relations between the two countries have improved significantly, not least because Turkey's sense of being let down by the West in relation to the EU accession process, which is felt across the Turkish political spectrum, has been paralleled by the growth of negative Russian perceptions over the eastward enlargement of NATO. The unintended result has been that both countries have come to view both the West and each other slightly differently.

One consequence has been that Turkey's Caucasian diaspora support of the Chechen rebels in their conflict with Russia, and Russia's tolerance of PKK activities on its soil, have both given way, to a degree at least, to an agreement not to interfere in each other's affairs.

Another consequence has been that the economic relationship between the two has been transformed. The Blue Stream gas pipeline between Russia and Turkey, which became operational in 2003, was one breakthrough.¹⁴ This was quickly followed, in December 2004, by President Putin becoming the first Russian head of state to visit Turkey in thirty-two years, signing an agreement to pursue a 'Deepening of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership' in the process. Russia is now Turkey's largest trading partner and the leaders of the two countries have expressed a desire to see trade rise from under \$20 billion in 2010 to around \$100 billion per annum by 2015.¹⁵ Trade and investment is intensifying in the energy sector; Russian investment in Turkey's tourism and telecommunication sectors has also grown recently; and the Russian market now accounts for nearly a quarter of the Turkish construction industry's business.¹⁶ In May 2010, during a visit to Ankara by President Medvedev, a \$20-billion plan to build Turkey's first nuclear power plant at Mersin was also announced, with the Russian state holding company Rosatom responsible for its construction.¹⁷

Constraints on co-operation do still exist, however. Turkish and Russian policies conflict in the Caucasus, for example. Turkish-Armenian relations are driven partly by historical enmities and by Turkey's support for Azerbaijan, whereas Russia is Armenia's principal ally. It remains to be seen whether improvements in the wider Turkish-Russian relationship can be translated into efforts to mediate in the Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, a conflict which at the time of writing was dangerously close to erupting again, or whether this dispute will put a break on Russian-Turkish co-operation.¹⁸

Similarly, although Russia and Turkey co-operated over the Blue Stream pipeline, they are also energy competitors, especially in the Caspian region and in Central Asia. Russia would prefer to control the transit routes for energy that flows from these regions to the West and it supports the South Stream pipeline for this purpose. It is unhappy about the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and about Turkish-Azerbaijani co-operation on the proposed Nabucco West pipeline into Europe. Turkey, not surprisingly, favours pipelines that help make it, rather than Russia, the vital hub for the transport of natural gas to Europe.¹⁹ Turkey and Russia, furthermore, do not see eye-to-eye on the crisis in Syria.

Nevertheless, there is enough substance in the improved relationship between Turkey and Russia to make Ankara at least aware of, and perhaps in the future more sensitive to, Russian concerns in a number of areas, including in relation to security issues in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the issue of NATO's further eastern enlargement, and nuclear policy and posture.²⁰

Meanwhile, Turkey's relations with Iran, which were uneasy between the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the early 2000s for a number of reasons, have also improved markedly in recent years, although they remain problematic.²¹ Greater Turkish-Iranian co-operation in attempts to deal with the PKK – a body branded by both governments as a terrorist organisation – was initiated by an agreement signed by Prime Minister Erdogan in Tehran in 2004.²² The two countries have also collaborated to a greater extent on energy production and distribution, with the Turkish Petroleum Corporation contributing to the development of Iran's South Pars Gas field, while joint efforts have also been made to transport Iranian and Turkmen gas via Turkey to Europe.²³

Trade volumes between the two reached \$15 billion in 2011, from a base of less than \$200 million in 1991, mostly through Turkish imports of natural gas; however, tourism is also an important element of the trade relationship, with around 1 million Iranians visiting Turkey each year.²⁴

Although worried about the Iranian nuclear programme, Turkey has been reluctant to criticise Iran in public and, if anything, has accused the West of

hypocrisy over its targeting of Iran's nuclear programme while systematically ignoring Israel's possession of nuclear weapons. Instead, Turkey is actively trying both to develop friendly relations with Iran and to participate in efforts to establish greater transparency regarding Iran's nuclear activities.²⁵

Here again, however, co-operation has been limited by certain constraints. Turkey has never had what might be described as a genuinely strategic relationship with Iran. Each is a regional power, sometimes in competition but with a shared border and strong reasons to co-operate.²⁶ Turkey sees itself as geographically and culturally best placed to engage Iran on the nuclear issue and has sought to act as a mediator between Iran and the West, but it does not share Iran's vision for the region and its own soft power could be vital in limiting Iranian influence across the wider Middle East.²⁷

Relations between Ankara and Tehran have also recently borne increased strain due to their opposing views of the future of the Assad regime in Syria.

