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Overcoming disunity: Reinvigorating the P5 Process a decade on

GLOBAL SECURITY REPORT

Maximilian Hoell and Andreas Persbo

July 2020

The European Leadership Network (ELN) is an independent, non-partisan, pan-European NGO with a network of nearly 200 past, present and future European leaders working to provide practical real-world solutions to political and security challenges.

About the author

Dr Maximilian Hoell is a Policy Fellow at the European Leadership Network (ELN). He works on issues pertaining to nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation as well as transatlantic security. Alongside his work for the ELN, Max teaches political science at Paris Dauphine University. His previous experience includes stints at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the German Federal Foreign Office. Max earned a PhD in International Relations from University College London. He also studied at the Universities of Oxford, Yale and Montpellier, the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) as well as the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Andreas Persbo is the Research Director at the European Leadership Network. His research responsibilities at the Network covers the full spectrum of European security matters. His specific interests are West-Russia relations, NATO, as well as ways to regulate and control the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction. Before joining the ELN, Andreas served as the Executive Director of the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (2009-2019), where he'd previously served as a research and senior researcher (2004-2009) with a regional focus on Iran and South Asia. He was one of the founding members of the UK-Norway Initiative on Verified Warhead Dismantlement.

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European Leadership Network (ELN)
100 Black Prince Road
London, UK, SE1 7SJ

@theELN

europeanleadershipnetwork.org

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Preface



Des Browne
Lord Browne of
Ladyton

“[This report] is the product of a ten-month-long effort by the European Leadership Network (ELN) to explore common ground among the five nuclear-weapon states (NWS) parties to the NPT.”

As the P5 Process enters its eleventh year and as a prelude to the tenth review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), I am delighted to present this report. It is the product of a ten-month-long effort by the European Leadership Network (ELN), to explore common ground among the five nuclear-weapon states (NWS) parties to the NPT. Over ten months, ELN researchers conducted interviews with more than 60 officials and experts from all five NWS and some non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). On 12 February, they participated in the 2020 London P5 conference at Lancaster House and hosted, with King’s College London, Track 2 and 1.5 workshops to probe some of the recommendations presented in this study.

In 2008, as UK Defence Secretary, at the Conference on Disarmament, I was the first to suggest the idea of the institution of a process for the NWS to discuss their common NPT obligations. Since then, observers have described the process as ‘secretive’ or ‘opaque’. I have referred to it as ‘a cartel’ because, like many NNWS parties to the NPT, I have become disappointed with the lack of progress towards multilateral nuclear disarmament. In the run-up to the tenth review conference, a significant number of NNWS parties to the NPT have institutionalised their dissatisfaction with the perceived slow pace of progress in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Over the last decade, the NWS have agreed common definitions of key terminology, consultations on their respective nuclear doctrines have helped them to manage strategic security and, in particular during the United Kingdom’s 2019-2020 tenure as coordinator, they have increased the transparency of their deliberations through reporting and engaging with some NNWS and civil society representatives. But, at this critical time, as this report shows, there remains scope for further action.

“The most comprehensive public report on the P5 Process to date, it delivers useful insights for security professionals, researchers and the interested public.”

This study offers useful information about the history, background, inception and trajectory of the process, while examining the dynamics within the grouping that govern the pace of progress. It contains a set of practical recommendations which, if adopted, could facilitate meaningful progress on issues of importance to most of the NPT membership. The most comprehensive public report on the P5 Process to date, it delivers useful insights for security professionals, researchers and the interested public.

This research would not have been possible without generous support from the MacArthur Foundation. On behalf of the ELN, I thank them. Nor would it have been possible without the willingness of officials to set aside time to engage with ELN researchers in a frank and thought-provoking way. These conversations were invaluable. I am grateful to all who participated in them.

1. Introduction

The tenth review conference of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was scheduled to begin on 27 April 2020.ⁱ However, it has been postponed until (at least) January 2021 in response to the unprecedented global health crisis caused by COVID-19.

This year marked the 50th anniversary of the NPT. The celebratory spirit, however, was tempered by continuing tension over the treaty's efficacy in producing desired results. The 2015 Review Conference (RevCon) disagreed on the timeline for discussions on a proposed weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East, and so failed to produce a final document. However, there were also other issues contributing to the discord five years ago, including a feeling that there was not enough attention given to nuclear weapons issues.

In 2016, United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution 71/258 decided to convene a 'conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination'¹. Negotiated over a short time, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) opened up for signature on 20 September 2017.² By late July 2020, 40 states had deposited instruments

“There is a possibility, the pandemic notwithstanding, that the TPNW could achieve its 50th ratification, and so enter into force, sometime in 2021.”

of ratification or accession. There is a possibility, the pandemic notwithstanding, that the treaty could achieve its 50th ratification, and so enter into force, sometime in 2021. If this happens, the first meeting of state parties to this new treaty will align with the tenth RevCon of the NPT.

The negotiation and adoption of the TPNW can, and likely should, be viewed as an expression of frustration, predominantly by the Global South, with what they perceive as a slow pace of disarmament efforts overall. Opponents of the ban treaty tend to argue that it does not create any incentives for change and that instead it harms efforts towards nuclear disarmament, by creating and reinforcing further division.

ⁱThe authors would like to thank Dr Lewis Dunn and several P5 officials for very helpful suggestions on an earlier draft of this report, and Marc Friedli for assisting with the compilation of the appendix.

Most states possessing nuclear weapons profess to subscribe to abolitionist aspirations, but usually without specifying a timeframe for abolition, and often stating conditionalities. One of these is that the present international environment does not facilitate deep reductions. Initiatives such as the 'Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND)'³, consequently, have been promoted to identify what changes are required to facilitate nuclear disarmament and, while we await that future, explore what steps can be taken to reduce nuclear risk in the present.

Despite this, the risk remains that a significant proportion of the NPT membership will express dissatisfaction with the pace of nuclear disarmament overall, and scepticism over the steps advocated by the nuclear possessor states and their allies. An atmosphere of distrust and suspicion threatens not only to complicate the review of the treaty but may in the longer perspective also complicate its operation. It is therefore imperative that the nuclear possessor states take concrete and visible action, reinforcing their good faith efforts to achieve their long-term disarmament goals.

There is no one measure that is likely to achieve this goal in isolation. Instead, several separate and mutually reinforcing activities may together produce the desired results. The CEND will build a knowledge base on long-term measures applicable within

bi- and multilateral settings and may help develop international acceptance on both the scope of actions as well as their implementation timeline. Initiatives such as the International Partnership on Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), an off-shoot of bilateral efforts such as the UK-Norway Initiative, will help marshal technical and scientific resources applicable to disarmament verification and monitoring. Finally, initiatives such as the P5 Process may help the nuclear-weapon states develop practical on-the-ground stop-gap measures while multilateral efforts progress.

It would appear that the international community has—by coincidence—adopted a concentric approach to nuclear disarmament. At its core lie the bilateral relationships, and principally that between the United States and the Russian Federation. Progress here is not a strict condition for progress elsewhere, but one can presume a strong correlation between movement in the bilateral sphere (through, for instance, successful implementation of present and successive Strategic Arms Reduction treaties) and the multilateral domain.

Outside the bilateral relationship resides the relationship between the nuclear possessor states inside the NPT. Together, they hold the vast majority of weapons worldwide, combined with considerable conventional military strength. Increasing international competition and, in particular, the rise of China as

a hegemonic competitor to the United States, have complicated deterrence relationships, necessitating a fresh approach to strategic arms control. The P5 Process has a clear role to play here, navigating previously uncharted water, and helping to steer a new course through novel and increasingly complex mini-lateral relationships.

Outside the P5 lie the other four nuclear possessor states (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Israel, and Pakistan). A conversation involving those would be necessary; their deterrents are pointed at each other, but also at countries inside the NPT framework. A broader circle still consists of the threshold states, which are able to produce nuclear weaponry within a relatively short time, but whose nuclear capability is held in a state of voluntary restraint. Ensuring that these states remain disarmed is a crucial aspect of disarmament which is sometimes overlooked. The conversation within the CEND and the IPNDV plays a vital role in this overall effort. So does work to strengthen non-proliferation norms.

This report will first give an overview of the objectives and structure of the P5 Process, before discussing its deliverables to date. It will proceed with a section outlining some of the challenges of and to the process. The paper concludes with a set of concrete and practical recommendations.

2. The objectives and structure of the P5 Process

There appears to be a widening gulf in expectations between the P5 and some non-nuclear-weapon states on what constitutes feasible achievements and goals for the P5 Process. Any attempt to evaluate the P5 Process must therefore consider its history and intended purpose.

Even though the P5 agreed, at their eighth formal conference in Beijing on 30 January 2019, on discussing five wide-ranging issues pertaining to disarmament, non-proliferation and strategic stability before the next NPT RevCon, the original purpose of this grouping appeared more limited. When the British defence secretary Lord Browne of Ladyton proposed the establishment of the P5 Process to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva on 5 February 2008, he spoke of ‘technical’ deliberations among all five nuclear-weapon states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States; ‘the P5’) recognised by the NPT ‘on the verification of nuclear disarmament.’⁴ The purpose of these ‘technical’ discussions on the dismantlement of nuclear warheads was to ‘reinforce a process of mutual confidence-building’⁵.

But although the United Kingdom initially conceived the P5 Process as a forum to consult on the technologies

needed to verifiably advance the disarmament obligation under NPT Article VI, the proposal ‘was only part of a wider confidence-building initiative, and clearly by the time of the inaugural conference the agenda was broader and the participation was predominantly by policy people’⁶. As Lord Browne told the Conference of Disarmament,

the UK is willing to host a technical conference of P5 nuclear laboratories on the verification of nuclear disarmament before the next NPT Review Conference in 2010. We hope such a conference will enable the five recognised nuclear weapons states to reinforce a process of mutual confidence building: working together to solve some of these difficult technical issues. As part of our global efforts, we also hope to engage with other P5 states in other confidence-building measures on nuclear disarmament throughout this NPT Review Cycle.⁷ The aim here is to promote greater trust and confidence as a catalyst for further reductions in warheads - but without undermining the credibility of our existing nuclear deterrents.⁸

The inception of the P5 Process raised expectations among some policy analysts and states parties. One report noted that the P5 Process was ‘a forum, in which all five NWS [nuclear-weapon states] would discuss,

collectively, and on a regular basis, how they would fulfil their unique responsibilities under the NPT. The very establishment of the “P5 Process”, therefore, was an important step forward⁹. But the actual statement that the P5 issued in the aftermath of their first formal P5 Process conference exhibited greater modesty:

The P5 states ... met in London on 3-4 September [2009] for a conference on confidence-building measures towards disarmament and non-proliferation issues. After the conference, they issued a statement reaffirming their commitment to all objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. ...

They reiterated their enduring commitment to the fulfilment of their obligations under Article VI of the NPT and noted that these obligations apply to all NPT States Parties.¹⁰

The inception of the P5 Process came at a critical time. The inability to agree a consensus final document at the 2005 NPT RevCon fuelled dissatisfaction among the non-nuclear-weapon states at the perceived lack of progress on nuclear disarmament. These negative atmospherics raised the possibility of another RevCon failure in 2010. The establishment of the P5 Process signalled the intention of the P5 to avert such a back-to-back failure by ‘bring[ing] the P5 together in a way that would generate a convincing dialogue that could [indeed]

“The inception of the P5 Process came at a critical time.”

convince non-nuclear-weapon states in the context of the NPT that they were taking their obligations under the treaty seriously¹¹.


Although there was no P5 conference in 2010, because of the NPT RevCon that year, the P5 decided to annually review their implementation of the 2010 Action Plan. France announced that the P5 conference in June 2011 would ‘signal the start of a process of regular P5 consultations, with a view towards preparing for the next NPT RevCon¹². More recently, P5 officials have described the purpose of the P5 Process as ‘maintaining strategic stability and promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation¹³. A P5 ambassador noted in an interview that, in light of deteriorating geopolitical relations among the P5, the purpose of the deliberations had changed: ‘If the original purpose of the P5 Process was predominantly disarmament verification, then its focus has now shifted to building trust and transparency, both among the P5 and between the P5 and the non-nuclear-weapon states¹⁴.

The P5 have met regularly since then with varying consistency. Each of the

P5 states volunteered after the 2010 NPT RevCon to coordinate the process. The so-called 'P5 coordinator'—the host state of a formal P5 conference—is in charge of organising the P5 conference and of coordinating P5 work in any given year. France hosted the 2011 conference; the United States convened the 2012 meeting; Russia the 2013 conference; and China the 2014 meeting. Following meetings in London (2015) and Washington, DC (2016), there were no formal P5 conferences in 2017 and 2018, when geopolitical relations between the P5 deteriorated to the point that France did not host a formal conference, contrary to the announcement made in the 2016 P5 statement. Russia, which should have organised a conference in 2018 if the P5 followed the order of hosts from the previous review cycle, did not convene a formal conference.

Although there was a break in formal P5 conferences in 2017-2018, the P5 continued to meet during this period at lower levels, having convened for instance a P5 Principals meeting in Geneva on 28 April on the sidelines of the 2018 Preparatory Committee.¹⁵ In the run-up to the tenth NPT RevCon, Beijing injected fresh momentum into the P5 Process in July 2018, when it assumed the role of coordinator.¹⁶ By December that year, China had 'convened two rounds of ambassador-level consultations in Geneva, [...] a heads of delegation meeting and a dialogue on nuclear doctrines and policies in the margin of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee in New York'¹⁷. China also announced that it would host a formal P5 conference in Beijing on 30 January 2019 in order to 'try and make a substantive contribution to the 2020 RevCon proceedings'¹⁸.

Diagram 1: The Structure of the P5 Process



* The P5 agreed at their 2020 conference to continue the doctrines discussion beyond the next RevCon.

Source: Own elaboration based on interviews with P5 officials.

Diagram 1 outlines the structure of the P5 Process in its current form. In addition to the formal P5 conferences, the P5 convene Principals meetings on the margins of NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) and United Nations General Assembly First Committee meetings.¹⁹ A third Principals meeting sometimes takes place in Geneva.²⁰ These meetings provide an opportunity for senior P5 officials to take stock of the progress. In 2019, two Principals meetings took place in New York: one at the margins of the third PrepCom and one on the sidelines of First Committee.

The P5 tend to de-brief the states of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPT) on their work—an interaction that has been ongoing since the 2015 London P5 conference.²¹ Criticism of the P5 Process as a secretive, opaque club fails to consider that the P5 started those briefings at the request of the NPT states. As one P5 official put it, ‘We are very open to having a conversation about our work. If you don’t ask, you don’t get’²². The member states of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) have followed this example, having approached China to ask for an update of the P5’s work to date.²³

The coordinator of the P5 Process convenes ad hoc ambassadorial-level meetings in Geneva, where most issues—except those pertaining to the peaceful uses pillar of the NPT—are discussed. In Vienna, the British ambassador initiated monthly dinner

“As one P5 official put it, ‘We are very open to having a conversation about our work. If you don’t ask, you don’t get’”

meetings for P5 ambassadors to speak about P5 work on the peaceful uses pillar of the NPT.²⁴

Some P5 states, like the United States, have a so-called ‘P5 lead’ in the capital—an official tasked with coordinating the individual state’s work in the P5 Process.²⁵

This structure appears not to have evolved since its inception. As a 2013 report notes, ‘The P5 Process since 2010 has consisted of high-level conferences, ambassadorial or expert-level working groups, and other ad-hoc meetings’²⁶. Besides these regular features, there is a novelty in the run-up to the tenth NPT RevCon. For the first time in the history of the P5 Process, the P5 agreed on a formal five-point workplan at the 2019 Beijing conference in a visible effort to make a substantive contribution to the next RevCon. As one official noted, ‘The workplan is the P5 contribution to making the 2020 RevCon a success, but achieving RevCon success obviously requires a collective effort between the nuclear- and non-nuclear-

weapon states²⁷. To facilitate this work, the P5 have set up the following working groups:

- a. Glossary meetings (mostly in Beijing; led by China)
- b. Doctrines meetings (in New York and Geneva; led by the United Kingdom)
- c. FMCT meetings (in Paris; led by France)
- d. Peaceful uses meetings (in Vienna)
- e. Discussions on the Bangkok Treaty (led by China)

With the exception of the doctrines discussion, the P5 have yet to indicate whether they will continue deliberations on the other four work streams in the next review cycle. It should be noted that the discussions on the Bangkok Treaty are different from the other work streams. Beijing briefs the other P5 states on the consultations that China holds with ASEAN on resolving Singapore's reservations to opening the protocol to the Bangkok Treaty for signature.

Although the P5 Process is now in its eleventh year, knowledge of the procedures and substance remains limited among outside observers and officials. This limited understanding of the P5 Process has resulted in a persistent perception that the P5 Process is 'unnecessarily opaque'²⁸ or that the P5 are a 'cartel'²⁹ involving 'much secrecy'³⁰. Interviews with observers and non-nuclear-weapon

state officials conducted for this study have demonstrated that it is in part the informal nature of the P5 Process that impedes a greater understanding among observers with regards to the frequency and substance of P5 deliberations. Those interviewed felt that a greater institutionalisation of the P5 Process would increase the procedural transparency, while greater non-nuclear-weapon state and civil society involvement in the P5 Process as well as P5 clarity on the areas of substantive disagreement would foster an understanding of P5 inertia or slow progress that would effectively counter the 'cartel' perception.

