




ELN

EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP NETWORK



POLICY BRIEF

European Security Programme

August 2012

No. 4

NATO, Russia, and the Nuclear Disarmament Agenda

Reflections Post Chicago

Des Browne and Ian Kearns

Contents

I. The Context for the Chicago Summit	2
II. The DDPR in the Big Picture	3
III. Future Policy: NATO-Russia Relations	5
IV. NATO Nuclear Policy	7
V. A Message to the Central and Eastern European Members of NATO	8
VI. Conclusion	10

About the Authors

Lord Des Browne of Ladyton is Chair of the ELN Executive Board and former UK Secretary of State for Defence

Ian Kearns is Chief Executive of the European Leadership Network

Summary

This ELN Policy Brief focuses on the big picture within which both the Chicago Summit and the NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR) took place. It examines the adequacy of the outcomes of both and offers a renewed call for NATO to contribute to nuclear disarmament efforts by changing both its nuclear policy and posture. In this wider context, it further suggests the need for some re-thinking of nuclear policy positions among central and eastern European allies in NATO and offers thoughts on how we can work together to improve the NATO-Russia relationship to the benefit of both and of the nuclear disarmament agenda as a whole.

The paper is organised into 6 main sections. Section 1 outlines the context within which the Chicago Summit took place and the issues uppermost in leaders' minds at the time. Section II describes the wider strategic landscape within which the DDPR was conducted and sketches a framework of issues and challenges that it was

reasonable to expect the DDPR to address. The paper then moves on, in sections III and IV to set out our view on NATO's responsibility to lead by taking new steps both in relation to the alliance's own nuclear policy and in relation to the NATO-Russia relationship. It recognises that nothing can happen unless Russia is a willing and constructive partner but argues nonetheless, that NATO still has much to do to fulfil its own responsibilities. In section V, we go on to make arguments as to why some central and Eastern European allies in NATO may be under-estimating the importance of the nuclear question to their own core national security interests and why they may need, as a consequence, to modify their position both in general terms and in the NATO-Russia debate, in their own interests. Finally, in the conclusion to the paper, we take issue with NATO's claim that its policy today is one of maintaining the status quo in nuclear posture terms. NATO is in fact pursuing an enhanced nuclear capability in Europe that can neither be afforded nor makes strategic sense in current or likely future circumstances.¹

I. The Context for the Chicago Summit

To turn to the first of these areas, namely the context of the Chicago Summit, there were at least three very important issues on the table when NATO leaders met in that city on 20-21 May 2012.

The first was the process and timeline for withdrawal from Afghanistan and the financial and other contributions that NATO member states could offer to help stabilise the situation in that country, post 2014. As seemed likely before the Summit, this was the issue that got the headlines during and after it, and for understandable reasons, since it was vital that the Alliance agree a coherent and joined up approach to ending combat operations. Only time will now tell whether the summit achieved a genuine long term NATO commitment to the people of Afghanistan through 2014, and beyond.

The second issue on the agenda was that of burden-sharing within NATO and the European contribution to Alliance resources in particular.

Bob Gates, in a speech in Brussels in June 2011, told Europe in no uncertain terms that its current level of contribution to the Alliance is not good enough. Anyone who has been to Washington recently, as we have, knows that his warnings are not hollow and that the reputation of European allies on Capitol Hill is not good, to say the least.

¹ This paper draws on a series of speeches delivered by Des Browne in the period March-June 2012. The venues for these speeches were the Russian Council on International Affairs, Moscow; A Geneva Centre for Security Policy Workshop at NATO HQ in Brussels; A panel discussion organised by the Council for International Relations, Prague; and a speech made in the UK Parliament in London. The paper also draws on a question to Her Majesty's Government regarding an assessment of the outcome of the NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, 29 May 2012, House of Lords Debate, available at: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldhansrd/text/120529-0001.htm#12052948000327>

To address the challenge, the European allies will have to pursue the most efficient and cost effective use of resources possible through more joint defence projects, increased regional cooperation, and the pooling and sharing of assets. This is now essential to the provision of adequate and credible conventional forces to underpin NATO's collective deterrence and defence strategy moving forward.