Prior to the anti-Assad uprising in 2011, Turkish-Syrian relations were on a positive trajectory. Syria's contribution was seen as important to efforts to contain the PKK, while growing economic links were actively being pursued. In the space of one week in October 2009, Turkey signed forty agreements with Syria (and incidentally, in the same week, another forty-eight with Iraq), covering a wide range of areas from environmental projects, to improved transport, trade and commercial links.²⁸ Turkey and Syria even held joint military exercises in April 2009.

Since then, however, the situation has reversed completely. While Iran continues to support the Assad regime, the ongoing conflict in Syria has prompted the Turkish government to break with Assad and provide active support to anti-Assad rebels fighting for control of the country. Turkey has now recognised the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people, while Iran is doing all it can to make sure the opposition movement fails.

Turkey's decision to take part in the NATO missile defence shield has been a further point of friction with Iran. In December 2011, the acting president of the Iranian Parliament's Foreign Policy and National Security Commission, Hussein Ibrahim, said that if Iran were attacked it would retaliate by attacking the radar site that Turkey has agreed to host as part of the NATO system.²⁹

As with Russia, however, there is still sufficient substance to the relationship with Iran for Turkey to want to take Iran's sensitivities into account when approaching NATO policy debates. This is true both in relation to nuclear policy and, perhaps even more so, as the Iranian threat mentioned above indicates, in relation to missile defence, which is why Turkey was so reluctant

to have Iran named as the target when the NATO-wide missile defence strategy was announced in June 2010 in Lisbon.

Evidently, Turkey's attempted foreign-policy reorientation has faced difficulties and constraints in relation to Russia, Iran and a number of other cases that could be mentioned, including the Kurdish Autonomous Region of northern Iraq and Armenia. It is also clear that Turkey's attempt to invest new energy in these relationships could also complicate its relationship with the US, other NATO allies and the EU. Some important questions therefore remain: what has been driving this reorientation and how long will it persist? Has it been a short-term experiment that is already running out of steam as it runs up against reality, or is it a reorientation that will gather momentum, despite the challenges, over the long term?

Is Turkey Turning Away from the West?

Concern has been expressed in some quarters that Turkey's attempts to change its foreign policy reflects a desire to turn away from the West, and from the US in particular. This is said to be evidenced by Turkey's approach to Iran on the one hand and by its worsened relationship with Israel, the US's primary ally in the Middle East, on the other.

On the latter, Prime Minister Erdogan has certainly been more pro-Palestinian and more critical of Israeli policy toward Gaza than his predecessors.³⁰ The Israeli attack on the Gaza-bound ship, the *Mava Marmaris*, in May 2010 was condemned by Erdogan as 'murder conducted by a state' and the resulting dispute between Turkey and Israel has held up progress on the NATO-Israel Partnership agenda.³¹

The current Turkish and Israeli governments also differ deeply over how to handle Iran. Whereas Israel sees the Iranian nuclear programme as an existential threat, Turkey has warned Israel against using its airspace in any attack on Iran and aspires instead to mediate between the international community and Iran. This was most clearly demonstrated by its efforts, with Brazil, to secure a deal for the transfer of low-enriched uranium out of Iran early in 2010.

However, it is important to note that Turkey's foreign policy reorientation predates the rise of Turkey's current ruling party, the Islamist Justice and Development party (AKP), to power, suggesting that claims of an ideologically or theologically motivated turn to the east are, at most, only partially true.³² The late President Turgut Ozal made efforts to build closer ties with Central Asia during his tenure between 1989 and 1993, and relations with both Iran and Syria improved prior to the commencement of AKP rule in 2002. Growth in Turkey's trade with its eastern and southern neighbours also began as far back as the 1980s and 1990s.

Far from being driven by a desire to move away from the West therefore – Turkey’s approach to both Iran and Israel notwithstanding – Turkey’s attempted foreign policy shift has been at least partly rooted in diplomatic, economic and political pragmatism.

Turkey’s recent positioning has reflected its changed geostrategic circumstances. Its dependence on the US has arguably decreased, while the country’s role, interests and importance on the international stage have expanded. This is the opposite outcome to that feared by some in Turkey at the end of the Cold War, who assumed that Turkey’s strategic importance to the US may have been permanently reduced. In fact, and given the current context of instability across the Arab world, Turkey has become more, not less, important to US policy goals across the entire Middle East, the Gulf, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey still needs and relies on the US as an ally, of course – a point brought home by the more recent period of instability affecting several of its close neighbours – but it no longer feels quite so tied to US positions and has perhaps more influence over US policy than it has enjoyed previously. Its policy for much of the last few years has been influenced by the perception that its room for manoeuvre has increased – something of which it is seeking to take advantage. It also sees a potential regional leadership opportunity for itself in a Middle East that is looking for new socioeconomic models to emulate.

