



**EUROPEAN  
LEADERSHIP  
NETWORK**



## **The Expert Dialogue on NATO-Russia Risk Reduction. Seven Recommendations**

“In December 2020, this group of senior Russian, American and European experts offered governments a set of recommendations on Russia-NATO risk reduction. The recommendations addressed most of the areas of common ground so far sketched in Russian, US and NATO exchanges during the present crisis. Had those recommendations been acted upon, we might now be on a better path away from crisis.

We renew to all sides seven of our recommendations, updated to meet the present situation. They are simply good sense. They are modest, but they can be implemented tomorrow and would be a start on making Europe safer:

**1. Regular meetings should be held between the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, reinforced by military experts, to address issues of current concern.**

*These meetings would not be to negotiate the present crisis but to ensure military deconfliction and day-to-day risk reduction at this time of heightened tension and military deployments. They would take place entirely separately from the series of prepared thematic meetings of the NATO-Russian Council that the NRC's Chairman has proposed.*

**2. In addition, NATO member states and Russia should resume contacts at the level of military representatives in the NATO Military Committee and restore the Russian military liaison mission at SACEUR Headquarters.**

*These steps would parallel the establishment of civilian hotline communications that Russia has proposed and the re-opening of the Russian mission to NATO and of NATO liaison offices in Moscow proposed by NATO. They would rebuild the communication that for safety and good deterrence must take place in foul weather and not just fair.*

**3. Russia and NATO member states could agree that both sides will conduct large-scale military exercises, as a rule, at a militarily meaningful distance from their borders, but where geography prevents this then additional measures of notification, transparency and predictability must be taken. They should consider reducing the scale and frequency of military activities with respect to numbers and**

**geography, in particular exercises near borders. Generally, military exercises should be executed responsibly, not provocatively.**

*Both sides should now be seeking to communicate militarily responsible, unprovocative behaviour. The definitions of meaningful distance, scale and frequency could be the subject of discussion through the military channels proposed above. Military professionals are able quickly to judge and report good faith or the absence of it.*

**4. Both sides could take initial steps in the form of parallel unilateral measures that do not necessarily require conclusion of a formal agreement between NATO, or NATO member states, and Russia, which could prove politically difficult to achieve in the present environment.**

*The crisis means that finding joint agreement on measures both large and small between Russia and NATO will generally require protracted, painstaking negotiation. A device for getting round this obstacle, especially for military risk reduction, is for commanders to order parallel, unilateral measures based either on informal mutual understandings or as a small, clearly communicated challenge to see whether the other side will reciprocate.*

**5. Russia and the United States could confirm that, irrespective of the course of the present crisis, they will systematically develop their dialogue on the future of strategic stability and cyber security as agreed at their Geneva summit in June 2021.**

*Progress on the fundamental issue of strategic stability is crucial, has its own value, and should not be subordinated to other levels and tracks of negotiations. We wholeheartedly support the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, published on 3 January 2022, including the P5 commitment to the fundamental principle that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.*

**6. Russia and NATO could immediately agree to launch negotiations on a new zero option for the deployment in Europe of US and Russian intermediate-range land-based missiles and their launchers.**

*In their recent exchanges Russia, the United States and NATO have all indicated that they want to see progress on ground-based intermediate-range missiles.*

**7. Russia and NATO member states could immediately agree to launch negotiations on a package of measures on the basis of the existing bilateral and multilateral agreements on prevention of incidents at sea and above the sea, and on prevention of dangerous military activities.**

*In their recent exchanges Russia, the United States and NATO have all indicated that they would like to see progress in these very practical areas of risk reduction, which are particularly relevant to periods of heightened tension.*

Taken together these seven measures would materially contribute not just to a reduction of Russia-NATO tension but a reduction of Russia-NATO risk.”

*Russia-NATO Dialogue Group*

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## Russian signatories

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# Экспертный диалог по сокращению рисков военной конфронтации между Россией и НАТО в Европе.

## Семь рекомендаций

В декабре 2020 года настоящая группа высокопоставленных российских, американских и европейских экспертов представила правительствам комплекс рекомендаций по снижению рисков между Россией и НАТО. Рекомендации касались большинства вопросов, где существует общность позиций, очерченных в нынешних переговорах между Россией, США и НАТО в ходе текущего кризиса. Если бы страны действовали согласно указанным рекомендациям, мы могли бы быть на пути, который бы не привел к кризису.

Мы вновь излагаем всем сторонам семь из наших рекомендаций, обновленных в соответствии с нынешней ситуацией. Они попросту выражают здравый смысл и представляют умеренные предложения, которые могут быть реализованы уже завтра и станут началом работы по укреплению безопасности в Европе.