Defence cuts and the crisis in the Euro-zone will inevitably affect this picture however, and our fear is still that without an effective response from Europe, support for the Alliance among the American political class will erode and NATO itself will either face a loss of credibility or an unwelcome need to scale back its level of ambition. These outcomes must be avoided. Europe's political leaders must respond post-Chicago with actions to match their 'smart defence' rhetoric, both in their own interests and in the interests of their publics and the Alliance as a whole.

The third issue on the table in Chicago, and one that could have simultaneously helped the Alliance to address these challenges while meeting new threats more effectively, including the growing threat emanating from nuclear weapons, was the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR). Despite its low profile in the public debate, we choose to focus much of the rest of our paper on it here because in our view its outcomes were, and potentially still are, central to future security not only on the continent of Europe, but even more widely.

II. The DDPR in the Big Picture

The first point in our case is that the DDPR had a significance well beyond the issues that dominated the limited public debate around it.

Much of this debate focused on the issue of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe and on the need to re-assure allies in Central and Eastern Europe if these weapons were removed. We understand this focus and concern, and indeed the European Leadership Network (ELN) has done much to encourage debate and research around it. It is a mistake, however, to think about the DDPR only from this vantage point.

The DDPR in fact represented a major opportunity to make a comprehensive, coherent and balanced assessment of the mix of capabilities required by the Alliance in the years ahead, be they nuclear, conventional and/or missile defence. It offered an opportunity to think through the linkages between these capabilities and to spell out the potential contribution that arms control and disarmament could make to reducing nuclear risks in Europe while improving the security environment on the continent as a whole. It also offered an opportunity to move the relationship with Russia into a new phase.

The review moreover, was conducted against the multiple backdrops of substantial cuts in defence expenditure across the Alliance, a period of more troubled relations with Russia, and of lessons to be learned from operations in Libya. To be of any value, it needed to reflect on and respond to these

developments – and provide a strategy to strengthen NATO's overall defence capabilities against 21st Century threats.

With regard to the NATO-Russia relationship, despite two decades of statements to the effect that the Cold War is over and a new era NATO-Russian cooperation is now upon us, the truth is that the recent problems in our mutual relations are a product of deep remaining mistrust. This mistrust is contaminating the debate on NATO-Russia missile defence cooperation, non-strategic nuclear weapons, the conventional force balance in Europe and also on the so called frozen conflicts in the Caucasus. The recent disagreements over how to respond to change in the Middle East, in particular over Syria, are also now making cooperation between us more difficult.

We surely have to ask in this environment: where will this mistrust lead us? Do we want to let our mutual relations continue like this indefinitely or even allow them to deteriorate further? Do we want to allow mistrust to persist to the point where it turns some future disagreement into a real and profoundly dangerous crisis between NATO and Russia? We think, and hope not.

NATO's DDPR could not, of course, totally transform this relationship, but it could and should have made a significant contribution to that transformation a priority.

Even more broadly, we would point out that contrary to what some people might think, the DDPR took place in the context of growing, not reduced, nuclear risks. To name just a few of the issues of concern:

- Two decades after the Cold War ended, a significant number of US and Russian nuclear weapons still remain on very high states of alert, ready to be launched at a few minutes' notice, leaving decision-makers too little time to react to crises or to make decisions on nuclear weapons use.
- China, India and Israel, are seeking to build effective, land, sea and air launched nuclear triads of their own.
- India and Pakistan, two countries that have fought three wars and one major skirmish with each other in recent decades, are both increasing their nuclear forces and building new plutonium production reactors.²
- We are not far from the possibility of further proliferation to Iran, with the risk of a proliferation cascade across the Middle East.
- Intelligence reports suggest that terrorists are seeking nuclear weapons or weapons-usable material and there is evidence that some

² For a review of the force development and modernisation programmes in the nuclear armed states see, Ian Kearns, Beyond the UK: Trends in the Other Nuclear Armed States, November 2011, available at: <http://www.basicint.org/sites/default/files/commission-briefing1.pdf>.

states, like North Korea, are happy to indulge in the kind of illicit trade in nuclear materials that might help them to succeed.