However, P5 officials routinely caution against attempts 'to define a "structure" or "procedures" for the P5 Process. It is inherently informal despite the formalistic tendencies of the main annual conference. The rhythm of the meetings has formed by practice, and the agendas have evolved over time.'³¹ The reason for this 'fluid nature', a P5 official noted, is that 'the P5 Process must necessarily be organic to enable us to adjust quickly to developments'³². This also means that, as a P5 official explained, 'just because the P5 agreed on a formal workplan for the first time in 2019 does not mean that this instrument will be retained going forward. The P5 Process must necessarily remain flexible'³³.

The following section examines each of the five work streams in detail.

3. The P5 Process work to date: perceptions and progress

The following paragraphs engage with criticism of P5 work before providing an update of developments in the P5 Process since ELN's September 2019 analysis of the five work streams.³⁴

As the P5 Process enters its eleventh year, its work has received no shortage of attention, though with varying levels of criticism. The P5 claim that their work within the process has achieved what it could possibly achieve in the current geopolitical environment, although some Russian officials interviewed expressed a desire for a more ambitious P5 agenda.³⁵ As one P5 official noted,

The P5 Process brings the P5 together to manage geopolitical tensions, to strengthen the NPT

“The P5 claim that their work within the Process has achieved what it could possibly achieve in the current geopolitical environment”

and to keep the prospect of a world without nuclear weapons on the table. The non-nuclear-weapon states seem not to appreciate this reality sufficiently. Given the adverse geopolitical environment at the moment, the fact that we are continuing this conversation in the framework of the P5 is a tremendous achievement. The non-nuclear-weapon states should thus refrain from investing the P5 Process with too many responsibilities.³⁶

Officials from the 12-nation NPDI, which includes the umbrella states of Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland and Turkey, noted in interviews the ‘important contribution that the P5 Process is making to the NPT review process’³⁷, with one diplomat judging that the P5 doctrines work in particular is ‘irreplaceably important’³⁸. Although the NPDI states have received regular briefings from the P5 in the margins of P5 Principals meetings since 2015, some NPDI officials expressed a desire ‘for greater involvement in the P5 Process’³⁹. One senior NPDI diplomat reasoned that,

Of course, we understand that some P5 discussions are about sensitive technological issues and that those sensitive talks must take place behind closed doors without non-nuclear-weapon states. But what we are asking for is some form of influence over what the P5 are

discussing as well as a channel for making a contribution to these deliberations. In other words, the P5 Process should not take place in isolation but should involve some non-nuclear-weapon states in political discussions. The P5 possess a special responsibility. They retain the weapons that the rest of the NPT membership has renounced for good. That is the basic situation that the P5 must not forget.⁴⁰

Other non-nuclear-weapon states have struck a similar, though somewhat more critical, chord. The six-nation New Agenda Coalition (NAC), for example, all of whose members except Egypt have signed the TPNW at the time of writing, has noted the 'importance of the P5 Process to achieving the objectives of the NPT' and commended 'China and the UK for reinjecting fresh momentum into the Process after two years of silence'⁴¹. At the same time, however, one NAC official interviewed for this study judged that,

The P5 simply haven't done enough. Their public statements are interesting but the outcomes of the P5 Process are not very clear. Greater engagement with non-nuclear-weapon states could remedy this situation because it would allow non-nuclear-weapon states a certain degree of leverage over discussion topics and substance.⁴²

The NAC held an informal meeting about the P5 nuclear talks with China, when Beijing coordinated the P5 Process. More recently, Cairo was interested in a follow-up meeting with the NAC after the United Kingdom had taken over as the P5 coordinator, but no such meeting took place during Egypt's chairmanship of the NAC. With Ireland having taken over as NAC coordinator, both the NAC and the United Kingdom continue to seek this conversation. As one P5 official explained,

We have been trying to organise a meeting with them, but having set dates, a member of the NAC has postponed three times. The last date agreed with the Irish was unfortunately cut across by the London conference itself, and we hadn't found another date that suited everyone afterwards before we went into lockdown [due to COVID-19].⁴³

As outlined in the previous section, the P5 Process consists of several working-group meetings and formal conferences. The last formal conference took place at Lancaster House in London between 11 and 13 February 2020. It provided an opportunity to assess progress on the five-point workplan that the P5 agreed upon at their Beijing conference on 30 and 31 January 2019. This workplan carries two-fold significance. As a P5 official explained in an interview,

First, it is the first formal P5 Process workplan (though

this implies in no way that the P5 Process will have a formal workplan in future iterations because sometimes it makes sense to have a workplan, sometimes it does not). Second, the fact that we have agreed on a workplan this year is significant, however, because this is the P5 contribution to making the next NPT RevCon a success. RevCon success, I must stress, implies a collective effort by both nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states.⁴⁴

The Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms

The Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms has been a long-term feature of the P5 Process deliberations. Formally agreed at the 2009 London P5 conference to 'increase the efficiency of nuclear consultation'⁴⁵ by minimising different interpretations of nuclear terms, the first edition of the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms was presented at the 2015 NPT RevCon. It disappointed some non-nuclear-weapon states because it simply 'borrowed' a number of definitions from existing bilateral glossaries and from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) glossaries, while missing disarmament-related vocabulary.⁴⁶ The ensuing criticism of the P5 glossary effort culminated in allegations that the P5 'were unwilling to make progress'⁴⁷ just as one report had warned: 'The glossary's greatest danger...is that it will simply be seen as lightweight, or as distraction from

the task of "real" disarmament'⁴⁸.

Another critic described the glossary work 'as adding insult to injury for non-nuclear-weapon states, especially at a time when the P5 are questioning the continued applicability of existing commitments like the Thirteen Steps agreed at the 2000 NPT RevCon and the 2010 Action Plan'⁴⁹.

P5 officials have rejected these claims in interviews:

The idea of the glossary came out of the experience of bilateral treaty negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is about narrowing the gap between different interpretations of the same term. This is the nuts and bolts technical work to make disarmament work. The criticism that we simply borrowed definitions misses the point because the fact that the P5 have taken these definitions onboard reaffirms previous work.⁵⁰

The inclusion of the glossary in the five-point workplan, agreed at the 2019 P5 conference in Beijing, signalled the initiation of 'phase two' of the glossary work. Three glossary meetings took place in Beijing on 27-28 February 2019, 28-29 August 2019 and 10-12 December 2019 respectively, with a fourth meeting occurring on 11 February 2020 during the London P5 conference. China, which coordinated the glossary work, was intent on producing a long document to showcase the progress the P5 had

“The challenge for the P5...was ‘to find a balance between reproducing existing definitions to satisfy their ambition of a long document and actually resolving disagreements on challenging terms’”.

made since 2015. But officials from other P5 states familiar with the glossary work dampened expectations in earlier interviews, stating that:

It is difficult to see how we can get through the list we’d like to get through in the limited time we have left. The product needs to be out by RevCon, but it is unrealistic to think that we can produce in a matter of months what we said in 2015 would take several years.⁵¹

The challenge for the P5, we argued in our 2019 September policy brief, was ‘to find a balance between reproducing existing definitions to satisfy their ambition of a long document and actually resolving disagreements on challenging terms’⁵². During the civil society component of their 2020 London conference, the P5 announced that they had finalised the second edition of the glossary, which would be

presented, subject to final approval by the capitals, at the next NPT RevCon.

Nuclear Doctrines

Another longer-standing feature of the P5 Process agenda is the discussion on nuclear doctrines. The United Kingdom convened one doctrines meeting during the United Nations General Assembly First Committee in New York in October 2019. The P5 shared their nuclear doctrines in advance of the meeting, gave brief national statements at the meeting and asked each other questions.⁵³ A second meeting was scheduled to take place in Geneva in November 2019. Although this meeting was later postponed to January 2020 ‘as the experts of one of the members became unavailable’⁵⁴, it has not convened at the time of writing. P5 officials note that ‘discussions on reconvening continue, as has work through correspondence, including preparations for a side event at the RevCon’⁵⁵.

The P5 plan on holding a joint side-event at the next NPT RevCon to brief the non-nuclear-weapon states on their doctrines deliberations. Although the P5 have yet to agree on the precise shape and substance of this side-event (it will likely consist of presentations of their nuclear doctrines), they announced at their 2020 London conference that they decided to render the doctrines discussion ‘a permanent feature of the P5 Process agenda to promote strategic trust’⁵⁶.

Continuing the doctrines dialogue beyond the next NPT RevCon is a promising development. In the current geopolitical environment, in which inter alia nuclear modernisation programmes and allegations of non-compliance with arms control agreements cause mistrust and concerns about intentions, having a frank conversation about nuclear doctrines can be a potent means of addressing misunderstandings and misperceptions, whose resolution would in turn improve strategic security. Indeed, officials from all P5 states highlighted the ‘immense value’ of these discussions in interviews for they provide a platform for addressing misunderstandings and misperceptions about the nuclear doctrines of other P5 states.⁵⁷ For example, the doctrines dialogue enables a P5 state to ask another member to clarify aspects about its nuclear doctrine and posture.⁵⁸

Although the P5 states declined to provide specific examples of doctrinal misperceptions or misunderstandings addressed in the doctrines deliberations when pressed at their 2020 London conference, probably to avoid embarrassing individual P5 states, one can safely expect these discussions to focus at least in part on Russia’s alleged adoption of an ‘escalate to de-escalate’ posture.⁵⁹ As the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review put it,

Russian strategy and doctrine emphasize the potential coercive

“Chinese officials and experts explained in interviews that Beijing is modernising its arsenal to ensure its second-strike capability in case of a disarming first strike by an adversary.”

and military use of nuclear weapons. It mistakenly assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve to ‘de-escalate’ a conflict on terms favorable to Russia.⁶⁰

Russia’s alleged adoption of ‘escalate to de-escalate’ has prompted the United States to reciprocate, with the June 2019 US Joint Chiefs of Staff Nuclear Operations manual stating that ‘Using nuclear weapons could create conditions for decisive results and the restoration of strategic stability’⁶¹.

Russia will have been keen to discuss the Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review in the doctrines talks, which Moscow perceives to undermine

strategic stability by ‘lowering the threshold for nuclear weapons use, announcing the development of new low-yield nuclear weapons and weakening the CTBT’⁶².

Some P5 states will have questioned China about its nuclear force modernisation, which has prompted some observers to doubt the continued applicability of Beijing’s no-first-use policy (NFU).⁶³ In line with China’s 2015 Defense White Paper, entitled ‘China’s Military Strategy’, which gives the sole purpose of China’s nuclear forces as ‘maintain[ing] strategic deterrence and carry[ing] out nuclear counterattack’⁶⁴, Chinese officials and experts explained in interviews that Beijing is modernising its arsenal to ensure its second-strike capability in case of a disarming first strike by an adversary:

China is the only NPT state to have an unconditional NFU commitment to both nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states. Our NFU policy is crystal clear: if you attack China with nuclear weapons, China will strike back to inflict unbearable and disastrous consequences on your major cities. Our NFU is designed to prevent nuclear war, meaning that our nuclear weapons are purely for self-defence. The other nuclear-weapon states have an offensive nuclear posture and are preparing to win a nuclear war. China has no launch-on-warning posture. This proves that Western criticism of China’s NFU being unverifiable is untrue. Beijing also

has not and will not give a nuclear umbrella to other states and China has not, and will not, threaten the use of nuclear weapons against other states. But to sustain this posture—to ensure the survivability of our second-strike force—we need to modernise our capability.⁶⁵

This contrasts with the assessment of China’s modernisation programme in Western P5 states. As the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review puts it,

While China’s declaratory policy and doctrine have not changed, its lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear modernization program raises questions regarding its future intent. China has developed a new road-mobile strategic intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a new multi-warhead version of its DF-5 silo-based ICBM, and its most advanced ballistic missile submarine armed with new submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). It has also announced the development of a new nuclear-capable strategic bomber, giving China a nuclear triad.⁶⁶

Officials from other Western P5 states struck a similar chord, noting that ‘China, unlike all other P5 states, has thus far not adopted a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. If China does not intend to drastically increase its arsenal, why has China not followed

the other P5 states in announcing such a moratorium?⁶⁷

The doctrines discussion should allow the P5 to exchange views on these and other issues. Beyond the immediate enhancement of strategic security, and better understanding each other's doctrines, the P5 doctrines deliberations could eventually result in efforts to find common ground on specific risk reduction measures in the sphere of crisis communication in the next review cycle. The penultimate section outlines specific recommendations to this effect.

The FMCT

The P5 workplan calls for 'substantive discussions on FMCT-related technical issues in the CD'⁶⁸ under France's leadership. Whereas Russian officials have called the FMCT 'obsolete'⁶⁹ in interviews given the existence of moratoria, the Western P5 states regard a verifiable ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes as a 'priority'⁷⁰. First, such a ban would signal to the non-nuclear-weapon states engagement on the disarmament pillar of the NPT as it is one of the Thirteen Steps agreed at the 2000 NPT RevCon and an objective of the Action Plan adopted at the 2010 NPT RevCon. As such, one Western P5 official judged that 'the FMCT is crucial to the advancement of NPT Article VI'⁷¹. Second, Western P5 states remained concerned about China's lack of a moratorium on the production of fissile

material for weapons purposes as in the absence of such a moratorium, China could increase its arsenal rapidly if it so decides.⁷²

Following a good exploration among the P5 during the 2018 United Nations General Assembly First Committee, France hosted two experts' meetings on the FMCT. The first meeting was held in Paris on 19 September 2019; the second one took place in Geneva on 13 January 2020. These discussions built on deliberations held by subsidiary bodies of the CD in 2018. Whereas officials familiar with the meetings noted that there was 'scope for progress'⁷³, some experts were markedly more critical:

Advancing technical discussions is nice and well, but at the end of the day negotiations for an FMCT have not opened. It is admittedly not a P5 state that is blocking the opening of the negotiations, though one does wonder if China could not engage its neighbour and ally Pakistan on the issue. Failing that, the P5 could demonstrate leadership and commitment by beginning negotiations on an FMCT among themselves. Let's not forget that it was only three nuclear-weapon states that negotiated the NPT, which is thought to be the most successful arms control agreement in the world.⁷⁴

Bangkok Treaty

The P5 have consulted since the last review cycle on engaging the member states of the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ; the so-called Bangkok Treaty) with the aim of signing and ratifying the protocol to the treaty. Signing and ratifying the protocol to the Bangkok Treaty would oblige the P5 'not to contribute to any act which constitutes a violation of the Treaty or its Protocol by States Parties to them' (Article 1). Like all the protocols to the other nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Bangkok Treaty Protocol requires the P5 'not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State Party to the Treaty ... [and] not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone' (Article 2).

One distinguishing characteristic of the Bangkok Treaty is that it includes the continental shelves and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of contracting parties. Because the continental shelves and EEZ are not clearly specified in the South China Sea, there remains uncertainty over the scope of the treaty and the obligations contained in its protocol.

Although 'The United Kingdom and others are ready to sign the Protocol, so long as we can enter our usual reservations, which is what the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] states object to'⁷⁵, some P5 states are reluctant to sign the

Protocol because:

they object to the inclusion of continental shelves and EEZ; to the restriction not to use nuclear weapons within the zone; or from within the zone against targets outside the zone, and to the restriction on the passage of nuclear-powered ships through the zone vis-à-vis the issue of the high seas as embodied in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).⁷⁶

The United States in particular also expressed concerns about the treaty's language on port calls by ships which may carry nuclear weapons.⁷⁷ The Bangkok Treaty (Articles 2 and 7) does not outlaw the transit as such but leaves it to the individual member state to allow or not allow the transit through the zone. This suggests that states parties to the Bangkok Treaty would enquire about the presence of nuclear weapons on those vessels. However, the United States will not declare whether nuclear weapons are present aboard its ships and it does not disclose the location of its nuclear submarines.⁷⁸

The United States led discussions and resolved reservations with Indonesia in 2011, and was ready to sign the protocol in 2012.⁷⁹ All the P5 states except for China then notified ASEAN of the usual reservations.⁸⁰ At this point, the Russian Federation declared that it would not view itself bound by the protocol to the Bangkok Treaty

“All the P5 ambassadors to the CD met the ASEAN Secretary General to express the P5’s willingness to resume deliberations between the ASEAN and the P5.”

‘if it should unilaterally determine that an ASEAN member had allowed foreign vessels or aircraft with nuclear weapons to enter or transit their waters and airspace. It thus effectively undercut Article 7 of the SEANWFZ Treaty’⁸¹. This clearly targeted the United States.⁸² When Moscow’s reservation came up, Singapore—which during the Bangkok Treaty negotiations pushed for Article 7 ‘to ensure that nothing in the Treaty would compromise the right of the US to deploy its military assets to and through Southeast Asia’⁸³—refused to allow the opening for signature of the protocol unless the reservations were resolved.⁸⁴ So this is about Singapore, Russia, and the United States.⁸⁵

All the P5 ambassadors to the CD met the ASEAN Secretary General to express the P5’s willingness to resume deliberations between the ASEAN and

the P5.⁸⁶ China has taken the lead in furthering conversations with ASEAN but no progress has been made.⁸⁷ With P5 officials noting that the ASEAN has yet to respond to their request, it remains unclear at the time of writing what a RevCon deliverable might look like. Three scenarios are plausible:

- Best case: The P5 resolve the reservations and the protocol is opened for signature. The P5 could then sign the protocol at a RevCon side event, which is what they did in 2015 with the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone protocol. Alternatively, the P5 could sign the protocol at the next ASEAN Summit.
- Some progress: The P5 and ASEAN could open consultations and report on the progress at RevCon. If they can give a credible account that positive discussions are underway and that they are on track to resolving the reservations and opening the protocol for signature, this would be a positive signal.
- Worst case: The conversation leads nowhere.

Peaceful Uses

The P5 committed in their five-point workplan ‘to strengthen[ing] cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear security and nuclear safety, through the Friends of the Nuclear Energy based in Vienna’⁸⁸.