At the same time, Turkey’s requirement for sustained and accelerated economic growth to meet the needs of its population offers a persuasive additional explanation for the change in its foreign policy. In 2010 the Turkish economy grew 9.2 per cent, and in 2011 by 8.5 per cent – the second-fastest growth rate in the G20 after China. This growth underpins Turkey’s increased confidence on the international stage, but it remains the case that with a rapidly growing population, projected to rise from around 74 million today to 87 million by 2025 and 94 million by 2050, and with economic growth projected to slow to around 5 per cent in the period 2012–17, the government is under enormous pressure to improve economic performance still further.³³

In the context of the crisis in the Eurozone, in practical terms this means exploiting the large economic potential of relationships with the Middle East, the Gulf region and Russia. As already noted, economic ties to Russia have been growing significantly, but Turkey has also had some success in the Middle East. Krastev and Leonard report that ‘In 2009, nearly 20% of the country’s exports went to the Middle East, compared with just 12.5% in 2004. Trade with Iran has also increased more than six-fold since 2002.’³⁴ At the same time, the EU’s share of Turkish exports has fallen below the 50 per cent level,³⁵ while Turkey is now also attracting large numbers of tourists from the Arab world – around a million a year.

The other central dimension to Turkey's trade reorientation relates to energy. At present, Turkey receives nearly two-thirds of its gas and around a third of its oil from Russia,³⁶ and Iran is one of the few alternative suppliers capable of meeting Turkey's needs. It is therefore entirely understandable that Turkey perceives strong interests in better relations with both Russia and Iran as it seeks to meet its growing energy needs.

A number of shifts in the Turkish domestic environment, moreover, have acted as political facilitators for the foreign policy re-alignment.

On the one hand, Turkish politicians interested in exploring a new approach to the outside world for diplomatic and economic reasons have found a receptive public. The Transatlantic Trends survey in 2011, for example, showed that between 2004 and 2011 there was a drop in the proportion of the Turkish population that viewed future membership of the EU as a good thing, from 73 per cent to 48 per cent.³⁷ Some 62 per cent of Turks polled in the same survey had an unfavourable view of the United States, apparently influenced by negative views of the invasion of Iraq and the US approach to relations with both Iran and Israel. A plurality of Turks, 43 per cent, also thought that economic co-operation with the Middle East was more important than co-operation with the EU, and 42 per cent thought that on security matters Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbours were more important than countries in the EU. It remains to be seen how the conflict in Syria and wider turmoil in the Middle East might affect these numbers in future but for the time being, the Turkish population seems willing to look south and east for its future and not only to the west.

Turkey's political party system has also seen major change, with the rise of the AKP as the dominant force in Turkish politics since 2002. This has brought to the fore Islamist political leaders who are showing interest in looking more to Turkey's immediate and close neighbourhood, while being careful, it remains important to note, to maintain alliances with the West.

Equally important, is the recent decline in influence over domestic politics of the Turkish military, which is an important source of Turkey's conservative attitudes to deterrence and defence debates inside NATO due to the dominance of the General Staff in the Ministry of Defence. This has both been because of scandal, and as a result of legislative changes designed to increase democratic and civilian control over the military in line with the requirements of any possible future EU membership.³⁸

None of this means that Turkey's relationships with the European Union or NATO have ceased to be important. For example, far from representing a turn away from the EU, Turkey's increased economic ties with its neighbours often rest on Turkey being an important gateway to EU markets, and the

levels of its trade with those markets still dwarf its levels of trade activity with the Middle East. The Turkish leadership reportedly also sees its regional relationships not as an alternative to the EU, but as a version of the special relationship enjoyed by the UK with the Commonwealth.³⁹

As Turkey approaches the entire issue of the NATO nuclear debate, therefore, it does so against the background of this complex set of needs, interests and concerns. It has pursued new relationships, particularly with Russia and Iran, but also with others that have the potential to affect its views and calculations in internal NATO policy debates. In Chapter III, this paper examines how and in what ways this is true in relation to the debate regarding US non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. Before doing so however, the next chapter briefly reviews two other important elements of the context to Turkey's position in the debate, namely its formal stance in the NATO debate so far and its approach to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament diplomacy in general.