In our view, the nuclear order that is emerging, of smaller global nuclear weapon stockpiles overall but of weapons distributed across more states in more unstable regions, has the potential to be less stable than the Cold War and is more likely, as a consequence, to see nuclear weapons used. This surely is something that has to be avoided and is a crucial part of the context within which the DDPR took place.

It is worth remembering also, when considering the big picture context of the DDPR, that in Lisbon in 2010 NATO leaders committed themselves to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. Despite what some allies might want, leaders cannot simply make this statement and then ignore it when making their own nuclear policy.

As Oliver Meier recently pointed out in a piece on the European Leadership Network Chicago Forum, ‘the members of NATO include three of the five NPT nuclear weapon states and eight of the 14 states that have nuclear weapons on their territory. NATO is also the only military alliance that practices “nuclear sharing” among its members.’³

Our message in this context is that the Alliance has a responsibility to be the change it wants to see in the world, not just to advocate for that change on the part of others, and the DDPR was a prime opportunity to demonstrate commitment to change in the European and global nuclear orders.

III. Future Policy: NATO-Russia Relations

On a conference panel with President Medvedev in Moscow on 23 March 2012, one of the authors of this Policy Brief (Des Browne) called for a number of measures to improve NATO-Russian relations. We briefly reiterate those measures here, to illustrate the course that we think is now necessary if we are to move beyond the unsatisfactory status-quo.

First, on missile defence, the immediate practical priority as the recent EASI Working Group paper on missile defence argued⁴, is to create joint NATO-Russia cooperation centres for pooling and sharing data from satellites and radar, in real-time, to build confidence and provide common notification about any missile attack. Joint command-staff exercises should also be resumed and expanded to include defence against medium and intermediate range missiles. This cooperation should be built on the principle of national sovereignty and each party, while cooperating, should protect its own territory.

³ Oliver Meier, In Chicago, NATO should do a Sarkozy, 16 April 2012, available at: http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/in-chicago-nato-should-do-a-sarkozy_358.html.

⁴ EASI Working Group, Missile Defense: Toward a New Paradigm, February 2012, available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/WGP_MissileDefense_FINAL.pdf.

To break the log-jam and get this cooperation moving however, we believe the United States and its NATO allies should be willing to specify the maximum number of interceptors that are to be deployed in Phase IV of the Phased Adaptive approach of NATO's planned BMD system. Such a number would have to be subject to 4 or 5 yearly strategic review against the changing missile threat environment but giving a number now ought to be possible, and it would be a valuable trust-building measure. We believe if the positions in this debate were reversed, NATO would request such a number from Russia and it ought therefore to provide one itself.

Second, we believe the U.S. and Russian presidents should task each of their military leaderships to find ways to increase transparency, and warning and decision times for political and military leaders, so that no nation in the Euro-Atlantic area fears a short warning nuclear or conventional attack or perceives the need to deter or defend against such an attack with non-strategic nuclear weapons. Two decades after the Cold War ended this remains crucial for European security as a whole.

Third, amid persistent criticism in some quarters, we need to publicly defend, protect and continue to ensure full implementation of the New START Treaty, the verification regime of which builds confidence and stability in an important area of the US-Russian bilateral relationship at an important time.⁵ This agreement is the nearest thing we have to a security anchor for the relationship and we should ensure its continued existence and well-being. Any break-down in implementation or withdrawal from the Treaty by either side would immediately replace hard information about nuclear deployments with a vacuum that could only add to mistrust.

Fourth, we urge everyone to also balance the areas of controversy between NATO and Russia with growing cooperation across a wider front of issues such as trade, energy, sustainable exploitation of the Arctic, counter-terrorism, stabilising Afghanistan, and more. We have many interests in common and many future opportunities that we can work together to exploit.

Change in, and a more constructive approach from, Russia will of course be vital if any progress is to be made and in particular we would urge an end to the kind of provocative speech-making offered by the Chief of the Russian General Staff, General Nikolai Makarov, in Helsinki recently.⁶ Nonetheless, NATO cannot hide behind occasionally unwelcome Russian behaviour: it must be unambiguous about its own preferred direction of travel and do all it can to remove the excuses for inaction on the Russian side while a cooperative future relationship between NATO and Russia is still a possibility.

