Institutionalised and forward-looking security and defence cooperation during the war and interim period are critical security guarantees for Ukraine. Kateryna Anisova writes that the G7-EU-coalition-of-willing nexus can assure a comprehensive and mutually reinforcing approach for bolstering Ukraine’s capabilities and integrating it into the Euro-Atlantic security system before the war ends.
Current security guarantees for Ukraine range from unavailable to ineffective, writes Sascha Ostanina. She proposes a middle-ground solution to provide collective security for Ukraine through a binding self-defence agreement between the EU and Ukraine. Such an agreement would provide Ukraine with access to weapons and ammunition in the event of Russian aggression.
To avoid making post-war Ukraine’s public sentiments grow anti-Western or isolationist, Denys Karlovskyi writes that NATO must build a mutually beneficial framework of security cooperation with Ukraine’s government and maintain the current level of Ukrainian public support for NATO and the EU. One way of achieving this is for NATO member states to engage with the Ukrainian public in a way that is on par with the government.
Our networks are at the heart of our policy impact. Reaching right across Europe they bring together established figures with emerging leaders who are all committed to better security for Europe.
Over 250 influential figures from 50 countries, including China, Russia, and the US, warn that nuclear arms control cannot fall victim to geopolitical competition
Statement by the Euro-Atlantic Security Leadership Group (EASLG): Advancing Global Nuclear “Fail-Safe”
Former and serving senior officials, military leaders, and experts from across the Euro-Atlantic region call on all nuclear arms states to reduce the risk of nuclear blunder, and to cooperate to eliminate nuclear risks and threats.
As the CTBT’s 25th anniversary year comes to a close, CTBTO Executive Secretary Dr Robert Floyd and a diverse set of leaders from the Treaty’s most recent ratifying states send a powerful message on the CTBT’s relevance and resilience in today’s world.
Pragmatic steps forward: How to protect the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and get the review cycle on the right track
To prevent a further erosion of the effectiveness and efficiency of the current review cycle of the NPT, there is an urgent need for action. Michael Biontino looks at what pragmatic proposals could be taken up from the 2023 PrepCom Chair’s recommendations and the working paper from the Chair of the working group on further strengthening the review process of the NPT.
To better understand emerging technologies, NEVER members Konrad, Anemone, Emil, Arthur, and Joel outline the evolution of the risk landscape around emerging disruptive technologies and draw parallels between the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and those posed by novel biotechnologies. They explore the broader challenge of governing emerging technologies and suggest potential ways forward.
Listen to the first episode of the NEVER podcast – Ok, Doomer! In this episode, we explore the basics of man-made existential risk, featuring an introduction to the topic, its relationship to great power competition, how governments have dealt with potential existential risks such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, and how they should respond to them in future.
Policy briefs & reports
The nuclear-weapons states China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are increasingly recognising the implications of integrating AI into nuclear weapons command, control, and communication systems. Exploring the risks inherent to today’s advanced AI systems, this report sheds light on characteristics and risks across different branches of this technology and establishes the basis for a general purpose risk assessment framework.
Chinese thinking on AI integration and interaction with nuclear command and control, force structure, and decision-making
Fei Su and Jingdong Yuan analyse Chinese-language literature to present Chinese perspectives on AI and its military applications. The paper offers recommendations to mitigate the risks associated with the military use of AI in nuclear C2 systems, particularly focusing on the steps that China could consider to enhance its practices.
Russian thinking on AI integration and interaction with nuclear command and control, force structure, and decision-making
Oleg Shakirov analyses Russian-language literature on the Russian debate on AI and the nuclear field and offers recommendations for P5 states to advance dialogue on AI integration into nuclear C2, force structure and decision-making.