Notes and References

1. See Tarik Oguzlu, 'Turkey and the Transformation of NATO', SETA Policy Brief No. 33, July 2009, p. 6.
2. Bulgaria and Romania both acceded to NATO in April 2004. On Turkey's value to allies in the post-Cold War period, see *ibid.*, p. 6.
3. For a discussion of Turkey's changing security and geopolitical environment, see F Stephen Larrabee, 'Turkey's New Geopolitics', *Survival* (Vol. 52, No. 2, April-May 2010).
4. See Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, 'The Spectre of a Multipolar Europe', European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2010, pp. 43–44.
5. See Bruno Tertrais, 'Nuclear Proliferation in Europe: Could it Still Happen?', *Non-Proliferation Review* (Vol. 13, No. 3, November 2006), p. 572.
6. See Sinan Ulgen, 'Turkey and the Bomb', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2012, p. 7.
7. Oguzlu, 'Turkey and the Transformation of NATO', p. 5. See also Tertrais, 'Nuclear Proliferation in Europe', p. 572, which states that: 'Immediately before the March 2003 U.S. led invasion of Iraq, a crisis of confidence developed within NATO as several alliance members refused to invoke Article IV of the Washington Treaty, which calls for consultations among members in case one of them believes its security is threatened, thus repeating, in Turkish eyes, the experience of 1991'.

8. For a discussion of some of the wider debate on NATO's strategic role and purpose, see Oguzlu, 'Turkey and the Transformation of NATO'.
9. See Sebnem Udum, 'Turkey's Nuclear Comeback: An Energy Renaissance in an Evolving Security Context', *Nonproliferation Review* (Vol. 17, No. 2, July 2010), p. 372.
10. Katinka Barysch makes this point in Katinka Barysch, 'Can Turkey Combine EU Accession and Regional Leadership?', Centre for European Reform Policy Brief, January 2010.
11. See Foreign Office, 'The EU and Turkey: Stronger Together', statement by sixteen EU foreign ministers, 28 June 2012.
12. According to senior sources at NATO, at the ministerial meeting held in early December 2012, Turkey reportedly opposed the instigation of contingency planning with regard to greater Alliance involvement in Syria.
13. For a wide-ranging discussion of Turkey's changing geopolitical environment see Larrabee, 'Turkey's New Geopolitics'.
14. Bulent Aras, 'Turkey and the Russian Federation: An Emerging Multidimensional Partnership', SETA Policy Brief No. 35, August 2009, pp. 4–5.
15. Krastev and Leonard, 'The Spectre of a Multipolar Europe', pp. 51–52.
16. Larrabee, 'Turkey's New Geopolitics', pp. 167–69.
17. Krastev and Leonard, 'The Spectre of a Multipolar Europe', p. 52.
18. Aras, 'Turkey and the Russian Federation'.
19. Anita Sobjak and Konrad Zasztowt, 'Nabucco West – Perspectives and Relevance: The Reconfigured Scenario', PISM Policy Paper No. 44, 12 November 2012.
20. See Larrabee, 'Turkey's New Geopolitics', p. 168.
21. Between 1970 and the early 2000s, Turkey had concerns over Iran's development of medium- and long-range ballistic missiles, while Turkish strategic alliances with Iran's sworn enemies, namely the United States and Israel, placed important constraints on attempts to co-operate. For a discussion of this see Udum, 'Turkey's Nuclear Comeback'; and Tertrais, 'Nuclear Proliferation in Europe'.
22. Larrabee, 'Turkey's New Geopolitics'.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 164.

24. Ulgen, 'Turkey and the Bomb', p. 6.
25. For a discussion of this see Udum, 'Turkey's Nuclear Comeback', p. 372.
26. See C Candar, 'Turkey's Soft Power Strategy: A New Vision for a Multipolar World', SETA Policy Brief No. 38, December 2009.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 8–9.
29. Ulgen, 'Turkey and the Bomb', p.10.
30. Larrabee, 'Turkey's New Geopolitics', pp. 166–67
31. See Joshua Teitelbaum, 'Turkey is Calling for a Jihad Against Israel', *Guardian*, 8 June 2010.
32. Krastev and Leonard, 'The Spectre of a Multipolar Europe', pp. 49–50.
33. For data on the current population see Turkstat, 'Demographic Structure of Turkey and its Future, 2010–2050', press release no. 13140, 11 July 2012, <<http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=13140>>, accessed 30 January 2013. For data on forward population projections, see UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Turkey Country profile, <<http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/country-profiles/pdf/792.pdf>>, accessed 30 January 2013. For data on Turkey's economic growth rates, see Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Economy, economic outlook briefing <<http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=economicoutlook>>, accessed 30 January 2013.
34. Krastev and Leonard, 'The Spectre of a Multipolar Europe', p. 49.
35. See Larrabee, 'Turkey's New Geopolitics', p. 160.
36. This figure is taken from Krastev and Leonard, 'The Spectre of a Multipolar Europe', p. 52.
37. See the German Marshall Fund of the United States, 'Transatlantic Trends: Key Findings 2011', p. 37, <http://www.gmfus.org/publications_/TT/TT2011_final_web.pdf>, accessed 30 January 2013.
38. For some discussion of the Ergenekon scandal see Serdar Kaya, 'The Rise and Decline of the Turkish "Deep State": The Ergenekon Case', *Insight Turkey* (Vol. 11, No. 4, 2009), pp. 99–113. It should be noted that despite the recent reduction in the influence of the military, civilian involvement in the Turkish Ministry of Defence remains relatively weak.
39. This claim is made in Krastev and Leonard, 'The Spectre of a Multipolar Europe', p. 51.