⁵ For a detailed discussion of the Treaty's central provisions, verification regime and implementation to date, together with an examination of its underlying value and of the controversy surrounding it, see Stela Petrova, New START: A Net Assessment, ELN European Security Policy Brief No.3, available at: http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/new-start-a-net-assessment_419.html

⁶ See Russian General Warns Finland About NATO, in Helsingin Sanomat, International Edition, available at: <http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Russian+general+warns+Finland+about+NATO/1329104270495>

IV. NATO Nuclear Policy

Turning to NATO's own nuclear policy and posture, we still believe a number of specific steps need to be taken here too.

First, to make a positive contribution to disarmament, NATO leaders must not only re-commit to what they signed up to in Lisbon, namely the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – including through further reductions, but must also get far more specific about what is required and what NATO will do to help deliver the conditions necessary. At the moment, NATO's commitment in this area is unsupported by a plan of diplomatic action and this is a gap that needs to be filled.

Second, alliance leaders must act to change NATO's declaratory policy to state that the fundamental purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack. We welcome the bringing of the NATO position into line with the declaratory policies of the states principally providing NATO nuclear capability (namely the US and the UK) that took place in Chicago, but more still needs to be done.

This is not merely about language. As Carlo Trezza recently pointed out, declaratory policy leads to targeting policy and planning, and this in turn underpins the numbers of nuclear weapons deemed necessary.⁷

Third, NATO leaders should announce an immediate reduction of 50 per cent in the total number of US non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Europe, implemented as a 50 per cent cut in the number of weapons held in each individual country currently hosting them. This step would be a concrete contribution to nuclear risk reduction in Europe while doing nothing to undermine the principle of nuclear burden or risk sharing among alliance members.

Fourth, beyond the 50% cut, leaders should express a desire to see a further reduction and consolidation of NATO non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, leading to their eventual elimination or full consolidation to the United States within 5 years. This should be done through a process of reciprocal steps taken by both NATO and Russia, with the final timing and pace of this action being determined by broad political and security developments between NATO and Russia, including but not limited to developments in Russia's tactical nuclear posture.⁸

Fifth, NATO leaders should give greater prominence to the contribution of arms control and disarmament in NATO security policy more generally, by making the Weapons of Mass Destruction Control and Disarmament

⁷ Carlo Trezza, NATO Must Change Declaratory Policy in Chicago, 03 May 2012, available at: http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/nato-must-change-declaratory-policy-in-chicago_375.html.

⁸ At least one serving Foreign Minister in the central and east European region has, for example, suggested to us privately that a change in Russia's position in relation to the frozen conflicts in the Caucasus could count as a reciprocal move for any change in NATO's current position on non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Europe.

Committee in NATO permanent and by using it for internal Alliance consultations on arms control and disarmament issues that have the potential to enhance alliance security overall.

Alongside these actions, we acknowledge that steps must be taken to re-assure some allies in NATO with regard to the Article V commitment. This means continuing efforts to upgrade contingency plans for defensive operations in NATO territory, including but not limited to the territory of central and Eastern Europe. It means focusing not just on major attack scenarios but also on what might be termed more ambiguous attempts at intimidation of some NATO members. Broadening reassurance measures through missile defence cooperation and preparations to deal with cyber-challenges is also important.

We strongly support the statement published by 45 European Leaders shortly before the Chicago summit calling for NATO's political leadership to implement all of these actions.⁹

Challenges remain, of course, particularly in relation to how to balance the re-assurance of central and eastern Europe with the need to engage rather than alienate Russia but we would argue that if re-assurance measures inside NATO are accompanied by the nuclear reductions and increased transparency and warning and decision time measures called for above, then it should be possible to square this circle, provided Russia is willing and able to act as a partner.

V. A Message to the Central and Eastern European Members of NATO

There are also some grounds on which to ask our allies in central and Eastern Europe to re-think their own positions in this debate.

Despite understandable concern in some countries in the region and in the Baltic States in particular with regard to Russia and its behaviour, the levels of tension on the continent of Europe today are not high in historical terms. Compared to the years of the Cold War, when some parts of today's NATO were under Soviet occupation or enforced membership of the Warsaw Pact, the current political conflicts and disagreements with Russia are far less serious. This is an important point of context.