The designated chair of the tenth NPT RevCon, Ambassador Rafael Grossi of Argentina, had also proposed focusing attention on the peaceful uses pillar of the NPT on the grounds that this pillar 'has been if not marginalised, then less looked into. It is an area that means a lot for the vast majority of the [NPT] membership'⁸⁹. Both nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon state officials commended this development due to the substantial progress that had been made and that could still be made in the sphere of nuclear security. For example, some P5 states converted high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuelled reactors to low-enriched uranium (LEU) models in Ghana and Nigeria.⁹⁰

At their London conference, the P5 announced a joint side event at the RevCon on peaceful uses of nuclear technology.⁹¹ Although the P5 have not disclosed further details about the substance of the event, the P5 deserve credit for their work on peaceful uses, especially because, as one non-nuclear-weapon state official noted in an interview, 'Following Grossi's election to Director-General of the IAEA on 29 October 2019, there was a lack of direction from Argentina, the country chairing the 2020 RevCon, on where to focus attention'⁹². It is likely that the discussion at the P5 side event will revolve around P5 contributions to helping third countries exploit nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. P5 officials remarked in interviews that France was interested in ensuring that developing countries with nuclear materials have adequate accident

“It is likely that the discussion at the P5 side event will revolve around P5 contributions to help third countries exploit nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.”

prevention and response mechanisms in place. If, for example, a fire breaks out in a hospital stocking radioisotopes for medical treatments, the state would need to be well prepared to ensure the safety of the nuclear material during the emergency.⁹³ Similarly, France remains interested in helping third countries use nuclear applications for the preservation of cultural heritage.⁹⁴

Other P5 members sought reform of the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme to ensure that least developed countries could secure a greater share of the funds for the civilian nuclear programmes. This reform would come at the expense of China, which is one of the biggest beneficiaries from the programme, having been allotted €1,147,410 in 2018.⁹⁵ Only Pakistan and Uzbekistan received more funds, having been allocated €1,245,774, and €1,287,788 in 2018 respectively.⁹⁶

4. Challenges of and to the P5 Process

Bringing together the five nuclear weapons possessing states within the NPT is a laudable achievement of its own. These states are strategic rivals with sometimes irreconcilable foreign policy and security objectives. Any attempt to find commonality, be it formally or informally, ought to be supported. The P5 Process represents such an attempt. However, while a conversation sometimes is a stand-alone objective, the P5 Process, at least judging by the way it has been portrayed, also aims to serve two overall purposes; namely, to achieve nuclear disarmament in the long term and strategic risk reduction in the meantime. The P5 Process faces several challenges if it is to achieve those objectives.

The P5 are facing a changing geostrategic context. It is broadly accepted that the brief period of relaxation of relations between the Russian Federation and the United States started to freeze over after the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. An attempt by the Obama administration in 2009 to reset bilateral relations was short-lived, with tensions increasing over a range of issues, from the civil war in Syria to continuing deployments of missile defences in Europe's east and the adoption of the Magnitsky Act. The freezing of the relationship accelerated after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014.

US relations with China have sharply deteriorated since the election of President Donald Trump in 2016. The last few years have been marked by trade wars, visa restrictions and concerns over currency manipulation. In the meanwhile, China has cemented its position as the world's second-largest economy, and has started to display clear aspirations to play a global leadership role. The Sino-Russian relationship has gradually improved.

The COVID-19 pandemic sweeping the globe may exaggerate these divisions in the coming years, as the global economy realigns. It may, of course, also help bring governments together, since a global problem ultimately requires an internationally coordinated response. Which way major power relationships take is, at present, difficult to foretell.

There are allegations of non-compliance with existing arms control commitments. The P5 Process is hampered by persisting concerns and escalating complaints about non-compliance with existing treaty obligations. The United States' 2020 compliance report, for example, contains a long list of alleged treaty breaches by both China and the Russian Federation.⁹⁷ These allegations range from violations of agreements to the development of banned categories of nuclear delivery vehicles to violations of norms against nuclear testing. The Russian Federation has, in return, expressed

“These states are strategic rivals with sometimes irreconcilable foreign policy and security objectives. Any attempt to find commonality, be it formally or informally, ought to be supported. The P5 Process represents such an attempt.”

reservations about the United States' compliance with commonly agreed rules. These perceptions have led to a continual erosion of both bilateral and multilateral arms control. Before the pandemic of 2020, there were few signs that this erosion was tailing off. Instead, it appeared to have gained momentum.

Distrust of this level is bound to complicate both formal negotiations and informal meetings conducted under the P5 Process. However, the high level of distrust also elevates the process' importance. Arms control remains critical to establish the rules of international conduct in periods of high tension. The need for it dissipates slightly during periods of detente. For the conversation to be productive, however, it is essential to refrain from airing allegations and to focus on practical proposals designed to overcome non-compliance.

Some of the P5 may fear a slippery slope towards formal negotiations.

For some of the P5, there is likely an incitement to keep the process informal, without any diplomatic mandates. They would be wary of getting on a 'slippery slope' of increasing commitments outside of traditional negotiation venues. While keeping the discussions informal is often touted as a strength of the process, it may also be a weakness. Some may ask what the purpose of these talks is if they are not designed to produce a result? Former British secretary of defence Lord Browne

of Ladyton expressed a variation of this scepticism in a keynote speech delivered to the Arms Control Association in 2014. He noted that 'our intention was to create a force for progressive dynamism, it appears that we, inadvertently, created a cartel'⁹⁸.

While there is intrinsic value in keeping lines of conversation open, this rationale may not convince everyone, especially not those governments interested in highlighting what they perceive to be an overall lack of progress on nuclear disarmament.

The conversation has progressed haltingly. Since it was established, the process has been subject to interruptions, at least as far as the formal conferences are concerned. Why meetings have not taken place regularly is not clear, but is likely partly due to the general deterioration of the diplomatic climate. Another reason could be a lack of political interest in the process from the policymakers higher up in the national hierarchy. The Nuclear Security Summit series was successful, at least in the short term, due to high-level buy-in from national leaders.

In January 2020, France and the Russian Federation appeared to have agreed that a P5 summit would be beneficial.⁹⁹ In apparent response, US president Trump proposed that the summit focus on three-way arms control between China, the Russian Federation and the United States.¹⁰⁰ A tripartite conversation in

this format looks unlikely, as Beijing has repeatedly dismissed the notion of trilateral arms control. Moreover, while Russia may have an interest in curtailing an expansion of China's nuclear arsenal, it would be hesitant to allow the summit to focus exclusively on trilateral arrangements. As of July, all permanent members of the Security Council have expressed support for the proposal. It remains unclear whether it can go ahead, given that the COVID-19 pandemic makes holding in-person meetings difficult, and as the Kremlin originally did not think that a video-conference was a workable substitute.¹⁰¹ Although Moscow no longer appears opposed to holding the event via video-conference, a date has yet to be agreed.¹⁰²

If the United States is willing to accept a broader agenda at the proposed summit, it could be used to highlight and top up the P5 Process' political capital. For instance, the leaders could endorse and then closely supervise a regular working group on strategic risk reduction.

There is a perception that the P5 Process is just a 'talking shop'. A high-level endorsement could also help mitigate another weakness of the P5 Process, namely that it may be perceived as a talking shop designed to divert attention from the NPT's disarmament pillar. One senior P5 official noted in an interview that the purpose of the CEND initiative was to rectify this misperception and highlight progress made by the majority of

the nuclear-weapon states.¹⁰³ If so, it makes sense to coordinate the two processes closely, so that lessons learned within the CEND can be transferred into a P5 context, as well as the other way around. By having heads of governments oversee this process, and contribute through regular summits, the P5 Process may gain further impetus and weight.

Process participants should seize the opportunity, should discussions held within the process open up space for formal treaty negotiations. However, it is essential to accentuate that the process does not represent a legal commitment to negotiate new arms control, nor does it signal an obligation to be bound by new international law. Making an argument that the process is a formal precursor to negotiations would de-incentivise some of the P5. Whether informal talks would satisfy the NPT Article VI criteria to 'pursue negotiations in good faith' is mostly an academic question that can be left unresolved.

5. Recommendations

The P5 have made progress on the five work streams to prepare the ground for a successful RevCon. However, there remains scope for further action to take the process forward. This section makes practical recommendations for the P5. If adopted, these recommendations could boost the productivity of the P5 deliberations and may help produce outcomes that would be conducive to achieving a final document at the next RevCon. They could also help lay the ground for further P5 work in coming years.

The recommendations are grouped into three time periods; namely, steps that can be taken by the next RevCon (2020-2021), over the following 'intersessional period' (2021-2022), and throughout the 'preparatory session' for the 2025-2026 RevCon.

5.1 Recommendations implementable before the 2020/2021 Review Conference

Recommendation 1: Focus on doctrines. Our consultations, held together with King's College London (KCL), highlight that mistrust and misperceptions about P5 strategic intentions and doctrines continue to impede substantive progress. Although the states have each published their nuclear postures and doctrines, the documents provide varying levels of detail.

Thus, to enable a more structured comparison and a more in-depth understanding of each state's doctrine, the P5 should collate written responses to the following questions in a single P5 doctrines document:

- What is the role of nuclear weapons in your national security strategy? To what extent has this and your state's arsenal evolved since the end of the Cold War?
- How does your force posture and force planning support your state's national security strategy?
- Under what circumstances would you consider the use of nuclear weapons?¹⁰⁴

Recommendation 2: Make the process more transparent. The P5 should explain their transparency measures to the non-nuclear-weapon states in a joint document. The P5 should also counter criticism of opacity and inertia by:

- 2.1. Broadening the scope of civil society involvement in the P5 Process.** The United Kingdom deserves credit for its innovative civil society work during its tenure as coordinator of the P5 Process, allowing KCL and the ELN to unofficially explore common ground among the P5 through Track 2 and 1.5 workshops and through a dedicated plenary at the London P5 conference. This format offered unprecedented civil society engagement, bringing P5 officials and experts together to discuss concrete proposals for the P5 Process as well as the challenges and opportunity that the P5 Process faces. One principal finding was that civil society representatives gained an enhanced understanding of the dynamics governing P5 progress or inertia, thereby effectively countering initial scepticism and criticism from some civil society representatives. To enhance trust and transparency between civil society representatives and P5 officials, and to increase the efficiency of the civil society efforts, future coordinators of the P5 Process should thus not only continue the civil society shadow process, but also agree on a common format for civil society engagement, retaining as many features of the British format as possible.
- 2.2. Engaging more seriously with civil society recommendations.** Another chief outcome of the ELN-KCL project was that the shadow process resulted in practical recommendations for P5 cooperation, demonstrating that there remained scope for further P5 action.¹⁰⁵
- 2.3. Better communicating the value of their deliberations.** The P5 routinely claim that their doctrines discussion has helped them overcome misperceptions or misunderstandings by affording the P5 the opportunity, as one official noted, 'to ask questions directly to a representative of another state about what we don't understand. That other state will then have a chance to explain, and not rarely will the answer enlighten us: "Ah, that's what you meant!"'¹⁰⁶ However, the P5 have thus far not provided specific examples of these instances of enlightenment, inviting criticism from some non-nuclear-weapon states and experts that 'the P5 Process is a talking shop and nothing but an exercise in public relations management designed to give the non-nuclear-weapon states the impression that substantive progress is taking place when there is in fact no such progress'¹⁰⁷. Providing three specific examples in writing to the next RevCon of how the doctrines discussion has resolved misperceptions would be an effective means of convincing observers that the P5 nuclear talks strengthen international security tangibly by clarifying strategic intentions; thus, rather than being a cynical ploy, the P5 Process creates strategic trust.

5.2 Recommendations for the intersessional period

Recommendation 3: Consider a formal workplan. P5 officials have indicated in interviews that although the formal five-point workplan is a novelty this year, the P5 Process needed to remain organic, meaning that future iterations of the P5 Process may not include a formal workplan.¹⁰⁸ The P5 should retain this instrument and utilise it with greater frequency in future. The P5 should also spell out what specific objectives the P5 hope to achieve on the individual work streams. The objectives should be framed as answers to the following questions:

- What change do you expect to achieve?
- What can be done to achieve that change?

A formal workplan structured in terms of objectives rather than discussion topics helps the P5 set clearer and more attainable goals for their deliberations each year, while providing the non-nuclear-weapon states with a greater insight into the substance and scope of P5 work.

The P5 should counter criticism of opacity and inertia by:

- **3.1. Broadening the scope of non-nuclear-weapon state involvement in the P5 Process**, as we recommended in September 2019.¹⁰⁹
- **3.2. Explaining areas of disagreement** (as per our September 2019 recommendation).¹¹⁰ Although non-nuclear-weapon state officials and experts welcomed the idea in interviews as an important transparency measure that could foster understanding for slower progress in the P5 Process—and perhaps even prompt mediation attempts—P5 officials have dismissed the suggestion as unrealistic for fears of embarrassing each other and jeopardising the anyway already difficult deliberations. Communicating disagreements is possible however without pointing the finger at each other. The P5 should submit a joint working paper in the next review cycle in which they outline areas of disagreement in a neutral way. Producing a joint, written document would enable the P5 to avoid embarrassing individual states for the drafting process would afford the states in question the opportunity to object to specific language.
- **3.3. Re-engage in political discussions on the FMCT.** ELN's September 2019 policy brief suggested that the P5 should focus on work areas where more meaningful progress seemed feasible given the unlikelihood of FMCT negotiations at the time and the Russian claim that the FMCT was obsolete

due to unilateral moratoria on the production of fissile material production for weapons purposes.¹¹¹ Interviews with officials from Western P5 states have since then revealed deep-seated concerns about China's lack of a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.¹¹² Some Russian observers share this concern, speculating that China may have increased its arsenal substantially from the usual estimations of 240-300 warheads, with one article suggesting that China may have as many as '1000 warheads hidden in tunnels'¹¹³. Another Russian expert estimates that Beijing possesses '1600-1800 nuclear warheads'¹¹⁴. Although the ideal outcome of these deliberations would be a collective pre-emption of such de-stabilising speculations through a Chinese moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, which may not be feasible at the present time, more modest measures may help mitigate these speculations. The P5 could introduce a structured exchange within the P5 Process on fissile material production plans and capabilities, updating each other on the production rates of fissile material for weapons purposes.

Recommendations for the 2025/2026 Review Conference

Recommendation 4. Make the doctrines dialogue permanent. Although the announcement to render the doctrines discussion a permanent feature of the P5 Process at the 2020 London conference is a step in the right direction, the P5 should outline a longer-term vision for this format with concrete deliverables beyond the establishment of strategic trust. Examples could include more substantive risk reduction measures in crisis communication:

- The P5 could conclude an agreement on avoiding and managing dangerous situations, modelled on bilateral US-USSR agreements from the early 1970s and the late 1980s.¹¹⁵ Of particular relevance are the 1971 US-USSR Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, the 1972 US-USSR Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, the 1973 US-USSR Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, and the 1989 US-USSR Agreement on Preventing Dangerous Military Activities. These agreements facilitated an information exchange on accidents and exercises to prevent escalation and reduce nuclear risks.
- The P5 could also discuss the merits of a multilateral crisis hotline to supplement existing bilateral channels of communication. A multilateral hotline would allow the rapid dissemination of information among all P5 states.

Once the crisis communication measures above have been adopted, the P5 could consider more far-reaching risk reduction measures such as the establishment of a code of nuclear responsibilities.¹¹⁶

Conclusion

The P5 have made some progress in the framework of the P5 Process. The P5 explain the slow progress by mistrust, stemming from allegations of non-compliance with existing arms control agreements and uncertainty over intentions, claiming that the rhetoric of some P5 states is at odds with their nuclear modernisation programmes. Consequently, key outcomes that the non-nuclear-weapon states seek have yet to materialise, such as further substantive reductions in arsenals, the FMCT and the entry-into-force of the CTBT, among others.

The international community will undoubtedly judge the health of the NPT by progress (or lack thereof) on some of these initiatives. There is widespread agreement among officials and experts alike that a back-to-back RevCon ‘failure’—that is, the inability to agree a consensus final document for the second time in a row—should be avoided. Our in-depth interviews with officials from all nuclear-weapon states and some non-nuclear-weapon states and the ELN-KCL civil society shadow process have revealed that there remains scope for progress in the P5 Process between now and the next RevCon and beyond despite the difficult geopolitical environment. Of the several recommendations set forth, the P5 should prioritise the practical measures relating to enhancing the transparency of the P5 Process. Indeed, the fruitful civil society

shadow process has demonstrated that by better engaging with experts and non-nuclear-weapon states on the dynamics within the P5 Process, the P5 can counter perceptions of inertia and opacity among civil society representatives and non-nuclear-weapon states. There is widespread interest among experts and non-nuclear-weapon states in greater involvement in the P5 Process and in greater insights into the areas of P5 disagreement that govern the progress or lack thereof that the P5 are making on policy initiatives.

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Appendix: P5 statements since 2009

Joint Statement on the First P5 Conference, London, 2009

The P5 states (China, France, Russia, UK and US) met in London on 3-4 September for a conference on confidence building measures towards disarmament and non-proliferation issues. After the conference they issued a statement reaffirming their commitment to all objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The conference was originally proposed by the UK Defence Secretary at the Conference on Disarmament in February 2008 and was referred to by the UK Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, in a speech on 17 March 2009.

The P5 reaffirmed their commitment to all objectives of the Non- Proliferation Treaty and that we should advance on all fronts to achieve them. They reiterated their enduring commitment to the fulfilment of their obligations under Article VI of the NPT and noted that these obligations apply to all NPT States Parties. They stressed their intention to work with all States Parties to the NPT in creating the conditions to enable further progress under Article VI. They called upon on all non NPT States to work towards the same objective.