II. Turkish Nuclear Diplomacy

Turkey is a party to all major international nuclear non-proliferation instruments and regimes. It became a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1979 and is committed to the full implementation, further strengthening and universalisation of all three pillars of the NPT: non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use.¹

At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Turkey made a pointed call for the international community to work on additional measures to be taken against states leaving the treaty while found to be in non-compliance with their treaty obligations. It also acknowledged the vital role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the sole legitimate body in determining compliance and supports both the comprehensive safeguards and Additional Protocol of the IAEA as the indispensable compliance verification standard.

With regard to disarmament, Turkey has formally welcomed the renewed commitment of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to the principles of the NPT, and the vision of a nuclear-weapons-free world.² It welcomed President Obama's 2009 Prague speech and fully supports the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and the Russian Federation, signed on 8 April 2010.

Turkey believes all nuclear-weapon states should take further positive steps to enhance global security. It believes, in particular, that any additional disarmament steps taken should be irreversible, verifiable and based on increased transparency. As part of a group composed of Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Spain, Turkey has stated its desire to see further reductions in NSNW, pending their total elimination, and has urged states in possession of nuclear weapons to reveal their aggregate numbers, both deployed and in reserve, to reduce their operational status, and to diminish their role in national security policies.³

Turkey has also been active in diplomacy surrounding the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It became the 53rd state signatory to have ratified the CTBT on 16 February 2000 and actively encourages ratification of the treaty by the remaining eight states whose ratification is required for its entry into force.⁴ It similarly advocates urgency in efforts to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, and sees progress on an FMCT not only as important in its own right but as a device that may pave the way for parallel positive steps on issues like preventing an arms race in outer space.⁵ As one of the group of countries that comprise the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (the others being Canada, Australia, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland and the United Arab Emirates), Turkey has also pushed

for parallel forums of discussion on an FMCT to be explored outside of the stalled Conference on Disarmament, with one option being a UN conference similar to that held on an Arms Trade Treaty in July 2012.⁶

Turkey supports the concept of nuclear weapon-free zones and, in particular, supports the establishment of an effectively verifiable zone free of such weapons and their means of delivery in the Middle East.⁷ This is seen as a pressing priority, not only because, as noted earlier, Israel is thought to possess nuclear weapons and Iran is thought to be seeking them, but also because no state in the region is formally a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime, and several states in the region are thought to either possess non-conventional weapons or to have previously possessed or sought them.⁸

Turkey further supports initiatives designed to improve nuclear security and to allow the responsible use of nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes. This includes support for the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Proliferation Security Initiative. It also promotes efforts to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian reactors. Turkey's strong support of states' rights to the peaceful use of nuclear energy is linked to the belief that to enjoy this right states should be willing to sign up to the IAEA Additional Protocol.⁹

Against the backdrop of these wider nuclear policy positions and the wider foreign policy concerns outlined in the last chapter, Turkey has participated fully in the internal NATO nuclear debate but has done so in ways that do not immediately appear consistent with its stance on nuclear matters in general.

Although Turkey supports increased nuclear transparency in general terms, it is reluctant to increase transparency with regard to NATO nuclear forces and with regard to the US NSNW stationed on Turkish territory. Although it has called for all states to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons in national security policies and has welcomed President Obama's vision of a world without nuclear weapons, it apparently had little difficulty signing up to the outcome of the NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR) which stated that 'NATO is committed to maintaining an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities for deterrence and defence.'¹⁰

As the host country to around sixty B-61 free-fall US nuclear weapons, Turkey's position is to accept the removal of these weapons, provided it is consulted by the US on the decision beforehand and that there is a consensus within NATO in support of the move. However, in line with its longstanding attitude on these issues inside NATO, Turkey seems more than content to have the weapons remain where they are at present, as a demonstration of its commitment to NATO's burden-sharing principle, and as a manifestation

of the US security commitment to Turkey. Some analysts have also argued that Turkey's security elite views nuclear weapons on Turkish soil as a status enhancer for Turkey within NATO.¹¹

Whether the latter point is true or not, Turkey could hardly be described as agitating to have the weapons removed.

