Following the public release of previously classified Russia documents on nuclear deterrence, Dmitry Stefanovich explores the growing concerns over cyber threats and the potential opportunities for the P5.
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There is an opportunity for the Euro-Atlantic community to constructively engage with Iran and its neighbours in the wake of the COVID crisis. Although Iran’s HOPE initiative advances an intra-regional format, it may be insufficient in terms of the scope of military contacts and information exchange.
The ELN and King’s College London publish policy recommendations for the P5 process in the run-up to the next Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.
Sherri Goodman and Katarina Kertysova explore the growing risks of nuclear incidents in the Russian Arctic and propose concrete transparency and confidence-building measures to limit them.
Nuclear risk reduction could be a feasible area to show progress during the next NPT Review Conference.
The EU’s eastern neighbourhood demands a coherent approach. The Eastern Partnership fails to deliver.
The next phase of the EU’s Eastern Partnership will be launched this week. The approach set out so far fails to deliver – at this week’s summit, leaders should address the gaps.
The COVID-19 global health and economic crises have exposed fundamental flaws and weaknesses in the institutions dealing with international peace and security – and the absence of effective political leadership to correct them.
As the IAEA Board of Governors discuss Iran during their June 2020 convening, Sahil Shah argues that the E3 – the UK, France, and Germany – should reinvoke bold action seen in the early 2000s.
Carrying out a “nuclear warning” – a non-repeatable strike intended to restore deterrence in case an adversary miscalculates – means the failure of deterrence. The very real consequence is escalation to a nuclear exchange.