In a wide ranging discussion, the P5 considered the confidence- building, verification and compliance challenges associated with achieving further progress toward disarmament and non- proliferation, and steps to address those challenges. They looked at ways to increase mutual understanding by sharing definitions of nuclear terminology and information about their nuclear doctrines and capabilities. They made presentations on enhancing P5 strategic stability and building mutual confidence through voluntary transparency and other measures. They also considered the international challenges associated with responding to nuclear accidents and undertook to consider ways to co-operate to address these challenges.

Joint Statement on the Second P5 Conference, Paris, 2011

The P-5 met in Paris on 30 June – 1 July for their first follow-up meeting to the NPT Review Conference, with a view to considering progress on the commitments they made at this Conference, as well as to following up on the London Conference on Confidence Building Measures towards Nuclear Disarmament in September 2009.

They reaffirmed their unconditional support for the NPT, which remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They also reaffirmed the recommendations set out in the balanced Action Plan agreed in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and called on all States Parties to the NPT to work together to advance its implementation.

They met with the determination to work together in pursuit of their shared goal of nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT, including engagement on the steps outlined in Action 5, as well as reporting and other efforts called for in the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. They called on all States, both States Parties and Non Parties, to contribute to this nuclear disarmament objective, including by ensuring that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime remains robust and reliable.

The P-5 continued their previous discussions on the issues of transparency and mutual confidence, including nuclear doctrine and capabilities, and of verification, recognizing such measures are important for establishing a firm foundation for further disarmament efforts. In order to increase efficiency of P-5 nuclear consultation, they approved to continue working on an agreed glossary of definitions for key nuclear terms and established a dedicated working group.

The P-5 discussed the particular political and technical challenges associated with verification in achieving further progress towards disarmament and ensuring non-proliferation. They shared information on their respective bilateral and multilateral experiences in verification. They will continue their discussion of this issue later this year at an expert-level meeting in London.

As a follow-up to the 2010 NPT RevCon discussions, the P-5 shared their views on how to respond to notifications of withdrawal from the Treaty, while recognizing the provisions of Article X. They also stressed the need for strengthening IAEA safeguards, including through promoting the adoption of the Additional Protocol and the reinforcement of IAEA's resources and capabilities for deterring and detecting non-compliance.

The P-5 States recalled their commitment to promote and ensure the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its universalization. They called upon all States to uphold the moratorium on nuclear weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from acts that would defeat the objective and purpose of the treaty pending its entry into force. They reiterated their support for immediate commencement of

negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, including verification provisions. In order to sustain the potential of negotiations in the CD, the P-5 will, prior to the next United Nations General Assembly, renew their efforts with other relevant partners to promote such negotiations.

The P-5 welcomed the steps taken by the U.S., Russia and the UK towards holding a Conference on a Middle East WMD Free Zone (MEWMDFZ) in 2012.

The P-5 will follow on their discussions and hold a third P-5 Conference in the context of the next NPT Preparatory Committee.

Statement by Mr Gérard Araud, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, on behalf of the P5, New York, 27 July 2011

Allow me, Mr. Secretary General, on behalf of the People's Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, to thank you for convening this follow-up meeting to the High Level Meeting held on 24 September last year. We welcome the personal commitment and leadership you have shown on disarmament and non-proliferation. We fully support your continuing efforts to revitalize the work of the Conference on Disarmament. We are deeply concerned by its long- running stalemate and lack of progress since last year's meeting. It is crucial to reaffirm the negotiating role of the CD and to allow it to resume its substantive work without delay.

Ten months after the High Level Meeting, today's follow-up meeting is a timely opportunity to reflect on the situation of the disarmament machinery and consider ways to make further progress on disarmament, international peace and security.

We welcome the numerous positive developments in the area of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in the recent years. In particular, the adoption of a concrete and balanced Action Plan on all 3 pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by the NPT Review Conference in 2010 has shown the international community's firm commitment to reinforce the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and address nuclear issues with a global and pragmatic approach. Now, all State parties must work together to advance the implementation of the NPT Action Plan.

In this context, the P5 States are strongly determined to assume their responsibilities and play their part. At the High Level Meeting last year in September, France committed to organize the first P5 Follow-up Meeting to the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Accordingly, on June 30th and July 1st, the P5 met in Paris, at Directors General and expert level, with a view to consider progress on the commitments they made at the NPT Review Conference and to contribute to the preparation of the next NPT review cycle. They discussed a wide range of issues relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

It was the second time that the P5 got together in this format with this agenda. The first was the London Conference on Confidence-building Measures in 2009. The Paris Conference was therefore a significant and vital opportunity to further build mutual trust and confidence on nuclear matters. We'd like to share with you the general outcomes of our discussions, which were reflected in the Final Joint Press Statement issued at the end of the Conference.

As Nuclear Weapons States, we discussed how we intend to meet our disarmament obligations under the NPT, including engagement on the efforts called for in the 2010 NPT Action Plan, particularly the steps outlined in Action 5, as well as reporting and other efforts. We continued our previous discussions on the issues of transparency and mutual confidence, including nuclear doctrine and capabilities, and on verification. Such measures are important for establishing a firm foundation for further disarmament efforts.

We also shared views on measures to uphold the NPT's non-proliferation pillar, to include how to respond to notifications of withdrawal from the NPT, while recognising the provisions of Article X, and stressed the need to strengthen IAEA safeguards, including through promoting the adoption of the Additional Protocol and the reinforcement of IAEA's resources and capabilities for deterring and detecting non-compliance.

All States, NPT Parties and non-Parties, must contribute to fulfilling the overall objective of disarmament, by creating the necessary security environment, resolving regional tensions, promoting collective security, ensuring that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime remains robust and reliable, and making progress in all the areas of disarmament.

We are convinced that, as the sole standing multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, the CD should maintain the primary role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament.

We urge all CD Member States to agree without delay on a comprehensive and balanced program of work allowing the CD to resume its substantive work.

We recognise that one key element in the effective implementation of Article VI of the NPT and in the prevention of nuclear proliferation is the negotiation of a Fissile-Material Cut-Off Treaty. An FMCT would help cut off the most important building blocks needed for nuclear weapons. We reiterate our support for immediate commencement of negotiations at the CD on an FMCT, including verification provisions.

In order to sustain the potential of negotiations in the CD, the P5 will, prior to the next UNGA, renew their efforts with other relevant partners to promote such negotiations.

Furthermore, the P5 recall their commitment to promote and ensure the swift entry into force of the CTBT and its universalization.

Statement by the United States of America on Behalf of the P5 to the 2012 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, 3 May 2012

1. On the occasion of the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference (RevCon), the People's Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their unconditional support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We are pleased to provide this information on P-5 activities since the 2010 NPT RevCon to the Preparatory Committee, in addition to any national contributions.

2. We welcome the adoption by the NPT RevCon in May 2010 of a balanced Final Document across all three pillars of the Treaty - nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The success of the 2010 RevCon and inclusion in the Final Document of a consensus Action Plan demonstrates the international community's shared commitment to seeking a safer world for all and to creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the NPT; in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security; based on the principle of undiminished security for all; and underlining the vital importance of nonproliferation for achieving this goal.

3. We reaffirm our commitment to the Action Plan adopted at the 2010 NPT RevCon, our determination to meet our commitments, and to work with all States Party to the NPT to strengthen the Treaty during the years leading up to the 2015 RevCon. Doing so will help ensure that it can continue to protect the global peace and security from the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and effectively address the current and pressing challenges that we face. Every State can and should contribute to this goal, through concerted efforts to prevent proliferation challenges and the threat of nuclear terrorism, and to achieve general and complete disarmament. We stress the importance that all States Party fully implement and comply with the Treaty and call upon all States Party to implement the provisions of the Action Plan in all its aspects.

4. As nuclear-weapon States, we reaffirm our enduring commitment to the fulfillment of our obligations under Article VI of the NPT. We are pleased to recall that we met in Paris from 30 June - 1 July 2011, for our first follow-up meeting to the 2010 NPT RevCon, with a view to considering progress on the commitments we made at this Conference, as well as to following up on the September 2009 London Conference on Confidence Building Measures towards Nuclear Disarmament. We met with the determination to work together in pursuit of our shared goal of nuclear disarmament under Article VI, including engagement on the steps outlined in the 2010 RevCon's Action 5, as well as other efforts called for in the Action Plan.

5. We continued our previous discussions on the issues of transparency, mutual confidence, and verification, and considered proposals for a standard reporting form. We recognize the importance of establishing a firm foundation for mutual confidence and further disarmament efforts, and we will continue our discussions within the P5 with a view to reporting to the 2014 PrepCom, consistent with our commitments under Action 5 of the 2010 RevCon final document. We decided to continue working on an agreed glossary of definitions for key nuclear terms and, to that end, we are pleased to announce that we have established a dedicated working group, to be led by China. In this regard, enhancing our understanding of each other's thinking about nuclear weapons is an important building block for strengthened and continuing P5 engagement towards nuclear disarmament. Having shared information on our respective bilateral and multilateral experiences in verification, we followed this up with an expert-level meeting in London on 4 April at which UK scientists and technical experts shared the outcomes and lessons from the UK-Norway Initiative—a research project on nuclear warhead dismantlement verification. At the P5 meeting P5 experts offered comments on the Initiative. We also stressed the need for strengthening IAEA safeguards. As a follow-up to the 2010 NPT RevCon discussions, we shared views on how to respond to notifications of withdrawal from the Treaty, while recognizing the provisions of Article X.

6. At the Paris meeting, we also recalled our commitment to promote and ensure the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its universalization. We called upon all States to uphold their national moratoria on nuclear weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty pending its entry into force. The moratoria, though important, are not substitutes for legally binding obligations under the CTBT. We call upon all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify this Treaty. We reiterated our support for immediate commencement of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), within a balanced work programme based on the CD 1864 program of work, on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) for the purpose of banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We committed to renew our efforts with other relevant States towards achieving this goal. In that context, we met again, with other relevant parties, during the United Nations General Assembly First Committee and in Geneva, and will continue to provide information on our efforts. We will follow up on our discussions and hold a third P5 Conference in Washington on June 27-29, 2012.

7. We recall the unprecedented progress and efforts made by the nuclear-weapon States in nuclear arms reduction, disarmament, confidence-building and transparency and note with satisfaction that stocks of nuclear weapons are now at far lower levels than at any time in the past half-century. Our individual contributions to systematic and progressive efforts in this respect have been and will be highlighted by each of us nationally. All other States must contribute to fulfilling these disarmament goals by creating the necessary security environment, resolving regional tensions, promoting collective security, and making progress in all the areas of disarmament.

8. We support the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which entered into force on 5 February 2011 and is now being implemented. When it is fully implemented, the Treaty will result in the lowest number of deployed nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia since the 1950s. We believe it to be a significant step in the implementation of Article VI of the NPT, and by promoting mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation can help build a stronger basis for addressing the threats of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. We also welcome the announcement by the United Kingdom in 2010 of reductions in the numbers of warheads and missiles on board its nuclear deterrent submarines, and a reduction in its overall nuclear weapon stockpile to no more than 180, a process which began in 2011 and is due to be completed by the mid 2020s. We also welcome the recent achievement by

France of the objectives announced in 2008, resulting in the reduction by one-third of the number of nuclear weapons, missiles and aircraft of the airborne component and leading to an arsenal totalling today fewer than 300 nuclear weapons. We also welcome China's reaffirmation to keep its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security, and of its policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, as well as its unequivocal commitment that China will unconditionally not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

9. We emphasize the importance of the prohibition of chemical, biological and toxin weapons in realizing the objective of Article VI of the NPT and urge all countries which have yet to do so to sign, ratify and bring into force the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). We are pleased with the outcome of the BTWC Review Conference, which was able to set out the program of work for the next five years in areas we see as high priorities - strengthening national implementation measures, identifying and responding to developments in science and technology and international cooperation and assistance.

10. The proliferation of nuclear weapons undermines the security of all nations. It sets back the cause of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, and imperils the prospects for strengthening international cooperation in nuclear energy, including the role we wish to see such cooperation play in combating climate change and ensuring sustainable development of peaceful nuclear energy. We reaffirm that all States Party must ensure strict compliance with their nonproliferation obligations under the NPT and work actively to ensure that others comply with their nonproliferation obligations. We remain deeply concerned by the challenge that non-compliance by Treaty Parties poses to the integrity of the NPT regime.

11. We welcome the constructive and useful discussions between the E3+3 and Iran in Istanbul on April 14. As reflected in the E3+3 statement issued there, we seek a sustained process of serious dialogue, where Iran and the E3+3 can take urgent practical steps to build confidence and lead to compliance by Iran with all its international obligations. We will be guided in these efforts by the step-by-step approach and the principle of reciprocity. The NPT forms a key basis for what must be serious engagement on Iran's nuclear program, to ensure all the obligations under the Treaty are met by Iran, while fully respecting Iran's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with Articles I, II, and III of the Treaty. We expect that subsequent meetings of E3+3 and Iran will lead to concrete steps towards a comprehensive negotiated solution which restores

international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program.

We remain concerned by Iran's persistent failure to comply with its obligations under UNSC resolutions and to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors Resolutions. We stress the need and urgency for Iran to reach an agreement with the IAEA on a structured approach, including on access to relevant sites and information and based on IAEA verification practices, to resolve all outstanding issues, particularly those relating to possible military dimensions, in accordance with the resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on November 18, 2011.

12. We also remain concerned about the DPRK's nuclear program, including its uranium enrichment program. We strongly urge the DPRK to fulfill its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks, and to fully comply with all its obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, including abandoning all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and immediately ceasing all related activities. We note with serious concern the 13 April launch by the DPRK and call on the DPRK to refrain from further actions which may cause grave security concerns in the region, including any nuclear tests. We reaffirm our firm support for the resumption of the Six Party Talks at an appropriate time.

13. We underline the fundamental importance of an effective IAEA safeguards system in preventing nuclear proliferation and facilitating cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As agreed in the 2010 Action Plan, we call on all States that have not yet done so to bring into force IAEA Additional Protocols as soon as possible. As also agreed in the Action Plan, we call for the application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements in States Party in accordance with Article III of the Treaty, and encourage all States Party with pre-2005 small quantities protocols that have not yet done so to amend or rescind them, as appropriate, as soon as possible. We welcome the fact that 138 States have signed an Additional Protocol and that 115 States have an Additional Protocol in force. We note the IAEA's view that the Protocol is of vital importance for the Agency to be able to provide credible assurance, not only that declared nuclear material is not being diverted from peaceful uses, but also that there are no undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State. We believe that a comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an Additional Protocol should become the universally recognized standard for NPT verification, and stand ready to offer the necessary support to States wishing to bring a Protocol into force.

14. We remain committed to ensuring that the IAEA has sufficient technical, human, and financial resources, as well as authority to fulfill its safeguards responsibilities, including verifying non-diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and ensuring that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or nuclear activities. Where non-compliance is established by the IAEA Board of Governors, the case should, in accordance with the IAEA Statute, be brought to the immediate attention of the UN Security Council to determine whether it constitutes a threat to international peace and security. We emphasize the Security Council's primary responsibility in addressing such threats.

15. We reaffirm our support of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and Zangger Committee and note the important role of these two international export control mechanisms in securing the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In this context we welcome the NSG action to strengthen its guidelines on the transfer of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies. We urge all States to take appropriate national measures in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law to prevent proliferation financing and shipments, to strengthen export controls, to secure sensitive materials, and to control access to intangible transfers of technology and to information that could be used for weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

16. We note the importance attached by non-nuclear weapon States to security assurances and their role in strengthening the non-proliferation regime. In 1995, we issued separate statements on security assurances as noted Security Council resolution 984 (1995). Some of us have subsequently issued statements about their assurances. We note that protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties offer a means for codifying negative security assurances in a legal framework. We stand ready to engage in substantive discussions on security assurances in the Conference on Disarmament in the context of an agreed Program of Work.

17. Nuclear-weapon-free zones that are established in accordance with Article VII of the Treaty and the Guidelines from the UN Disarmament Commission's 1999 Session and are fully complied with have made and continue to make an important contribution to the strengthening of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime in all its aspects, and to achieving nuclear disarmament and the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. We are pleased to report on the substantive progress made in the process of moving towards signature of the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ). We will continue to work with the States Party to SEANWFZ further in this direction, in particular, on the earliest possible signing of the Protocol to the Treaty by the

nuclear-weapon States. We confirm our commitment to continue working with the States Party to the treaty establishing the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone towards resolving all the outstanding issues in relation to the Treaty and its corresponding Protocol.

18. We are committed to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, and we support all ongoing efforts to this end. We welcome the steps taken by the three NPT Depositary States (the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom) and the UN Secretary General toward convening a Conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means. We welcome the announcement on October 14, 2011, by the Spokesman for the UN Secretary General on behalf of Ban Ki-moon and the three NPT Depositary States about the appointment of Jaakko Laajava, Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, as facilitator and the designation of Finland as the host government for this Conference. We note the IAEA Forum on Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East held in Vienna on November 21-22, 2011, and the joint intervention made by the representatives of the NPT Depositary States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America at the Forum. We express hope for a successful Conference to be attended by all the States of the Middle East.

19. We emphasize that the threat of the acquisition of nuclear weapons or related materials and technical expertise by non-state actors would constitute a grave threat to international peace and security. We reaffirm the importance of full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, as well as the international Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. We renew our commitment made at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit to strengthen nuclear security and reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. We urge States to accelerate their domestic approval of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, so that this Amendment can be quickly brought into force. We also encourage all States Party to apply, as appropriate, the IAEA recommendations on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5) and other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date.