There is no real domestic anti-nuclear movement in Turkey, and consequently no real political pressure to change the status quo, though it is also true that the presence of US nuclear weapons on Turkish soil is not widely known among the Turkish public.¹² Were this situation to change, there might well be strong public criticism, but the issue is not a live one in Turkish politics as things stand.

The F-16 aircraft that would be required to deliver the weapons to their target also do not have to be renewed until the 2030s, meaning that the cost arguments with regard to aircraft renewal, which might yet be an important factor in places like the Netherlands, are not an issue in Turkey (though it should be noted here, too, that there are question marks over whether the Turkish aircrews even continue to exercise, and therefore maintain certification for, the nuclear mission).¹³

Turkey's support for the goal of a nuclear-weapons-free world and its wider advocacy of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, not to mention its commitment to a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East and its attempted reorientation of foreign policy should therefore be seen, in this context, as indicators of long-term aspirations that sit uncomfortably alongside NATO's, and Turkey's, perceived shorter-term need to maintain a credible minimum deterrent.

Turkey has not successfully reconciled these positions. It is not, of course, alone in this, but its approach to the NATO nuclear debate is in many ways a manifestation of its attempts to manage the resulting, and arguably growing, tensions and dilemmas.

Notes and References

1. See the Statement by Ambassador Feridun Sinirlioglu at the 2010 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, p. 1, <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/turkey_en.pdf>, accessed 18 January 2013.
2. *Ibid.*

3. See Cole Harvey, 'Major Proposals to Strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: A Source Guide for the 2010 Review Conference', Arms Control Association, March 2010, p. 19, <<http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/Proposals%20to%20Strengthen%20NPT.pdf>>, accessed 30 January 2013.
4. For more information on Turkish ratification of the CTBT see the CTBTO Preparatory Commission press release, 'Turkey Ratifies Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty', <<http://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/press-releases/2000/turkey-ratifies-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty/>>, accessed 18 January 2013. For Turkish support of all-states-ratification see the Statement by Ambassador Feridun Sinirlioglu at the 2010 Review Conference, p. 1.
5. *Ibid.*
6. See Andrea Berger, 'Finding the Right Home for FMCT Talks', Arms Control Association, October 2012, <<http://www.armscontrol.org/print/5541>>, accessed 30 January 2013.
7. See Toni Johnson, 'Fifteen Nuclear Agendas to Watch', Council on Foreign Relations, 27 May 2010, <<http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/fifteen-nuclear-agendas-watch/p22023>>, accessed 30 January 2013. Also see the Statement by Ambassador Feridun Sinirlioglu at the 2010 Review Conference, p. 2.
8. See Sinan Ulgen, 'Turkey and the Bomb', p. 5.
9. See Cole Harvey, 'Major Proposals to Strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: A source guide for the 2010 Review Conference', Arms Control Association, March 2010, p. 42, <<http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/Proposals%20to%20Strengthen%20NPT.pdf>>, accessed 30 January 2013. For more information on support for the IAEA Additional Protocol, see 'Working Paper Submitted by Belgium, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain and Turkey for Consideration at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.33, 12 May 2009.
10. The text of the DDRP is available at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm?mode=pressrelease>, accessed 30 January 2013.
11. Sinan Ulgen, 'Turkey and the Bomb', p.12.
12. A point made in correspondence to the author from a former holder of very high office in Turkey.
13. This point was made to the author both by senior sources at NATO and by a senior Turkish policy-maker, though in separate conversations.

III. Risks for Turkey in the NATO Nuclear Debate

In approaching the nuclear policy debate, both inside and outside of NATO, Turkey finds itself increasingly needing to balance the benefits and risks of change against the benefits and risks of the status quo. That there are risks to Turkish policy and interests either way seems clear.

To take the risks of change first, these depend to a large extent on the precise circumstances in which any change is attempted.

As noted in the introduction to this paper, some make the exaggerated argument that if the US unilaterally withdrew its non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe, including from Turkey, and Iran proceeded to develop and test a nuclear weapon at around the same time, then Turkey might feel its Western security guarantee had become so unreliable and the threats to its security so grave that it needed to go it alone militarily, even to the extent of developing a nuclear weapon of its own.¹ From this perspective, NATO's current nuclear policy, including the forward deployment of US NSNW in Europe, has the distinct benefit of meeting risks to Turkey's national security interests in the short term while simultaneously reducing the chances of Turkey itself going nuclear, reinforcing Turkey's commitment to the global non-proliferation regime, and bolstering efforts to prevent proliferation across the wider Middle East.²

However, the risks to Turkey's interests do not lie only in the scenario in which the US unilaterally withdraws its nuclear weapons from Europe on the one hand, while Iran goes nuclear on the other. Even if Iran did not obtain nuclear weapons and even if US NSNW were removed from Europe only as part of a NATO consensus to do so, this might still create significant problems for Ankara.