**1. Проводить регулярные встречи начальника Генерального штаба ВС РФ, председателя Комитета начальников штабов ВС США, ВГК ОВС НАТО в Европе и председателя Военного комитета НАТО с участием военных экспертов для решения возникающих актуальных вопросов.**

*Эти встречи будут посвящены не обсуждению нынешнего кризиса, а обеспечению военного примирения и повседневного снижения риска в период повышенной напряженности и военного развертывания. Они будут проводиться полностью отдельно от серии подготовленных тематических заседаний Совета Россия-НАТО, предложенных его председателем.*

**2. Кроме того, надо возобновить контакты между Россией и государствами-членами НАТО на уровне военных представителей в Военном комитете НАТО и воссоздать российскую военную миссию связи при штабе ВГК ОВС НАТО в Европе.**

*Эти шаги будут осуществляться параллельно с созданием предложенной Россией гражданской линии прямой связи и предложенными НАТО повторным открытием российской миссии при НАТО и отделений связи НАТО в Москве. Они восстановят коммуникацию, что для безопасности и разумного сдерживания должно происходить не только в спокойные времена, но и в кризисы.*

**3. Россия и НАТО могли бы согласиться проводить крупные военные учения, как правило, на существенной с военной точки зрения дистанции от общих границ при учёте специфики тех или иных зон соприкосновения. Они должны рассмотреть, как сократить регулярность и уменьшить масштабы военной деятельности по количеству привлекаемых войск и географическому охвату, в частности, ограничить учения вблизи границ. В целом надо проводить учения ответственно, а не провокационно.**

*Обе стороны должны стремиться к ответственному в военном отношении, не провоцируемому поведению. Определение разумного расстояния, масштаба и частоты военных учений могло бы стать предметом обсуждения по военным каналам, предложенным выше. Военные специалисты могут быстро оценивать и*

*докладывать своему командованию о добросовестности другой стороны или ее отсутствии.*

**4. В случае достижения какой-либо формальной или неформальной договоренности могут предприниматься первоначальные шаги в виде параллельных односторонних мер, не требующих заключения формальных соглашений между Россией и НАТО или отдельными странами-членами НАТО, которые могут оказаться политически труднодостижимым.**

*Кризисная ситуация означает, что достижение взаимного согласия о мерах, как больших, так и малых, между Россией и НАТО в целом потребует длительных, кропотливых переговоров. Чтобы преодолеть это препятствие, особенно в том, что касается уменьшения военных рисков, командиры должны отдавать приказы о параллельных односторонних мерах, основанных либо на неофициальных взаимных договоренностях, либо в качестве небольшой, четко поставленной задачи с тем, чтобы убедиться, что другая сторона ответит взаимностью.*

**5. Россия и Соединенные Штаты могли бы подтвердить, что, вне зависимости от направления развития нынешнего кризиса, будут целенаправленно развивать диалог о будущем стратегической стабильности и кибербезопасности, в соответствии с договорённостями, достигнутыми на саммите в Женеве в июне 2021 года.**

*Достижение прогресса в фундаментальном вопросе стратегической стабильности является принципиально важным, является самоценным и не должно зависеть от переговоров на других уровнях и треках. Мы всецело поддерживаем Совместное заявление лидеров пяти государств, обладающих ядерным оружием, о предотвращении ядерной войны и недопущении гонки вооружений, опубликованное 3 января 2022 г., включая приверженность «ядерной пятерки» фундаментальному принципу, согласно которому в ядерной войне не может быть победителей, и она никогда не должна быть развязана.*

**6. Россия и НАТО могли бы безотлагательно согласиться начать переговоры по отказу от размещения в Европе американских и российских ракет средней и меньшей дальности наземного базирования и пусковых установок (новый «нулевой вариант»).**

*В ходе недавних переговоров Россия, США и НАТО выразили желание добиться прогресса по вопросу о ракетах средней и меньшей дальности наземного базирования.*

**7. Россия и страны – члены НАТО могли бы безотлагательно согласиться начать переговоры по комплексу мер на основе имеющихся двухсторонних и многосторонних соглашений о предотвращении инцидентов на море и в воздушном пространстве над ним, а также о предотвращении опасной военной деятельности.**

*В ходе недавних переговоров Россия, США и НАТО выразили желание добиться прогресса в этих областях, где возможны практические шаги по снижению рисков, которые особенно важны в период обострения напряженности.*

*В своей совокупности эти семь предложений существенно способствовали бы не только сокращению напряжённости в отношениях между Россией и НАТО, но и снижению рисков военного конфликта между ними.*



Группа экспертов Диалога Россия-НАТО  
Февраль 2022