We note that despite bitter historical experience and remaining concerns, this must be the view shared by many governments in the region itself, since according to the latest data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and NATO, none of the NATO member states

⁹ 'NATO's Leadership Challenge at the Chicago Summit', 18 May 2012, ELN Statement, www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/medialibrary/2012/05/17/4252b4f9/ELN%20Chicago%20Statement_English.pdf

located in central and Eastern Europe are meeting the goal of 2% expenditure on defence.¹⁰

Lithuania spends only 0.8% of GDP on defence, Latvia and Hungary 1%, the Czech Republic and Slovakia 1.1% each, Estonia 1.7%.¹¹ In all of these countries moreover, levels of defence expenditure have been going down each year since 2009. This does not seem to us, even allowing for the period of austerity and the harsh history of the region, to be the behaviour of countries living in genuine fear of attack. Only in Poland, where defence expenditure currently represents 1.9% of GDP, has defence expenditure been increasing in recent years as a percentage of national income. This is a positive step that we welcome, but we know from our interactions with colleagues in Warsaw that this is not driven by fear of imminent or even likely Russian aggression.

We dwell on these points as a way of saying this: If NATO as a whole can provide reassurance measures to central and eastern European members then these members in turn should have nothing to fear from a change in NATO nuclear posture and from the withdrawal of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe in particular.

And one further point is, we believe, of deep significance. The President of the United States has been warning of the world's increasing nuclear dangers since before he took office and has been working hard since to mobilise the world to take the global nuclear threat more seriously. Despite this, there is still a view in some parts of central and Eastern Europe that nuclear issues, beyond Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons, are not much of a priority.

We agree that there is an urgent need for increased transparency on Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons and for reciprocal Russian action in response to any moves made by NATO. But we also think that by limiting mainstream political interest largely to this Russian dimension of the nuclear problem, the states of central and Eastern Europe are making themselves vulnerable where it really matters, namely in their relationship with the United States.

To understand what might be at stake, consider the implications for European NATO allies of a nuclear terrorist attack on the U.S. If the experience of the response to 9/11 is anything to go by, and depending on

¹⁰ For more information on military spending of Central and Eastern European states please refer to: Military Expenditure in Europe by Subregion, 1988-2011, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, available at: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/regional/milex_europe ; and 'Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence', April 2012, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2012_04/20120413_PR_CP_2012_047_rev1.pdf.

¹¹ 'Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence', April 2012, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2012_04/20120413_PR_CP_2012_047_rev1.pdf.

what the source of any attack was thought to be, such an incident would almost certainly be followed by military operations outside the NATO area, by significant US demands for European allies' to contribute to such operations, and by a wide-ranging and politically heated debate inside the United States and elsewhere, on why more had not been done prior to the attack to address the nuclear problem.

We readily acknowledge, of course, that many allies in central and eastern Europe have made major and vital contributions to NATO operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, but some in the region, it seems clear, are both failing to invest in the kinds of conventional capabilities that may be essential in this situation, and at the same time are being less than welcoming, in practice if not in rhetoric, of President Obama's attempts to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons for security.

This, we would argue, is to take political risks with the most centrally important relationship to the re-assurance of central and Eastern Europe, namely that with the United States. Indeed, to manage those risks, a wider central and East European investment not only in defence but also in addressing the world's nuclear dangers would appear to be a sound, self-interested investment in the solidity and cohesion of the transatlantic alliance upon which the region so heavily depends.

This is also the backdrop against which NATO is currently considering maintaining and indeed, upgrading, around 200 ageing B-61 nuclear weapons in Europe, despite the fact that no military commander can be found anywhere who would actually reach for them, in any scenario, and despite the fact that the money required to modernise both the weapons and associated aircraft is unlikely to be forthcoming. It is also the context in which many countries in central and Eastern Europe have been clinging to the NATO status quo on nuclear policy and posture, a policy and posture that we believe it is time to re-think.

VI. Conclusion

Unfortunately, the outcome of the Chicago Summit and the DDPR did not rise to the challenges of the times as we have described them. The DDPR was, and is, an indecisive document. In the words of our United States colleague, Sam Nunn, a US senator for 24 years and former chairman of the powerful US Senate Armed Services Committee: "The Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR) has made little progress in defining a clear strategy for changing the nuclear status quo and deserves, at best, a grade of 'incomplete'".¹²

¹² 'Statement by Sam Nunn on NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture Review', 21 May 2012, <http://www.nti.org/newsroom/news/statement-former-senator-sam-nunn-natos-deterrence-and-defense-posture-review/>.