If, for example, additional military exercises and plans to reinforce Central and Eastern Europe in the event of a crisis were the price paid for this consensus within NATO, this could alienate Russia, contribute to a general worsening of NATO-Russian relations and, if it went far enough, place Turkey in a particularly difficult position with Russia. This would be an important setback, especially if the NATO relationship with Russia deteriorated to the extent that it impacted significantly on Turkey's economic and energy interests in relation to Russia.

A third scenario, in which the US itself made no unilateral decision to remove its NSNW from Europe but no consensus for change in NATO could be reached either, might also be damaging to Turkey if, and it remains a significant if, this was accompanied by decisions in some other NATO states to unilaterally request that these weapons be removed from their soil. Such a development

would be likely to cause division in NATO and to exacerbate existing Turkish anxieties over the strength of NATO collective defence commitments. It could also leave Turkey exposed as the only European country with nuclear weapons on its soil. This could again place Turkey in a difficult position in its relationships with Russia and, indeed, with Iran. More widely, however, it could also weaken Turkey's attempt to seek a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East and to re-orient itself long-term to a major leadership role in the region.

It is on this last point that the risks posed by the status quo to Turkey become clear too. If US NSNW were to stay in Europe indefinitely, including in Turkey, this, along with the country's involvement in NATO's missile-defence shield, might serve Turkey's short-term security interests, but only perhaps at the expense of its long-term diplomatic leadership potential in the Middle East. This is because the retention of these weapons can be expected to draw strong criticism from Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbours.

Some of these, such as Iran and Syria, criticise Turkey's policy of hosting nuclear weapons because they see these weapons as being directed against them. Others, such as Egypt, portray the weapons as symbols of a lingering Western imperialism.³ Almost all of Turkey's neighbours, however, view its support for a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East, positioned as a way of addressing the Iranian and Israeli nuclear issues, as hypocritical in the face of Turkey's continued reliance on US extended nuclear deterrence guarantees and its continued active participation in NATO nuclear burden-sharing. This is not necessarily a problem for a country that is comfortably anchored in the West, but for one seeking to balance its ties to the West with long-term political and economic engagement and a leadership role in the Middle East, it may become much more of a costly constraint over time.

Notes and References

1. See Miller, Robertson and Schake, 'Germany Opens Pandora's Box', p. 3.
2. As Ian Lesser puts it: 'in the absence of a predictable Western security guarantee, Ankara might also consider deterrent capabilities of its own, although the prospect for this is complicated and politically risky for Turkey.' Quoted in Tertrais, 'Nuclear Proliferation in Europe: Could it Still Happen?', p. 572.
3. For a discussion of these attitudes see Kibaroglu, 'Reassessing the Role of US Nuclear Weapons in Turkey'.

IV. Conclusion

While it is clear that Turkey is not opposed to a change in NATO nuclear policy in principle, and also that it is not pursuing one in practice, it is equally clear that its practical position is nuanced and its reactions to future developments and proposals will depend on precise circumstances and the way in which they unfold.

First, claims that the withdrawal of US NSNW from Turkey might stimulate Turkey itself to develop a bomb are exaggerated, even allowing for the possibility that Iran might successfully test a nuclear device. Turkey's reaction to such a development, or indeed to any removal of US NSNW from its territory, is likely to be shaped not only by those events but by the wider concerns, interests and policy positions discussed in this paper.

A scenario in which a serious deterioration in Turkey's relationship with the US is combined with Iran's successful testing of a device is the one most likely to lead to Turkish interest in a nuclear weapon. However, even in this scenario a move to develop a Turkish bomb would require a breach with the country's official position of support for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and for the norm of non-proliferation. Voices in support of this outcome have been few and far between inside Turkey, despite the fact that there are real concerns over Iran's current nuclear trajectory.

Any effort to build a nuclear weapon by Turkey in this or any other scenario would also be likely to take a long time and be fraught with economic and political risk.¹ Turkey's current nuclear infrastructure is limited. It lacks the infrastructure required to enrich uranium or to reprocess spent nuclear fuel.² Once word of a nuclear-weapons programme became known, moreover, Turkey could also expect sanctions and increased international isolation. Even allowing for the fact that a substantial portion of the Turkish population may initially support the attempt to go nuclear, this would be likely to cause economic hardship and place great strain on the government's legitimacy and support. It may also leave Turkey a long way from Foreign Minister Davutoglu's attempt to pursue the policy of 'zero problems' with neighbours and contribute to a regional security environment that undermines rather than supports Turkey's self-interested attempt to become a central economic hub for the entire region.

