Sir, Two years ago in a letter to The Times (Dec 8, 2020) we drew to your attention recommendations from more than 100 high-level Russian, US and European experts for our governments on reducing Russia-Nato risks (letter, Dec 8, 2020). Had those recommendations been acted upon we might now be...
As nuclear deterrence receives renewed attention, Ward Wilson reconsiders what we know about nuclear deterrence, examines what we don’t know, and thinks about what work still needs to be done. Wilson argues that greater emphasis needs to be put on psychology and neuroscience, examining past failures more closely, and comparing criminal deterrence and nuclear deterrence.
The AUKUS deal has generated a broad debate over its possible non-proliferation implications, with much discourse focusing on Iran. Ludovica Castelli writes that we should not measure the impact of AUKUS simply by whether other would-be proliferators exploit the precedent it has set but by the bigger questions it raises about the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.
It is simply unrealistic of Biden’s critics to think the US can obtain a “better deal” in which Iran makes sweeping concessions without gaining anything in return. But if the JCPOA is restored, new channels will open for multilateral diplomacy with Iran, write Esfandyar Batmanghelidj and Sahil Shah
Rapid technological change and a return to nuclear great-power competition suggest that the contours and central dynamics of our nuclear world are in flux. Andrew Futter writes that this shift requires a frank debate about the role of UK nuclear weapons and where they fit in the future of UK security policy.
This report looks at how the complex interactions of emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) could impact nuclear decision-making, particularly in an escalating regional conventional conflict. In some scenarios, EDTs could exacerbate nuclear escalation, while in other circumstances they could encourage nuclear restraint.