20. We recognize the inalienable right of all States Party to the NPT reflected in Article IV to the development, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I, II, and III of the Treaty. We underline the particular importance of international cooperation, both through the IAEA and bilaterally, for States Party new to nuclear

technology. We are ready to work actively with States Party wishing to develop nuclear energy for peaceful uses consistent with their NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations.

21. We welcome the work of the IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurance of fuel supply and related measures, as effective means for facilitating nuclear cooperation in accordance with Article IV of the NPT and addressing the expanding need for nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel services, preserving the competitive open market, responding to the real needs of customers, and strengthening non-proliferation. We welcome the IAEA Board of Governors' decisions on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle to assure IAEA Members of an adequate nuclear fuel supply, which include the establishment of the International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) at Angarsk, which is now operational; the decision to establish a low-enriched uranium bank under the control of the IAEA at a location to be determined; and support for a nuclear fuel assurance mechanism that provides the option of an additional political assurance to complement commercial contracts. We also welcome the Russian low-enriched uranium (LEU) reserve and the American Assured Fuel Supply, which is comprised of downblended uranium from weapons programs to establish a backup source of LEU, both of which are also operational. We reaffirm our readiness to work with the IAEA and with other countries to explore and pursue approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle that will facilitate access to the benefits of nuclear energy and serve all countries' interests in preventing proliferation to state or non-state actors.

22. We regard the events at Fukushima, Japan, as a sobering reminder of the need for strong international cooperation on nuclear safety and reaffirm our commitment to work closely with one another for the implementation in due course of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety adopted at the Agency's 55th General Conference and to promote the highest standards and best practices. We recognize that we all benefit greatly from a rigorous peer review process conducted on a regular basis and that the international nuclear safety regime offers many opportunities for collaboration.

23. Regarding the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the cornerstone of the international safety regime, we welcome the extraordinary meeting of Contracting Parties to take place in August 2012, and we support a review that could result in measures to strengthen and improve the Convention. We call on all countries with nuclear activities to adhere to the Convention on Nuclear Safety without further delay, so that they may benefit from the full extent of dialogue and resources available to Contracting Parties. Regarding the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste

Management, we welcome the meeting of Competent Authorities that took place in April 2012. We support a review that could lead to measures to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of this instrument. Regarding the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, we support a review of measures that could lead to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of this instrument. Regarding the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, we support a review of measures that could lead to strengthening and improving the effectiveness of the Convention. These measures could include updated implementation and reporting guidance so that the efficiency and substance of notifications made pursuant to the Convention will be further improved in accordance with the Nuclear Safety Action Plan. We also call on the IAEA to consider further review of the relevant IAEA safety standards in accordance with the Nuclear Safety Action Plan to identify issues that may warrant examination and revision in light of the Fukushima accident.

24. We note that the importance of international nuclear safety and security cooperation extends beyond nuclear power to all non-power applications, many of which are the purpose of projects being funded under the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme with the objective of improving the health and livelihood of millions of people using nuclear technology.

25. We call for the development of nuclear energy in a culture of openness and transparency, one which builds confidence among neighbors and stresses the importance of promoting the sustainable development of peaceful nuclear energy within a framework that ensures effective safety, security, non-proliferation conditions, and arrangements for civil nuclear liability for the benefit of all.

26. We note the potential for nuclear energy to facilitate achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and sustainable development, in addressing climate change, in providing energy security, and in addressing vital non-power applications such as nuclear medicine, agriculture, water resource management, and industry. We stress our long-standing support for the IAEA's critical role in expanding access to these nuclear applications, together contributing more than \$35 million towards the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Fund in 2011, plus further extra-budgetary contributions, including through the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative and other programs.

27. States Party have the right to withdraw from the NPT under Article X. We call for the United Nations Security Council to address without delay and State Party's notice of withdrawal from the Treaty, including the events described in the required notice pursuant to Article X. A State Party remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal. We

welcomed the discussion of this issue at the 2010 RevCon and call for further discussion of modalities under which NPT States Party could respond collectively and individually to a notification of withdrawal, including through arrangements regarding the disposition of equipment and materials acquired or developed under safeguards during NPT membership.

28. As we enter the review cycle leading to the 2015 Review Conference, we reaffirm our commitment to the goal of seeking a safer world for all and creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the NPT. We call on all States Party to work towards that goal by taking concrete measures to implement the Action Plan agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference, which is based on a balance across the three mutually reinforcing pillars of the Treaty.

Joint Statement on the Third P5 Conference, Washington, DC, 2012

The five Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear-weapon states, or “P5,” met in Washington on June 27-29, 2012, in the wake of the 2009 London and 2011 Paris P5 conferences to review progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and to continue discussions on issues related to all three pillars of the NPT – nonproliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament, including confidence-building, transparency, and verification experiences.

The P5 reaffirmed their commitment to the shared goal of nuclear disarmament and emphasized the importance of working together in implementing the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan. The P5 reviewed significant developments in the context of the NPT since the 2011 Paris P5 Conference. In particular, the P5 reviewed the outcome of the 2012 Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, continued their discussion of how to report on their relevant activities, and shared views, across all three pillars of the NPT, on objectives for the 2013 Preparatory Committee and the intersessional period. The 2012 PrepCom outcome included issuance of a P5 statement comprehensively addressing issues in all three pillars (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/12).

The P5 continued their previous discussions on the issues of transparency, mutual confidence, and verification, and considered proposals for a standard reporting form. The P5 recognize the importance of establishing a firm foundation for mutual confidence and further disarmament efforts, and the P5 will continue their discussions in multiple ways within the P5, with a view to reporting to the 2014 PrepCom, consistent with their commitments under Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the 2010 RevCon final document.

Participants received a briefing from the United States on U.S. activities at the Nevada National Security Site. This was offered with a view to demonstrate ideas for additional approaches to transparency.

Another unilateral measure was a tour of the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center located at the U.S. Department of State, where the P5 representatives have observed how the United States maintains a communications center to simultaneously implement notification regimes, including under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Vienna Document.

The P5 agreed on the work plan for a P5 working group led by China, assigned to develop a glossary of definitions for key nuclear terms that will increase P5 mutual understanding and facilitate further P5 discussions on nuclear matters.

The P5 again shared information on their respective bilateral and multilateral experiences in verification, including information on the P5 expert level meeting hosted by the UK in April, at which the UK shared the outcomes and lessons from the UK-Norway Initiative disarmament verification research project. The P5 heard presentations on lessons learned from New START Treaty implementation, were given an overview of U.S.-UK verification work, and agreed to consider attending a follow-up P5 briefing on this work to be hosted by the United States.

As a further follow-up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the P5 shared their views on how to discourage abuse of the NPT withdrawal provision (Article X), and how to respond to notifications made consistent with the provisions of that article. The discussion included modalities under which NPT States Party could respond collectively and individually to a notification of withdrawal, including through arrangements regarding the disposition of equipment and materials acquired or derived under safeguards during NPT membership. The P5 agreed that states remain responsible under international law for violations of the Treaty committed prior to withdrawal.

The P5 underlined the fundamental importance of an effective International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system in preventing nuclear proliferation and facilitating cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The P5 discussed concrete proposals for strengthening IAEA safeguards, including through promoting the universal adoption of the Additional Protocol; and the reinforcement of the IAEA's resources and capabilities for effective safeguards implementation, including verification of declarations by States.

The P5 reiterated their commitment to promote and ensure the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its universalization. The P5 reviewed progress in developing the CTBT's verification regime in all its aspects and efforts towards entry into force. Ways to enhance the momentum for completing the verification regime, including the on-site inspection component, were explored. The P5 called upon all States to uphold their national moratoria on nuclear weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty pending its entry into force. The moratoria, though important, are not substitutes for legally binding obligations under the CTBT.

The P5 discussed ways to advance a mutual goal of achieving a legally binding, verifiable international ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. The P5 reiterated their support for the immediate start of negotiations on a treaty encompassing such a ban in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), building on CD/1864, and exchanged perspectives on ways to break the current impasse in the CD, including by continuing their efforts with other relevant partners to promote such negotiations within the CD.

The P5 remain concerned about serious challenges to the non-proliferation regime and in this connection, recalled their joint statement of May 3 at the Preparatory Committee of the NPT.

An exchange of views on how to support a successful conference in 2012 on a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction was continued.

The P5 agreed to continue to meet at all appropriate levels on nuclear issues to further promote dialogue and mutual confidence. The P5 will follow on their discussions and hold a fourth P5 conference in the context of the next NPT Preparatory Committee.

Joint Statement on the Fourth P5 Conference, Geneva, 2013

The five Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear-weapon states, or "P5," met in Geneva on April 18-19, 2013 under the chairmanship of the Russian Federation to build on the 2009 London, 2011 Paris, and 2012 Washington P5 conferences. The P5 reviewed progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and continued discussions on issues related to all three pillars of the NPT – non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament, including confidence-building, transparency, and verification experiences. The P5 also had a positive exchange with representatives of civil society during the Geneva P5 Conference.

The P5 reaffirmed their commitment to the shared goal of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament as provided for in Article VI of the NPT, and emphasized the importance of continuing to work together in implementing the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan. The P5 reviewed the outcome of the 2012 Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, and significant developments in the context of the NPT since the 2012 Washington P5 Conference. They assessed issues relating to strategic stability and international security, and exchanged views concerning prospects for further steps to promote dialogue and mutual confidence in this area, including in a multilateral format.

In addition, the P5 welcomed a briefing by the Russian Federation and the United States on the ongoing implementation of the New START Treaty and its success to date. The P5 were also briefed by the Russian Federation and the United States on the joint 2012 inspection in Antarctica conducted pursuant to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and its Environmental Protocol. This joint inspection included verification that the international stations are implementing relevant environmental rules and that facilities are used only for peaceful purposes. The P5 shared views on objectives for the 2013 Preparatory Committee, the intersessional period thereafter, and looked ahead to the 2014 Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference.

The P5 discussed the latest developments in the area of multilateral disarmament initiatives including the situation at the Conference on Disarmament. They expressed their shared disappointment that the Conference on Disarmament continues to be prevented from agreeing on a comprehensive program of work, including work on a legally binding, verifiable international ban on the production of fissile material (FMCT) for use in nuclear weapons, and discussed efforts to find a way forward in the Conference on Disarmament, including by continuing their efforts with other relevant partners to promote such negotiations within the CD. The P5 reiterated their support for the immediate start of negotiations on a treaty encompassing such a ban in the Conference on Disarmament. They noted the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on FMCT, and expressed the hope that its work will help spur negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. The P5 reaffirmed the historic contribution of the pragmatic, step-by-step process to nuclear disarmament and stressed the continued validity of this proven route. In this context, they also emphasized their shared understanding of the serious consequences of nuclear weapon use and that the P5 would continue to give the highest priority to avoiding such contingencies.

The P5 advanced their previous discussions of an approach to reporting on their relevant activities across all three pillars of the NPT Action Plan at the

2014 NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting, consistent with the NPT Action Plan, and resolved to continue working on this issue under France's leadership. They plan to continue their discussions in multiple ways within the P5 with a view to reporting to the 2014 PrepCom, consistent with their commitments under Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the 2010 RevCon Final Document. They welcomed the progress made on the development of the P5 glossary of key nuclear terms under China's leadership and discussed next steps. They stressed the importance of this work, which will increase P5 mutual understanding and facilitate further P5 discussions on nuclear matters. The P5 reaffirmed their objective to submit a P5 glossary of key nuclear terms to the 2015 NPT Review Conference. The P5 are working toward the establishment of a firm foundation for mutual confidence and further disarmament efforts. They shared further information on their respective bilateral and multilateral experiences in verification and resolved to continue such exchanges.

The P5 recalled their Joint Statement of 3 May 2012 at the Preparatory Committee of the NPT Review Conference and pledged to continue their efforts in different formats and at various international fora to find peaceful diplomatic solutions to the outstanding problems faced by the non-proliferation regime. They reiterated their call on the states concerned to fulfill without delay their international obligations under the appropriate UN Security Council resolutions, undertakings with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and other appropriate international commitments. In the context of the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 12 February 2013 and the continued pursuit of certain nuclear activities by Iran, both contrary to the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, the P5 reaffirmed their concerns about these serious challenges to the non-proliferation regime.

The P5 underlined the fundamental importance of an effective IAEA safeguards system in preventing nuclear proliferation and facilitating cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The P5 stressed the need for strengthening IAEA safeguards including through the promotion of the universal adoption of the Additional Protocol and the development of approaches to IAEA safeguards implementation based on objective state factors. They also discussed the role of the P5 in assisting the IAEA in cases involving possible detection of nuclear weapon programs in non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) in conformity with the provisions of the NPT.

The P5 continued their previous discussions of efforts to achieve the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and reviewed the recent UK-hosted P5 Experts Meeting on CTBT, at which the P5 identified a number of areas for future P5 collaboration and decided to pursue further

intersessional work, in particular ahead of the Integrated Field Exercise in 2014. The P5 called upon all States to uphold their national moratoria on nuclear weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty pending its entry into force.

The P5 shared their views on how to prevent abuse of NPT withdrawal (Article X). The discussion included modalities under which NPT States Party could respond collectively and individually to a notification of withdrawal, including through arrangements regarding the disposition of equipment and materials acquired or derived under safeguards during NPT membership. They resolved to make efforts to broaden consensus among NPT States Party on the latter issue at the 2014 PrepCom, thus making a further contribution to the NPT Review Process.

The P5 reiterated the importance of the implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference decisions related to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, in particular those related to the convening of a conference to be attended by all the States of the Middle East on the establishment of the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the states of the region. They underlined their support for all States concerned, making all efforts necessary for the preparation and convening of the Conference in the nearest future. They also reiterated their full support to the ongoing efforts of the facilitator.

The P5 reviewed their efforts to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. They reaffirmed their view that establishment of such zones helps to build confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, enhance regional and international security, and reinforce the NPT and the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. They reaffirmed their readiness to sign the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone as soon as possible. They underlined the importance of holding consultations, including on the margins of the Second PrepCom, with the States Party to the Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone in Central Asia. They noted also the parallel declarations, adopted by the P5 and Mongolia concerning Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, at the United Nations headquarters in New York on 17 September 2012.

The P5 pledged to continue to meet at all appropriate levels on nuclear issues to further promote dialogue and mutual confidence. The P5 plan to follow up their discussions and hold a fifth P5 conference in 2014.

Joint Statement on the Fifth P5 Conference, Beijing, 2014

1. The five Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear-weapon states, or P5, met in Beijing on April 14-15, 2014, under the chairmanship of the People's Republic of China, to build on the 2009 London, 2011 Paris, 2012 Washington, and 2013 Russian-hosted Geneva P5 conferences. The P5 reviewed progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon), and continued discussions on issues related to all three pillars of the NPT – disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The P5 also had a useful discussion with representatives of civil society during the Conference.

2. The P5 reviewed significant developments at the 2013 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2015 NPT Review Conference and in the context of the NPT since the 2013 Geneva P5 Conference. The P5 reaffirmed that the NPT remains the essential cornerstone for the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and they remain committed to strengthening the NPT. They emphasized the importance of continuing to work together in implementing the Action Plan adopted by consensus at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and reaffirmed their commitment to the shared goal of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament as provided for in Article VI of the NPT. The P5 intend to continue to seek progress on the step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament, which is the only practical path to achieving a world without nuclear weapons and in keeping with our NPT obligations.

3. The P5 intend to strengthen P5 engagement to advance progress on NPT obligations and 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan commitments. The P5 advanced their previous discussions on the issues of transparency, confidence-building, and verification, and welcomed the achievement under France's leadership of P5 consensus on a reporting framework. They introduced to each other their national reports consistent with this reporting framework and Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the 2010 NPT RevCon Final Document, with a view to reporting to the 2014 PrepCom. They encourage other NPT States Party to submit reports, consistent with Action 20 of the NPT RevCon Final Document.

4. The P5 reviewed the work carried out by the Working Group on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms under China's leadership, and in this regard, noted the success of the Second Experts' Meeting of the Working Group held on 26-27 September 2013, in Beijing, which established milestones for the completion of the first phase of the Glossary effort for the 2015 RevCon. The progress made in this effort provides a solid foundation for the Working Group to submit its outcome

on the terms currently under discussion to the 2015 NPT Review Conference. The P5 stressed again the importance of this work, which is increasing mutual understanding and will facilitate further P5 discussions beyond 2015 on nuclear issues.

5. The P5 had an exchange of views on their nuclear doctrines, strategic stability, and international security from their individual country perspectives to gain better understanding and build strategic trust. They also discussed the importance of verification in achieving progress towards further disarmament and ensuring the success of nonproliferation efforts. The P5 welcomed briefings by the Russian Federation and the United States on aspects of the New START Treaty's implementation, as well as on implementation of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of Highly-Enriched Uranium Extracted From Nuclear Weapons, signed in Washington, D.C. on 18 February 1993, and its related Protocol on HEU Transparency Arrangements. The P5 shared further information on their respective experiences in verification and resolved to continue such exchanges.

6. The P5 visited the Chinese National Data Centre for the implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), as an endeavor to enhance transparency and mutual understanding. They recalled their commitment in the 2010 NPT RevCon Final Document to promote and take concrete steps towards early entry into force of the CTBT and its universalization. They called upon all States to uphold their national moratoria on nuclear weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty pending its entry into force. The P5 intend to continue their cooperative work to strengthen the CTBT verification regime. The P5 confirmed their support for the ad referendum arrangement for collaborative work by their CTBT technical experts towards improved critical on-site inspection techniques and technology.