Second, irrespective of the potential development of an Iranian nuclear weapon, Turkey's reaction to a US decision to withdraw its NSNW would be unlikely to rest on this issue alone, but also on how secure and supported the country felt across the range of other issues with which it is concerned.

Turkey's reaction to a unilateral withdrawal by the US of its NSNW is likely to be tempered should Turkey feel that NATO's collective defence guarantees could be relied on in a crisis; should it feel valued and trusted as a strategic partner of the US on issues like Iran; and should it feel itself to be on a fast track to European Union membership. Its reaction would likely be quite different should it feel unsupported by NATO; under pressure to become embroiled in NATO military activities in the Middle East even against its own interests; snubbed by the European Union; and facing moves by the US Congress, for example, to pass an Armenian genocide resolution.

Third, if a consensus for the withdrawal of US NSNW did emerge within NATO, Turkey would be likely to go along with it, so long as this wider political context were to its liking and so long as it could be reassured that any necessary alternative capabilities for credible deterrence would be made available. In this sense, some of Turkey's requirements for allowing US NSNW to be removed from Europe mirror those of the Central and Eastern European member states of the Alliance, though for different reasons. Rather than needing reassurance in terms of its security in relation to Russia, Turkey needs reassurance that it will be effectively supported with regard to any threats emerging from the countries it borders in the Middle East.

Fourth, while Turkey supports the consensus NATO position that Russia should be required to take steps to reciprocate any nuclear reductions implemented by NATO, it also actually wants Russian concerns around this entire issue to be handled sensitively. It may be too early to suggest that Turkey, in order to protect its relationship with Russia, would oppose a consensus in NATO in support of further reassurance measures for Central and Eastern Europe, but the time may come in the not too distant future when it could do so. It would need to be convinced that such reassurance measures would not run the risk of seriously alienating Russia. It can be expected to harbour similar concerns with regard to any future steps toward NATO enlargement for the same reason.

The optimal outcome for Turkey would therefore be one in which President Obama's attempted reset of relations with Russia bears fruit, so that a more trusting relationship emerges between NATO and Russia, allowing reduced reliance on nuclear weapons on both sides and the eventual managed and consensual removal of US NSNW from Europe. Achieved in this way, the change would arguably enhance, rather than reduce, the overall level of security in Europe, and would take place with few negative consequences for NATO cohesion and unity. It is for this reason that Turkey supports wider efforts to build a co-operative relationship between NATO and Russia, not just on nuclear issues but across other security challenges like counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and organised crime, and is also mindful of

Russian concerns over the nature of the NATO presence in the Black Sea region.³

If this goal of an improved NATO-Russian relationship could be achieved alongside a diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear crisis and a less confrontational relationship between Iran and the West, then the circle of Turkish policy could be squared.

In a scenario in which the dispute with Iran were resolved diplomatically, Turkey would be able simultaneously to maintain its close links with NATO allies, continue its support for the norm of nuclear non-proliferation, pursue its energy and economic interests in closer ties with both Russia and Iran and, over time, avoid the claims of nuclear hypocrisy that dog its current approach to the issue of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Its road to zero problems with its neighbours would not be clear, but an important set of obstacles would have been removed.

If the relationship with Iran worsens, however, then Turkey will likely feel itself threatened and in further need of practical support from NATO allies. In Turkish eyes, this would require a nuclear as well as a non-nuclear component, although the nuclear component would not necessarily need to come from the US NSNW currently stationed in Turkey.

Absent positive developments in terms of both the NATO-Russian relationship and Iran, and perhaps even still in the face of them, Turkey is likely to adhere to its current cautious position, emphasising deterrence, including nuclear deterrence, NATO's collective-defence guarantees, and Alliance cohesion as the bedrock of its security policy. Its simultaneous support for current NATO nuclear policy, for a nuclear-weapon-free world, and for a WMD-Free Middle East will remain un-reconciled.

Notes and References

1. For a discussion of this see Mustafa Kibaroglu, 'The Nuclearization of the Middle East and Turkey's Possible Response', EDAM Discussion Paper Series, 2012/5. See also Udum, 'Turkey's Nuclear Comeback', p. 373.
2. See Ulgen, 'Turkey and the Bomb', p. 1.
3. See Beata Górká-Winter and Marek Madej (eds), 'NATO Member States and the New Strategic Concept: An Overview', Polish Institute of International Affairs, May 2010, p. 110.

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