The DDR in fact, simply avoided the challenge of resolving differences among the allies on the future role of nuclear weapons in NATO and instead opted for the maintenance of a position close to, though not in fact, the status quo. Apart from acknowledging the recently modified “independent and unilateral negative security assurances offered by the United States, the United Kingdom and”, to some extent, France, the DDR broke little new ground on NATO’s declaratory policy and nuclear posture.¹³

More disappointingly it made no tangible progress on the issue US non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. The DDR stated instead that: “The review has shown that the Alliance’s nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defence posture”.¹⁴ However, as is increasingly widely known, the US is actually planning to modernise and enhance its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, not simply to maintain the current capability.¹⁵ The associated B61 Life Extension Program, arrived at through a national decision by the United States, is also inexplicably being pursued independently of serious consultation within NATO. Since some of the B61 bombs are based in Europe and some of the aging European dual capable aircraft used to carry them to target also need renewal, this is a move that comes at a significant financial cost to many European allies in a time of financial austerity, and in the absence of a demonstrated commitment by those allies to carry their share of the financial burden of existing commitments, let alone new ones.

More worryingly still, the decision to upgrade these weapons will prove to be a welcome excuse for Russia to continue investing in the upkeep of its own tactical nuclear arsenal, playing directly into the hands of hardliners in the Russian Federation who refuse to discuss reductions in Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons unless the US withdraws its own arsenal from Europe.

The DDR has therefore done little to help create the conditions necessary for a world without nuclear weapons despite NATO committing itself to pursuit of this goal at the 2010 Summit in Lisbon. Instead, and notwithstanding the practical steps that could have been taken and that we have set out in this document, we are asked to accept only the promise, of NATO considering “further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear

¹³ NATO on Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, 21 May 2012, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, available at:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm?mode=pressrelease.

¹⁴ NATO on Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, 21 May 2012, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, available at:

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm?mode=pressrelease.

¹⁵ Ted Seay, ‘Escalation by Default? The Future of NATO Nuclear Weapons in Europe’, 10 May 2012,

<<http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/medialibrary/2012/05/10/e074ba2d/ELN%20ATO%20Policy%20Brief%202%20-%20Escalation%20by%20Default.pdf>>.

weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia".¹⁶

As we noted at the outset, the DDPR was a major opportunity to make a comprehensive, coherent and balanced assessment of the mix of capabilities required by the Alliance in the years ahead and, importantly, it was an opportunity to spell out the potential contribution that arms control and disarmament could make to reducing nuclear risks in Europe and more widely. It did neither of these things. As a result, we believe NATO has missed a crucial opportunity for change, for overcoming Cold War thinking, for clarifying its role as a security organisation in the 21st century, and for enhancing overall European security.

Perhaps it is no surprise in these circumstances that, in his post-Chicago summit parliamentary Statement, the Prime Minister of our own country, David Cameron, neglected even to mention the DDPR. This is despite the fact that the issues covered by the review and the decisions made could shape the alliance's defence and deterrence posture for a decade or more and may well have a major impact on the NATO relationship with Russia.

It is to be hoped, in the context of the current over-powering focus across Europe on the economic crisis, that we do not collectively sleep-walk into a new Cold War on the back of this kind of negligence.

About the ELN

The European Leadership Network (ELN) is a non-partisan, non-profit organisation registered in the United Kingdom. It works to advance education in, and to promote greater understanding of, multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and related issues. It does this in particular by producing and disseminating independent research and analysis, and by providing an independent platform for international dialogue and debate on such issues. In conducting its work, the ELN draws on a network of senior European political, military and diplomatic figures for input, and has developed long-term strategic partnerships with some of Europe's other leading security, defence and foreign policy think-tanks. This combination is designed to ensure that the ELN draws on a wide range of European perspectives.

www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org

¹⁶ See NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, 21 May 2012, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, available at:
<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm?mode=pressrelease>.