7. The P5 supported efforts to revitalize the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and continue to be concerned with the impasse at the CD. They discussed efforts to find a way forward in the CD and reiterated their support for a comprehensive program of work, which includes the immediate start of negotiations in the CD on a legally binding, verifiable international ban on the production of fissile material (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty or FMCT) for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices on the basis of CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. The P5 participated fully in the first session of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on FMCT, established in UNGA/A/RES/67/53, and look forward to further engagement in this group.

8. In reaffirming the historic contribution of the pragmatic, step-by-step process to nuclear disarmament and stressing the continued validity of this proven route, the P5 also emphasized their shared understanding of the severe consequences of nuclear weapon use and their resolve to continue to give the highest priority to avoiding such contingencies, which is in the interests of all nations.

9. The P5 shared their views on topical proliferation issues and remain concerned about serious challenges to the nonproliferation regime. They pledged to continue their efforts in different formats and at various international fora to find peaceful diplomatic solutions to the outstanding issues faced by the nonproliferation regime. As they did previously, and looking ahead to the 2014 PrepCom, they called on the states concerned to fulfill without delay their international obligations under the appropriate UN Security Council resolutions, undertakings with the IAEA and other appropriate international commitments.

10. The P5 shared their views on how to prevent abuse of NPT withdrawal (Article X). They resolved to make efforts to broaden consensus among NPT States Party on the withdrawal issue at the 2014 PrepCom, thus making a further contribution to the NPT Review Process.

11. The P5 reviewed their efforts to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties as soon as possible. They also reiterated their support for the early convening of a conference, to be attended by all the States of the Middle East, on the establishment of the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the states of the region.

12. The P5 discussed issues related to strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. They stressed the need for strengthening IAEA safeguards including through the promotion of the universal adoption of the Additional Protocol and the development of approaches to IAEA safeguards implementation based on objective state factors. The P5 also discussed the role of the nuclear-weapon-states, in conformity with the provisions of the NPT, in assisting the IAEA in cases involving possible detection of nuclear weapon programs in non-nuclear weapon states.

13. The P5 noted that they are now more engaged than ever in regular interactions on disarmament, arms control, and nonproliferation issues. The P5 pledged to continue to meet at all appropriate levels on nuclear issues to further promote dialogue and mutual confidence. In addition to meeting at all appropriate levels, the P5 intend to hold a sixth P5 conference. The P5 welcomed the offer by the United Kingdom to host this conference in London in 2015.

Joint Statement on the Sixth P5 Conference, London, 2015

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS), or P5, met in London, 4-5 February 2015, for the sixth P5 Conference to review progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference and to discuss the next steps for the P5 Process. In particular the P5

considered the implementation of the 2010 Action Plan adopted by consensus as a roadmap for long term action. The P5 also considered a wide array of issues related to and steps towards making progress on all three pillars of the NPT: disarmament, non- proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In addition, the P5 had constructive and productive discussions with a number of non-nuclear-weapon states and civil society representatives.

In reaffirming their commitment towards achieving a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the NPT, the P5 reflected on the contribution that the P5 Process has made in developing the mutual confidence and transparency among the P5 that is essential to make progress towards multilateral nuclear disarmament. At the start of the second cycle of the process, all of the P5 noted the value of having an established dialogue, with each P5 state having now hosted a conference at least once. They welcomed how each conference had built on the success of the last and the increasing amount of intersessional work on issues such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the achievement of P5 consensus on a common reporting framework and the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms, which have all contributed towards the implementation of the 2010 Action Plan.

At their 2015 Conference the P5 restated their belief that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remains the essential cornerstone for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and is an essential contribution to international security and stability. They reviewed the NPT Preparatory Committee process over the course of this Review Cycle and considered the upcoming 2015 Review Conference, where the P5 intend to make a joint statement. The P5 looked forward to working with all States Parties to the NPT to ensure a positive outcome to the Review Conference that is balanced across the three mutually reinforcing pillars.

The P5 reaffirmed that a step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security for all remains the only realistic and practical route to achieving a world without nuclear weapons. To this end, the P5 discussed issues related to international security and strategic stability and their nuclear doctrines in order to enhance

mutual understanding in these areas. This included updates on New START implementation and the verification experiences of both the Russian Federation and the United States in relation to the New START Treaty. It was noted that, since the entry into force of the NPT, the step-by-step approach has already dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons held by the NWS from their Cold War peak. The P5 all reaffirmed the importance of full compliance with existing, legally-binding arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and obligations as an essential element of international peace and security.

The P5 stressed that addressing further prospects for nuclear disarmament would require taking into account all factors that could affect global strategic stability. In doing so they stressed the importance of engaging in frank and constructive dialogue to that end.

The P5 reiterated their shared understanding about the severe consequences of nuclear weapon use and underlined their resolve to prevent such an occurrence from happening. They also reaffirmed their commitment to existing security assurances regarding the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons, including, in accordance with UNSCR 984 (1995), their readiness to assist non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT that may become the victims of a nuclear attack (terrorist or otherwise).

The P5 discussed efforts to achieve entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and recalled their commitment in the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document to promote and take concrete steps towards early entry into force of the CTBT and its universalization. They called upon all states to uphold national moratoria on conducting any nuclear explosion. It was noted that all members of the P5 have such a voluntary moratorium in place. P5 collaboration on improving and maintaining the International Monitoring System was reviewed. The P5 intend to release a joint statement on minimizing the impact of medical isotope production on the International Monitoring System. Further, particular note was made of the successful completion of the Integrated Field Exercise 2014 in Jordan, to which all members of the P5 contributed equipment, personnel and effort. The P5 decided to continue regular technical meetings aimed at enhancing the verification regime and to hold a workshop on data quality objectives for radionuclide measurements for on-site inspections.

The P5 reiterated their full support for the United Nation's disarmament machinery, including the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and the Disarmament Commission. Whilst there was shared disappointment over the long-standing lack of consensus on a Programme of Work in the CD, the P5 welcomed the increased

activity of the CD in its 2014 session and in particular informal substantive discussions held on all CD agenda items under the Schedule of Activities and the efforts of the Informal Working Group which sought to produce a Programme of Work robust in substance and progressive over time in implementation. The P5 discussed efforts to find a way forward in the CD and reiterated their support for a comprehensive and balanced Programme of Work which includes the immediate start of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)) on the basis of CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. The P5 stressed in this regard the importance of the ongoing discussions of the Group of Governmental Experts established by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 67/53.

The P5 also decided that they should increasingly engage with the wider disarmament community. To this end, a number of non-nuclear-weapon states were invited, for the first time, to a briefing and discussion session as part of the P5 Conference. The P5 delivered a briefing on the Conference before discussing a number of NPT-related matters in greater depth and expressed their desire to continue such discussions when preparing for the important steps of the next review cycle, building on the increased engagement that has taken place in recent months with the NNWS. In addition to this an outreach event was organised in conjunction with Chatham House, providing civil society the opportunity to engage with the P5.

The P5 co-operative work featured heavily during the discussions and progress was made on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. The P5 announced their intention to release the first edition for the Ninth Review Conference. The P5 intend to revise and update the Glossary as appropriate in due course.

The P5 received updates on a variety of bilateral and multilateral projects regarding disarmament verification, including from some P5 members.

The P5 reiterated the need to find peaceful and diplomatic solutions to challenges to the non-proliferation regime. The P5 welcome the ongoing diplomatic process between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the P5+1, and highlighted their continued commitment to negotiations on a comprehensive settlement that would guarantee the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's programme. Regarding the interaction between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran, they noted the urgent need for full co-operation in order to resolve all outstanding issues, including those related to possible military dimensions. Additionally, the P5 stressed their resolve for a diplomatic resolution

to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula so as to achieve its complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization in accordance with the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks.

The P5 stressed the importance of maintaining and strengthening the IAEA's safeguards system. Discussions covered matters such as the universalisation of the Additional Protocol.

In discussing nuclear-weapon-free zones, the P5 welcomed the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on the Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in 2014 and its subsequent ratification by France and the UK, and noted the relevant efforts by others to bring about the Protocol's entry into force. The P5 also expressed hope that progress would be made on the signature of the Protocol to the South East Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, and encouraged the parties to that Treaty to continue to engage constructively in order to find solutions to outstanding issues. Furthermore, the P5 reaffirmed their full support for the efforts of the facilitator and co-conveners in holding a conference on establishing a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East, and urged all states of the region to redouble their efforts to reach consensus on arrangements so that a conference could be convened.

The P5 continued their discussion on the issue of withdrawal from the NPT. Whilst noting that every State Party has the right to withdraw under the provisions of Article X.1, the P5 expressed the hope that the Review Conference would reach consensus on recommendations concerning potential abuse of the exercise of the right of withdrawal.

The P5 reviewed actions by each of the P5 to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States Parties to the NPT in conformity with Articles I, II, and III of the NPT, and reaffirmed their support for the programs of the IAEA in this area, including the Technical Cooperation Programme.

The NWS looked forward to continuing their dialogue in order to make progress on NPT obligations. The P5 welcomed France's generous offer to host the next P5 Conference. They looked forward to a consensual, balanced outcome to the 2015 Review Conference, which would do much to enhance the P5's continuing efforts to strengthen the NPT.

Statement by the United Kingdom on Behalf of the P5 to the 2015 NPT RevCon, New York, 30 April 2015

1. As Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the People's Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm our enduring commitment to the NPT, which remains indispensable to the maintenance of international peace and security. For forty-five years, the NPT has served as the cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, a conduit for expanding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy amongst Parties to the Treaty, and the foundation for the collective pursuit of nuclear disarmament.

2. Every NPT State Party benefits from a strong and effective NPT regime and each can contribute to its implementation by helping to prevent proliferation, foster the safe and secure use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and create conditions conducive to nuclear disarmament. The purposes for which the NPT was established remain valid and continue to unite efforts to address current nuclear challenges. We look forward to joining with all States Parties in pursuit of common goals and pledge our strongest efforts toward a successful outcome at this ninth NPT Review Conference (RevCon).

3. We are committed to strengthening each of the NPT's mutually reinforcing pillars – disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These are complementary goals and should be pursued together, systematically and with equal determination across all three pillars by all States Parties. The consensus Action Plan from the 2010 RevCon was unprecedented and a result of the strengthened NPT review process adopted in 1995. We support the fullest implementation of all Action Plan recommendations and we call on all States Parties to continue working toward that end. The 2015 RevCon presents the opportunity to reaffirm that the Action Plan remains valid as a road-map, to take stock of its implementation, and to consider where consensus may be possible for further measures building upon the 2010 Action Plan.

4. As NPT nuclear-weapon States, we reaffirm the shared goal of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament as referenced in the preamble and provided for in Article VI of the NPT. In this regard, we remain steadfast in our commitment to seeking a safer world for all and achieving a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the NPT. We continue to pursue progressive and concrete steps towards this end, including the relevant recommendations of the Action Plan, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security, and based on the principle of increased and undiminished security for all. We continue to believe that an incremental, step-by-step approach is the only practical option for making progress towards nuclear disarmament, while upholding global strategic security and stability. This goal is what motivates our concerted efforts to pursue practical steps toward nuclear disarmament. All States can help fulfill this goal by creating the

necessary security environment through resolving regional tensions, tackling proliferation challenges, promoting collective security, and making progress in all areas of disarmament.

5. As detailed in our respective national reports to the 2015 Review Conference, there has been very substantial progress on Article VI. The Cold War nuclear arms race has ended. Global stocks of nuclear weapons are at their lowest point in over half a century as the result of unprecedented efforts on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. When fully implemented, the New START Treaty will result in the lowest number of deployed nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia since the 1950s.

6. We underline the need to pursue further efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and Action 3 of the 2010 Action Plan in a manner that promotes international stability and security. We stress that addressing further prospects for nuclear disarmament would require taking into account all factors that could affect global strategic stability. We also stress the importance of engaging in frank and constructive dialogue to that end, and confirm our readiness to do so. While we continue to work towards our common goal of nuclear disarmament, we affirm that our nuclear forces should be maintained at the lowest levels needed to meet national security requirements. We further reaffirm the importance of full compliance with existing, legally-binding arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and obligations as an essential element of international peace and security.

7. We are ever cognizant of the severe consequences that would accompany the use of nuclear weapons. We affirm our resolve to prevent such an occurrence from happening. We each give the highest priority to ensuring the safety, security, and effective control over nuclear weapons, and we each implement technical and procedural measures in this area that we continually assess and improve. We further affirm that we do not target any state with nuclear weapons. We note the importance of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategies. We will continue to pursue dialogue and cooperation in support of such efforts as appropriate.

8. Since the UK initiated the P5 process in 2009, we have held six conferences to foster dialogue, transparency and common approaches to strengthening the NPT. France plans to host the seventh conference. Each conference has built on the last and helps lay the groundwork for further steps. We continue to implement Action 5 of the Action Plan to “further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence” through P5 dialogue and action. In this regard, we agreed on a common reporting framework in 2014 under France’s leadership and completed

a first edition of a Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms under China's leadership. This edition will be released during the Review Conference and a side event will be held to introduce our efforts in this regard. The P5 intend to revise and update the Glossary as appropriate in due course. Also in this regard, we have increased our engagement with the wider disarmament community, including by meeting with non-nuclear weapon states as part of the most recent P5 Conference in London and continuing P5 engagement with civil society.

9. Our commitment to nuclear disarmament extends to efforts to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force at an early date. We look forward to the 9th Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT to be held in September in New York. We urge all states that have not done so to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible to bring about its entry into force. We take this opportunity to reaffirm our own moratoria on nuclear weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the CTBT's entry into force, and call on other states to do likewise. The CTBT constrains the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and thereby provides an effective disarmament and nonproliferation measure. We further note that nuclear stockpile maintenance programs are and will remain consistent with NPT obligations. We emphasize the very substantial efforts made in achieving the cessation of the nuclear arms race as called for in Article VI of the NPT and affirm our intention never to resume such an arms race.

10. We are working closely with the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization in Vienna on the development of the Treaty's verification regime, including its International Monitoring System, International Data Centre, and On-Site Inspection. Since the 2010 Review Conference, we have contributed extensively to the development of the Treaty's on-site inspection element, supplying personnel, equipment, and research. This has been in addition to our long standing efforts to reinforce the organization's detection capability through contributions in-kind and expert participation in Working Groups. Against this backdrop, we welcome the highly successful Integrated Field Exercise in Jordan late last year. We also call for all signatories to support efforts to complete the necessary preparation for the effective implementation of the CTBT's verification regime on its entry into force. In this regard, we recall our joint statement, issued following the 2015 P5 London Conference, on minimizing the impact of medical isotope production on the global radioactive monitoring activity, while recognizing that medical isotope production is critically important.

11. In keeping with the Action Plan, we reaffirm our support and readiness immediately to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use

in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)) in the Conference on Disarmament on the basis of CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced Program of Work. We welcome the in-depth discussions that took place in 2014 in the CD in the framework of the Schedule of Activities. We welcome the efforts undertaken by the UN Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to UNGA Resolution 67/53 and commend the final report adopted by consensus. We are convinced that this report will facilitate future negotiations in the CD.

12. We are cognizant of the role security assurances play in strengthening the NPT regime. We reaffirm our commitment to existing security assurances regarding the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons and recall our statements on negative and positive security assurances as noted in UNSCR 984, and as revised since then. We stand ready to engage in substantive discussions on security assurances in the Conference on Disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced Program of Work. We also continue to regard protocols to existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone treaties as an appropriate mechanism for providing legally binding negative security assurances. We welcome the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on the Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ) in May 2014 and its ratification by China, France, Russia, and the UK. We note that consultations also continue with the State Parties to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty and encourage the Parties to that Treaty to continue to engage constructively in order to find solutions to outstanding issues. We remain ready to sign the SEANWFZ Protocol.

13. We continue to reiterate the importance of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the progress made on this issue at the 2010 RevCon. We commend the efforts of the conference facilitator, Ambassador Laajava, and note the efforts of the co-conveners to advance consultations among regional states, particularly the five rounds of consultations held among the parties, so that the Helsinki conference on a Middle East WMD free zone can be held at the soonest possible time. We also commend the contribution of regional States who demonstrated a constructive approach and readiness for certain compromises. We look forward to the convening of this conference once the states of the region reach consensus on an agenda and related arrangements. We affirm our commitment to work with all states of the region and other relevant partners to advance this important action, which would be a concrete step toward realization of the 1995 Middle East Resolution.

14. While realizing all of the objectives of Article VI of the NPT, we reaffirm

that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security. We reiterate our call for further progress on all aspects of disarmament to enhance global security. We urge all countries which have yet to do so to ratify or accede to, and implement the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

15. The 2010 Action Plan underlines the importance of compliance with nonproliferation obligations in order to uphold the integrity of the NPT and the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. We reaffirm that all States Parties must ensure strict compliance with their nonproliferation obligations under the NPT. We remain deeply concerned by the challenge that non-compliance by States Parties poses to the integrity of the NPT and emphasize the importance of bringing it to the attention of the UN Security Council, which will determine if a situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security. We emphasize the Security Council's primary responsibility in addressing such threats. We continue to call for prompt and diplomatic solutions to challenges to the non-proliferation regime.

16. We welcome the fact that the P5+1 and Iran have reached solutions on key parameters on 2 April in Lausanne, Switzerland laying the agreed basis for the final text, and we highlight our continued commitment to complete successfully negotiations by 30 June on a comprehensive settlement that would ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's program. Regarding the interaction between the IAEA and Iran, we note the continuing need for full cooperation in order to resolve all outstanding issues, including those related to possible military dimensions. We welcome Iran's continuing implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) and the essential role the IAEA is playing in verifying them. Accordingly, we pledge to continue to implement our commitments under the JPOA.

17. We reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation of the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and call on the DPRK to do the same. We urge the DPRK to respond to diplomatic efforts aimed at the eventual resumption of the Six-Party Talks, and achieving complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

18. We underscore our support for actions to sustain and strengthen IAEA safeguards, which remain of fundamental importance to the NPT. We recognize that IAEA safeguards not only prevent nuclear proliferation but also facilitate cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We reiterate that the Additional Protocol, together with a comprehensive safeguards agreement,

should become the universally recognized standard for international verification of safeguards obligations under the NPT. As stated in the 2010 Action Plan, we call on all States that have not yet done so to bring into force IAEA safeguards agreements in accordance with Article III of the Treaty, as well as Additional Protocols and updated Small Quantities Protocols where applicable at an early date. We have each brought into force a voluntary offer safeguards agreement with an Additional Protocol applying to peaceful nuclear activities as a demonstration of our readiness to accept safeguards on civilian nuclear activities like those in place for non-nuclear-weapon states. We remain prepared to assist any state requesting help in the implementation of its safeguards agreements, including the Additional Protocol, in particular through our national support programs to IAEA safeguards. We further stress the importance of maintaining the credibility, effectiveness, efficiency, and integrity of the IAEA safeguards system and support efforts aimed at improving them further.

19. We recognize the substantial contributions made by the IAEA in support of the NPT and urge all States Parties to provide their full support to the IAEA, including by ensuring the Agency has sufficient resources to meet its responsibilities.

20. We reaffirm the right of NPT Parties to pursue peaceful use of nuclear energy without discrimination and in conformity with their nonproliferation obligations. We are committed to continuing to broaden access of NPT Parties to peaceful uses of nuclear energy in ways that respect the highest nuclear safety, security, and nonproliferation standards. Use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes substantially contributes to the sustainable development of humanity. When used in consistency with the highest standards of safety, security, and non-proliferation, nuclear energy promotes economic development of states and represents an important element of the world energy mix that provides energy security, addresses the challenges of climate change, and ensures vital non-power applications such as nuclear medicine, agriculture, water resources management and industry. We note our long tradition of support for international cooperation on peaceful uses, both bilaterally and internationally, including the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Program and Peaceful Uses Initiative, the IAEA's International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles, and the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation.

21. We strongly support measures to assure access to nuclear fuel, such as the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Reserve in the Russian Federation, the American Assured Fuel Supply, and the UK Assurance of Supply of Enrichment Services. We note the importance of establishing the IAEA low-enriched uranium (LEU) bank. These contributions promote achievement of sustainable development and

energy security goals and benefit all NPT States Parties.

22. We reaffirm our support of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and Zangger Committee. These two international export control mechanisms play an important role by providing the assurance that nuclear suppliers need to facilitate the greatest possible exchange of nuclear material, equipment, and technology for peaceful purposes. It is essential that export control lists and guidelines are kept up-to-date, taking into account the evolution of nuclear technology and nuclear proliferation developments. We welcome the efforts of the NSG in this regard. We encourage all States Parties to adopt export control guidelines and reiterate our readiness to provide assistance as States Parties may request.

23. Nuclear safety and security are critical to the future of nuclear energy. We reaffirm the fundamental responsibility of states in accordance with their respective obligations and the central role of the IAEA in international cooperation in these fields. We welcome the efforts to draw lessons from the tragic Fukushima accident, offer our full support to implementation of the IAEA's Nuclear Safety Action Plan, and welcome the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety, adopted 9 February 2015. We further recognize the substantial efforts undertaken to improve nuclear security, including through the Nuclear Security Summits held in Washington in 2010, in Seoul in 2012, and in The Hague in 2014, and the upcoming 2016 Summit to be hosted by the United States, as well as the IAEA Ministerial Conference for Nuclear Security in 2013 and the upcoming IAEA Ministerial Conference for Nuclear Security in 2016. We also welcome the contribution made by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism within its respective mandate and membership. These efforts have served to accelerate work to prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism and to provide further impetus to efforts by states and the relevant international institutions and organizations to strengthen nuclear security worldwide. In particular, we underline the need for universal support for the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as well as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the entry into force as soon as possible of the 2005 Amendment thereto. We stress the importance of a culture of nuclear safety and nuclear security, both for States Parties with established nuclear energy programs and those developing nuclear energy programs, and encourage universal support for all relevant international conventions, institutions, and organizations. We underline the need to strengthen and optimize international cooperation, in coordination with the IAEA, to better meet the growing needs in capacity building, in particular to train the necessary skilled workforce needed to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

24. While States Parties have the right to withdraw from the NPT, such a

withdrawal must be done in accordance with Article X of the Treaty. States Parties should support recommendations to prevent abuse of the NPT withdrawal provision. We note in this regard the role of the UN Security Council in addressing without delay any state's notice of withdrawal from the NPT, and recall that a state remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal, and such withdrawal would not affect any other legal obligation of the withdrawing state to other States Parties. At the same time, we are convinced that any decision taken by this Conference in relation to withdrawal from the NPT should not lead to the revision of Article X, re-open the text of the Treaty, or undermine the commonly recognized principles and norms of international law. P5 have agreed to make efforts to broaden consensus among NPT State Parties on issues of procedures and consequences of withdrawal at the 2015 RevCon.

25. We attach great importance to achieving the universality of the NPT. We urge those States that are not Parties to the Treaty to accede as non-nuclear-weapon States and pending accession to the NPT, to adhere to its terms. We stand ready to work with Parties to engage the non-Parties with a view to achieving this goal.

26. As we rededicate ourselves to the NPT and its three mutually reinforcing pillars – disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy – we also pledge our support for efforts to ensure the Review Conference builds on the success of the 2010 Action Plan and encourages further cooperation on steps to strengthen all three pillars of the NPT.

Joint Statement on the Seventh P5 Conference, Washington, DC, 2016

1. As Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the People's Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America met in Washington, D.C., 14-15 September 2016, for the seventh P5 Conference to demonstrate continued commitment to the NPT, and to review progress made on nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy including in fulfilling commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The P5 reaffirmed the ongoing relevance of all provisions of the Action Plan adopted by consensus at the 2010 NPT Review Conference that remains an indispensable roadmap for the implementation of all the three pillars of the NPT. The P5 took stock of the 2015 NPT Review Conference and discussed ways to enhance prospects for the 2020 NPT Review Cycle. The P5 look forward to working with all States Parties to the NPT to ensure a positive outcome to the 2020 NPT Review Cycle.

2. The P5 recognized the considerable progress made together through the P5 process since the first such conference in 2009 and reaffirmed the value of this format for fostering dialogue, transparency, and cooperation among Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and with international partners. The development of a common reporting framework for the 2015 NPT Review cycle, the work of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Experts Group, and the publishing of a Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms provide a sound foundation for further cooperative work. They resolved to continue working together through the P5 process to make further progress during the 2020 NPT Review Cycle.

3. The P5 reaffirmed that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, a framework for expanding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy amongst States Parties to the Treaty, and the foundation for the collective pursuit of nuclear disarmament. The P5 committed to working together and with other States Parties to strengthen in a balanced and effective manner each of the NPT's mutually reinforcing pillars – disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The P5 reaffirmed that the preservation of the integrity of the NPT, achieving its universality and its strict implementation are essential to regional and international peace and security.

4. At their 2016 Conference, the P5 reaffirmed the shared goal of and commitment to nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament, as referenced in the preamble and provided for in Article VI of the NPT. The P5 restated their steadfast commitment to seeking a safer world for all and achieving a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the NPT. We continue to pursue a progressive step by step approach towards this end, in a way that promotes international stability, peace, and security, and based on the principle of increased and undiminished security for all. We continue to believe that this approach is the only practical way to make progress toward nuclear disarmament while enhancing international peace and stability, and is the only realistic way to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. The P5 stressed that addressing further prospects for nuclear disarmament would require taking into account all factors that could affect global strategic stability. The P5 all reaffirmed the importance of full compliance with existing, legally-binding arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and obligations as an essential element of international peace and security.

5. The P5 expressed their deep concern with efforts to pursue approaches to nuclear disarmament that disregard the global strategic context. Such efforts will threaten the consensus-based approach that has served for decades to strengthen the NPT regime and enhance the Treaty's contribution to international security and may negatively affect the prospects for consensus at future

NPT Review Conferences. The P5 reiterated a call upon all members of the international community to engage in an open and constructive dialogue on nuclear disarmament, international security, and stability issues that is inclusive of all states and focused on practical measures leading to a world without nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

6. The P5 reiterated their full support for the United Nations' disarmament machinery, including the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and the Disarmament Commission. While noting their disappointment at the long-standing lack of consensus on a Program of Work in the CD, the P5 acknowledged creative efforts to find a compromise during the 2016 session and discussed a number of proposals towards that end. In this regard, the P5 reaffirm their support and readiness to explore all of the options to get the CD back to work, taking into account all previous proposals and agreements amongst themselves and bearing in mind the 2010 NPT Action Plan.

7. The P5 reaffirmed that, as stated in UN Security Council Resolution 1887 (2009), the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery constitutes a threat to international peace and security. They reaffirmed that all NPT States Parties must ensure strict compliance with their nonproliferation obligations under the NPT. The P5 remained deeply concerned by the challenge that non-compliance by States Parties poses to the integrity of the NPT and emphasize the role of the UN Security Council in determining if such situations constitute a threat to international peace and security. The P5 emphasized the Security Council's primary responsibility in addressing such threats. The P5 reiterated the importance of seeking peaceful and diplomatic solutions to the challenges facing the non-proliferation regime. They also noted the need to further strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system, including the universalization of the Additional Protocol.

8. They strongly condemned the January 6 and September 9 2016 nuclear tests, and the continued ballistic missile tests and ballistic missile launches carried out by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in violation of its obligations pursuant to relevant UN Security Council resolutions and in contravention of its commitments under the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. The P5 recalled the press statement of the UN Security Council on September 9, 2016. The P5 reiterated the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in North-East Asia at large. The P5 reaffirmed their commitment to the full implementation of the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, and urged the DPRK to respond to diplomatic efforts aimed at the eventual resumption of the Six- Party Talks and achieving complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a

peaceful manner. They stressed the importance of working to reduce tensions in the Korean Peninsula.

9. They also welcomed and reaffirmed their commitment to the full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) endorsed by the UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Successful implementation of this JCPOA will ensure that Iran's nuclear program is and remains exclusively peaceful and will enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as recognized in the relevant articles of the NPT in line with its obligations therein. They called for full implementation of all commitments pursuant to the JCPOA. They expressed their strong support for the IAEA's essential and independent role.

10. The P5 noted that global stocks of nuclear weapons are now at their lowest point in over half a century as the result of unprecedented efforts on the part of nuclear weapon states. They further underlined the need to pursue further efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament in accordance with the Preamble and Article VI of the NPT and in a way that promotes international security and stability and taking into account all factors that could affect strategic stability.

11. The P5 discussed global strategic stability and their respective nuclear doctrines. In their shared effort to strengthen international peace and security and to address further prospects for nuclear disarmament, they stressed their readiness to engage in frank and constructive dialogue that takes into account all factors that could affect global strategic stability. The P5 also decided to seek enhanced international understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in the overall international security environment.

12. The P5 noted that 2016 marks twenty years since the opening for signature of the CTBT, and reiterated their commitment in the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document to promote and take concrete steps toward early entry into force and universalization of the Treaty. They called upon all states to uphold national moratoria on conducting nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion pending entry-into-force of the CTBT. The P5 reviewed efforts to build and maintain the International Monitoring System (IMS), supported by the International Data Centre (IDC), as well as a strong On-site Inspection (OSI) regime.

13. The P5 reviewed various areas of cooperation and reaffirmed their shared commitment to broaden and deepen dialogue and cooperation. The P5 decided to undertake further activities on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms.

The P5 also reaffirmed the value of continuing regular meetings of technical experts to promote completion of the CTBT's verification regime and enhance its effectiveness. The P5 also decided to support and encourage dialogue among academic experts and scientists on mutually agreed issues related to international security and stability, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The P5 decided to pursue further interaction and dialogue with non-nuclear weapon States in various multilateral formats. They shared further information on their respective bilateral and multilateral experiences in verification and resolved to continue such exchanges.

14. The P5 reiterated their common understanding of the severe consequences of use of nuclear weapons. They underscored their resolve to prevent such an occurrence from happening. They further reaffirmed their commitment to existing security assurances regarding the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons and recalled their statements on negative and positive security assurances as noted in UN Security Council Resolution 984 (1995), and as revised since then. The P5 intend to continue to exchange views on the issue.

15. The P5 reaffirmed the protocols to existing Nuclear-Weapon- Free-Zone treaties as an important mechanism for providing legally binding negative security assurances and recalled their signature of the Protocol to the Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty in 2014 and their readiness to sign the protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone at the soonest possible time. They reiterated the importance of the 1995 NPT Review Conference Resolution on the Middle East and underlined their readiness to undertake efforts, including with states in the region, aimed at its implementation. The P5 underscored the need for renewed engagement among the states in the region in order to convene an initial conference on a Middle East Zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

16. The P5 underscored their commitment to prevent nuclear terrorism and their support for measures to strengthen overall nuclear security. They recalled the series of Nuclear Security Summits. Welcoming the entry into force of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in May 2016, they renewed their support to the universalization of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities as well as of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. They reaffirmed their support for relevant international organizations such as the United Nations, IAEA, and INTERPOL as well as international initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. They also further reaffirmed the central role of the IAEA in international cooperation in the area of nuclear security and expressed support for the international conference on nuclear security to be

held in Vienna on December 5-9, 2016.

17. The P5 remain steadfast in their commitment to broaden access of NPT States Parties to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and they reiterated the right of NPT States Parties to pursue the peaceful use of nuclear energy without discrimination and in conformity with their nonproliferation obligations and highest standards of nuclear safety and security. The P5 noted their extensive support for international cooperation, both bilaterally and multilaterally, on peaceful use, including the IAEA Technical Cooperation Program and multiple initiatives to strengthen IAEA programs in these areas as appropriate. They welcomed the progress in establishing the IAEA low-enriched uranium (LEU) bank in Kazakhstan and expressed their continuing support for the IAEA LEU Reserve in Angarsk (Russia), the American Assured Fuel Supply, and the UK Assurance of Supply of Enrichment Services. They affirmed that these initiatives pave the way for the assured access to nuclear fuel, which promote sustainable development and energy security and benefit all NPT States Parties.

18. The P5 welcomed France's plans to host the next Conference in 2017.

Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by the NPT Nuclear Weapon States, 15 September 2016

Our commitment to nuclear disarmament extends to efforts to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force at an early date. We welcome that 183 States have signed the treaty and 166 States have ratified the Treaty, including several nuclear weapons States. We pledge to strive for the Treaty's early ratification and prompt entry into force and urge all states that have not done so to sign and ratify the treaty. We take this opportunity to reaffirm our own moratoria on nuclear weapons test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the CTBT's entry into force, as such moratoria are an example of responsible international behavior that contributes to international peace and stability, while stressing that such moratoria do not have the same permanent legally binding effect as entry into force. We call on other states to do likewise, recognizing that a nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT.

The CTBT constrains the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and thereby provides an effective disarmament and nonproliferation measure. We further note that our nuclear stockpile maintenance and stewardship programs are consistent with NPT and CTBT objectives. We emphasize the very substantial efforts made in achieving the cessation of the nuclear arms race as called for in Article VI of the NPT and affirm our intention

never to engage in such an arms race.

We are working closely with the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization in Vienna on the development of the Treaty's verification regime, including its International Monitoring System, International Data Centre, and On-Site Inspection, while recognizing the high effectiveness and reliability of this regime to date, the Preparatory Commission is currently operating the IMS and IDC, and their respective means of communication, on a testing and provisional basis. We continue to contribute extensively to the development of the Treaty's on-site inspection element, supplying personnel, equipment, and research. This has been in addition to our long standing efforts to reinforce the organization's detection capability through contributions in-kind, equipment transfers, and expert participation in Working Groups. We also call for all signatories to support efforts to complete the necessary preparation for the effective implementation of the CTBT's verification regime, on its entry into force.

Statement by France on Behalf of the P5 on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) to the 73rd United National General Assembly, New York, 22 October 2018

We, the nuclear weapon States recognized by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, reaffirm our commitment to the Treaty, in all its aspects, fifty years since its signature.

This landmark Treaty has provided the essential foundation for international efforts to stem the threat that nuclear weapons would spread across the globe, and has thereby limited the risk of nuclear war. It has provided the framework within which the peaceful uses of nuclear technology – for electricity, medicine, agriculture and industry – could be promoted and shared, to the benefit of humanity. And by helping to ease international tensions and create conditions of stability, security and trust among nations, it has allowed for a vital and continuing contribution to nuclear disarmament.

We pledge our full and continued support for the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which plays a critical role in NPT implementation, both in promoting the fullest possible cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and in applying safeguards and verifying that nuclear programmes are exclusively for peaceful purposes. We emphasise the need to further strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, including the universalisation of the Additional Protocol.

We remain committed under the Treaty to the pursuit of good faith negotiations

on effective measures related to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. We support the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all. We are committed to working to make the international environment more conducive to further progress on nuclear disarmament.

It is in this context that we reiterate our opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We firmly believe that the best way to achieve a world without nuclear weapons is through a gradual process that takes into account the international security environment. This proven approach to nuclear disarmament has produced tangible results, including deep reductions in the global stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

The TPNW fails to address the key issues that must be overcome to achieve lasting global nuclear disarmament. It contradicts, and risks undermining, the NPT. It ignores the international security context and regional challenges, and does nothing to increase trust and transparency between States. It will not result in the elimination of a single weapon. It fails to meet the highest standards of non-proliferation. It is creating divisions across the international non-proliferation and disarmament machinery, which could make further progress on disarmament even more difficult.

We will not support, sign or ratify this Treaty. The TPNW will not be binding on our countries, and we do not accept any claim that it contributes to the development of customary international law; nor does it set any new standards or norms. We call on all countries that are considering supporting the TPNW to reflect seriously on its implications for international peace and security.

Rather, we urge all States to commit to the continued success of the NPT: to ensure compliance, to promote universalisation, to ensure the highest standards of non-proliferation, and to respond to ongoing and emerging proliferation challenges, wherever they occur. In this context our five countries reiterate our commitment to continue our individual and collective efforts within the NPT framework to advance nuclear disarmament goals and objectives.

Briefing on the Eighth P5 Conference, Beijing, 2019 (by Ambassador Li Song to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 5 February, 2019)

On 30th of January, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, or the P5, held the 8th formal P5 Conference in Beijing. It is the first time over the past two years that the P5 has held a formal conference. The conference was presided over by H.E. Mr. Zhang Jun, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs

of China, Deputy Minister Sergey Ryabkov of Russia, Under Secretary of State Andrea Thompson of the United States, Director for Strategic Affairs, Security and Disarmament Mr. Nicolas Roche of France, Mr. Philip Barton, Director General for Consular and Security, Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Wood, Ambassador Liddle, Ambassador Fu Cong, who is now Director General of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and myself participated in this conference. Focusing on the theme of “Strengthening the P5 Coordination and Safeguarding the NPT Regime”, we had a candid and in-depth exchange of views on nuclear policies and doctrines, nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and other issues. Since China was hosting this conference in its capacity of the coordinator of the P5, I have the pleasure to share with distinguished colleagues the following important consensus we reached during the Beijing Conference.

First, the P5 undertook to jointly fulfilling the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. The P5 recognized that the current international security environment is facing severe challenges, and maintaining sound relations with each other is of crucial importance to global strategic issues. The P5 agreed to have an objective assessment of each other’s strategic intentions, enhance dialogue on nuclear policies and doctrines, promote strategic trust and common security, and make utmost efforts to prevent nuclear risks, in particular resulting from miscalculation and misperception. The P5 also recalled the importance of

maintaining the existing international arms control architecture, emphasized the importance of compliance with all international arms control agreements, and reaffirmed their commitment to existing negative and positive security assurances. The P5 expressed their readiness to renew engagement with the parties to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, and continue to work towards the establishment of a Middle East Zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

Second, the P5 undertook to jointly safeguard the NPT regime. The P5 emphasized that the NPT constitutes the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as part of the international security architecture, and reiterated their commitment to abiding by all provisions of the NPT and promoting its universality. The P5 agreed to work to make the international security environment more conducive to further progress on nuclear disarmament, and to achieve a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all, through a gradual approach. The P5 hold the view that the TPNW contradicts, and risks undermining the NPT, and reaffirmed their opposition to the TPNW. The P5 undertook to make maximum efforts in seeking peaceful

and diplomatic solutions to the challenges facing the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and support the IAEA to strengthen the safeguards system within its mandate. The P5 will promote international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and enhance coordination and cooperation on nuclear safety and nuclear security. As previously agreed, the P5 reiterated their commitment to submitting their respective national implementation reports by the 2020 NPT Review Conference, and to working together to make the Review Conference a success.

Third, the P5 agreed to enhance coordination and dialogue through the P5 process. At present, the international security situation is undergoing complex and profound change. Interaction among major countries has a bearing on the international security environment, the evolution of the international order and the confidence of the international community. The P5 agreed to maintain their strategic dialogue on nuclear policies and doctrines, strengthen their coordination in the NPT review process, and in this regard to explore follow-up measures through the Ambassadors of Disarmament in Geneva. The P5 will continue to call upon all members of the international community to engage in an open and constructive dialogue. The P5 reaffirmed their support to China to lead the efforts to advance the work of the second phase of the P5 Working Group on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. The P5 welcomed the offer by the UK to host the next formal P5 Conference in 2020. The P5 is also proactive in having open and constructive dialogue with the international community. On 31 January, the P5 had a dialogue in Beijing with representatives from international academia, the media and embassies of some non-nuclear-weapon states. My briefing here today is also a new attempt to this end. The P5 stand ready to further interact with the international community in various venues, particularly under the framework of the NPT.

As the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the nuclear-weapon states recognized by the NPT, the P5, despite some differences on specific issues, were able to have an in-depth exchange of views in the spirit of mutual respect and in a frank and pragmatic manner, reached consensus on many issues, and identify the direction for future cooperation. This demonstrates the positive attitudes taken by the major countries to address international security challenges through cooperation and coordination, thus reinforcing the international community's positive outlook on the international security environment.

In conclusion, I would like to thank the other P5 countries for their support and cooperation in making the Beijing Conference a success. China will continue to work with the other P5 countries in building consensus and managing differences

in the field of strategic security, and call for major-country coordination to replace major-country competition, and win-win cooperation to replace zero-sum game, so as to make positive contributions to world peace and stability.

Statement by China on Behalf of the P5 to the Third Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review Conference, New York, 1 May 2019

Mr Chairman,

China, as the coordinator of the P5 process, is delighted to make a statement, on behalf of the P5, at the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review Conference to brief all parties on the latest developments of the P5 process.

At present the uncertain and unstable factors in international situation are on the rise. The international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime with the NPT as its cornerstone is facing more challenges. The P5 has made great efforts in strengthening NPT regime. Since China assumed the role of P5 coordinator last July, the P5 has successfully convened the annual formal conference in Beijing, held two rounds of informal consultations in New York, organized several rounds of ambassador-level consultations in Geneva, held two rounds of dialogues with the NPDI, and carried out dialogue in Beijing with diplomats of non-nuclear-weapon states in China and representatives of the academia

On 30th January 2019, under the Chairmanship of China, the P5 held the 8th formal P5 Conference in Beijing. Focusing on the theme of “Strengthening the P5 Coordination and Safeguarding the NPT Regime”, the P5 had a frank and in-depth exchange of views on nuclear policies and doctrines, nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and other issues. A number of common understandings have emerged from the discussions.

First, the P5 undertook to jointly fulfilling the responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. The P5 recognized that the current international security environment is facing severe challenges, and maintaining sound relations with each other is of crucial importance to global strategic issues. The P5 agreed to have an objective assessment of each other’s strategic intentions, enhance dialogue on nuclear policies and doctrines, promote strategic trust and common security, and make utmost efforts to prevent nuclear risks, in particular resulting from miscalculation and misperception. The P5 also recalled the importance of maintaining the existing international arms control architecture, emphasized the importance of compliance with all international arms control agreements, and reaffirmed their commitment to existing negative and positive

security assurances. The P5 expressed their readiness to renew engagement with the parties to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, and continue to work towards the establishment of a Middle East Zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

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Since the Beijing Conference, China has actively coordinated with its P5 partners to implement the outcome of the Beijing P5 Conference. In this respect, a number of progress has been achieved.

First, the P5 has started the work of the second phase of the P5 Working Group

on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. The Group convened its first meeting in Beijing last February, in which the P5 expressed their intention to achieve new tangible results to be submitted to the 2020 NPT Review Conference based on the previous outcome submitted to the 2015 NPT Review Conference. The discussions on glossary of nuclear terms help to promote mutual trust and reduce misunderstandings and miscalculations among the P5, thus constituting an important transparency measure on their nuclear policies.

Second, the P5 renewed engagement with the ASEAN countries on the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. China, as the coordinator of the P5 process, facilitated such engagement in order to make progress towards early signing of the Protocol while preserving previous consensus, which received positive response from the ASEAN countries.

Third, the P5 actively engaged with non-nuclear-weapon states. The Chinese Ambassador of Disarmament, as the coordinator of the P5 process, briefed a CD plenary session about the outcome of the Beijing P5 Conference, which is the first time in history that the P5 collectively expresses their views to CD members. Besides, the P5 had a dialogue with the NPDI in the Australian Mission in New York this morning and exchanged views on NPT review process and national reporting issue, which we believe contributes to enhancing mutual trust between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states.

Fourth, the P5 actively strove to strengthen the NPT regime. In this respect, the P5 Ambassadors of Disarmament held several rounds of consultations in Geneva. They agreed to strengthen the significant role of the NPT in preserving international peace and security, and at the same time, empower the NPT with a greater meaning of serving global development in the new era, through exploring pragmatic and effective initiatives of peaceful uses of nuclear energy that benefit all parties.

Fifth, the P5 convened the second Principals Meeting in the Chinese Mission in New York yesterday. The P5 reached 5-points consensus on the next steps of cooperation: First, to conduct experts-level consultations to explore the possibility of explaining respective nuclear policy and doctrine through jointly holding a side event during the 2020 Review Conference. Second, to renew engagement with the ASEAN countries on the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty under China's coordination. Third, to support China's leadership on the the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms with a view to achieving new tangible results to be submitted to the 2020 NPT Review. Fourth, to explore the way to strengthen cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear security and nuclear safety, through the Friends of the Nuclear

Energy based in Vienna. Fifth, to push for substantive discussions on FMCT-related technical issues in the CD.

In conclusion, on behalf of the P5, I would like to thank the non-nuclear-weapon states for their support to the P5 process. The P5 is ready to work with other delegations in a push for a positive outcome at this PrepCom in order to lay a good foundation for a successful NPT Review Conference in 2020.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Statement by the United Kingdom on Behalf of the P5 to the UN General Assembly, 74th Session First Committee, General Debate, New York, 8 October 2019

The United Kingdom has the honour to report to the Committee on the state of play in the P5 Process of dialogue between the five Nuclear Weapon States recognised by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty – China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States – as the co-ordinator of that Process for 2019/20. The UK assumed that role following the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 NPT Review Conference in May, after China's productive co-ordination of the Process in 2018/19. We express our sincere gratitude to China for their efforts during that time.

Mr Chair

Let me first once again reaffirm the commitment of all five of the Nuclear Weapon States to the NPT, in all its aspects, as we approach the fiftieth anniversary of its entry into force in 2020.

This landmark Treaty has provided the essential foundation for international efforts to stem the threat that nuclear weapons would spread across the globe, and has thereby limited the risk of nuclear war. It has provided the framework within which the peaceful uses of nuclear technology – for electricity, medicine, agriculture and industry, for example – could be promoted and shared, to the benefit of humanity. And by helping to ease international tensions and create conditions of stability, security and trust among nations, it has allowed for a vital and continuing contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

We remain committed under the Treaty to the pursuit of good faith negotiations on effective measures related to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. We support the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished

security for all. We are committed to working to ease international tension, which will be conducive to further progress on nuclear disarmament.

We pledge our full and continued support for the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which plays a critical role in NPT implementation, both in promoting the fullest possible cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and in applying safeguards and verifying that nuclear programmes are exclusively for peaceful purposes. We emphasise the need to further strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, including the universalisation of the Additional Protocol.

We urge all States to commit to the continued success of the NPT: to ensure compliance, to promote universalisation, to ensure the highest standards of non-proliferation, and to respond to ongoing and emerging proliferation challenges, wherever they occur. In this context our five countries reiterate our commitment to continue our individual and collective efforts within the NPT framework to advance nuclear disarmament goals and objectives.

Mr Chair

In that spirit, the Principals of the P5 delegations met in New York on 8 October to discuss prospects for the NPT Review Conference, and the contribution the P5 could collectively make to its success.

We had an in-depth exchange of views on the strategic security environment, and on the key issues facing the NPT in all its aspects at its Review Conference next year.

We also reviewed progress on the five areas of work agreed at our last meeting at this level, under the co-ordination of China, in the margins of the third PrepCom.

First, we reaffirmed the importance of in-depth dialogue on our respective nuclear doctrines and policies, for enhancing both mutual trust and confidence between the five Nuclear Weapon States, and the transparency of our nuclear doctrines with respect to the wider NPT community. We welcomed the productive discussions that have taken place between officials from P5 Defence and Foreign Ministries, and agreed that they should continue. We also discussed ways in which the P5 could work together on strategic nuclear risk reduction. We restated our commitment to present on our nuclear doctrines at a side event at the 2020 Review Conference.

Second, we reviewed our engagement with the ASEAN countries on the Protocol

to the Treaty establishing a South-East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, which we agreed to continue. We welcomed the constructive meeting between P5 delegations and the Secretary-General of ASEAN in Geneva on 25 June, and the renewed commitment by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Bangkok on 31 July to ongoing discussions with the Nuclear Weapon States on this issue.

Third, we welcomed China's ongoing leadership of the second phase of work on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms. The Glossary is both a valuable contribution to the technical basis for arms control and disarmament, and an important tool for promoting mutual understanding. Two meetings of the expert-level working group have been held in Beijing since the third PrepCom, and another is scheduled for December.

Fourth, we commended the discussions that have taken place between P5 delegations in Vienna on ways to strengthen our co-operation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear security and nuclear safety in the run-up to next year's Review Conference.

Fifth, we welcomed France's initiative to convene a first meeting of P5 experts on FMCT-related technical issues in Paris on 19 September, and looked forward to further discussions at that level that would contribute to efforts to make progress on an FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament.

Noting the publication by China and the UK of draft NPT National Implementation Reports at the third PrepCom, we also reaffirmed the commitment of all our countries to submit national reports to the 2020 Review Conference, once again using the common template agreed in 2013. We appreciate our continuing dialogue with the countries of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, which continued with a meeting on 9 October.

Finally, Mr Chair, we committed ourselves to continuing and deepening our dialogue and our collective work, with the aim of promoting a successful Review Conference in 2020. We will meet again in London in February 2020 for the ninth P5 Conference.

Summary of the Ninth P5 Conference, London, 2020 (by Ambassador Aidan Little on the UK's 'Disarmament blog: the P5 meet in London', 21 February)

Last week saw a major milestone in preparations for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in April, when the five NPT Nuclear Weapon States met at Lancaster House in London for their ninth annual 'P5' conference.

We began the Conference by welcoming the new RevCon President-designate, Gustavo Zlauvinen of Argentina, and the chairs of the three Main Committees, collectively known as the Bureau. It was useful to hear more about what they thought the key issues for the RevCon would be, what a successful outcome might look like, and what they thought the P5 could do to help achieve it.

In the afternoon, we continued the P5 Conference tradition of a civil society segment. This one was bigger and better than ever: thanks to our partners at King's College London and the European Leadership Network, the room was full, with almost 80 civil society participants from all five Nuclear Weapon States and 16 other countries. In a lively series of breakout groups, civil society participants engaged directly with members of the P5 delegations on some of the most important issues facing the NPT, not just in this review cycle, but looking ahead to the next. This element is now firmly embedded in the P5 Conference format, and an important contribution to transparency in the NPT.

Following a dinner for the leaders of the P5 delegations, we reconvened the next day in P5-only format to discuss the particular contribution the Nuclear Weapon States could make to the success of the RevCon. That was an opportunity to review the work that has been going on in various working groups over the past few months, not least on nuclear doctrines, the fissile material cut-off treaty, and the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. In particular, heads of delegation were able to agree that we would hold a joint side event on peaceful uses of nuclear technology as well as the one already announced on nuclear doctrines, that we would publish Phase 2 of our Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms, and that we would all present national reports at the RevCon.

The P5 will keep working on all these deliverables up to the RevCon. They also agreed that our work on nuclear doctrines and strategic risk reduction should continue beyond the RevCon – a recognition that these will continue to be important issues for the next review cycle.

The next milestone is the 50th anniversary of the NPT's entry into force, which is being marked with a high-level conference in New York on 5 March. After that, there will only be seven weeks to go until the RevCon itself. There's lots of work to do to get ready.

Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, March 10, 2020

The text of the following statement was released by the Governments of the United States of America, China, France, Russia and the United Kingdom on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the NPT.

On March 5, 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force. Today, 50 years later, we celebrate the immeasurable contributions this landmark treaty has made to the security and prosperity of the nations and peoples of the world. We reaffirm our commitment to the NPT in all its aspects.

The NPT has provided the essential foundation for international efforts to stem the looming threat – then and now – that nuclear weapons would proliferate across the globe. In so doing, it has served the interests of all its Parties.

We also celebrate the astonishingly diverse benefits of the peaceful uses of the atom, whether for electricity, medicine, agriculture, or industry. We reiterate our strong support for broadening access to the benefits of nuclear energy and its applications for peaceful purpose. This boon to humanity thrives because the NPT, and the nuclear nonproliferation regime built around the Treaty, has helped provide confidence that nuclear programs are and will remain entirely peaceful.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) plays a critical role in NPT implementation, both to promote the fullest possible cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to apply safeguards and verify that nuclear programs are entirely peaceful. An IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement together with an Additional Protocol provide credible assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and should become the universal standard for verifying the fulfillment of NPT obligations. We pledge our full and continued support to the IAEA and urge others to do the same.

We remain committed under the NPT to the pursuit of good faith negotiations on effective measures related to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. We support the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all. By helping to ease international tensions and create conditions of stability, security and trust among nations, the NPT has made a vital contribution to nuclear disarmament. The NPT continues to help create conditions that would be essential for further progress on nuclear disarmament.

The success of the NPT was not foreordained, nor is its future success guaranteed. It depends on our concerted and sustained efforts to ensure compliance, to promote universalization, to ensure effective safeguards, and to respond to ongoing and emerging proliferation challenges, wherever they occur. Even at the height of the Cold War, our predecessors made this wise investment in our shared security and prosperity. Today, we pledge our unstinting commitment to preserving and deepening this legacy for future generations.



European Leadership Network
100 Black Prince Road
London, UK, SE1 7SJ

secretariat@europeanleadershipnetwork.org
+44 (0)203 176 2555
[@theELN](https://www.theELN.org)
europeanleadershipnetwork.org