In recent years the US and the UK have said they might deter threats arising from emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) with nuclear weapons. This policy shift signals an increased emphasis on nuclear deterrence and challenges the UK’s non-proliferation and disarmament commitments. Instead of aiming to deter the extreme use of EDTs with nuclear weapons, this policy brief argues that the UK and other nuclear weapons states should focus on developing their national resilience to mitigate threats.
Institutionalised and forward-looking security and defence cooperation during the war and interim period are critical security guarantees for Ukraine. Kateryna Anisova writes that the G7-EU-coalition-of-willing nexus can assure a comprehensive and mutually reinforcing approach for bolstering Ukraine’s capabilities and integrating it into the Euro-Atlantic security system before the war ends.
This report explores how hybrid threats manifest in the Arctic, areas that are susceptible to influence, potential targets, actors who wish to shape public opinions, as well as the objectives being pursued. Kertysova and Gricius examine the threat and vulnerability landscape in the Arctic and assesses four key trends that have been observed.
Our networks are at the heart of our policy impact. Reaching right across Europe they bring together established figures with emerging leaders who are all committed to better security for Europe.
Over 250 influential figures from 50 countries, including China, Russia, and the US, warn that nuclear arms control cannot fall victim to geopolitical competition
Statement by the Euro-Atlantic Security Leadership Group (EASLG): Advancing Global Nuclear “Fail-Safe”
Former and serving senior officials, military leaders, and experts from across the Euro-Atlantic region call on all nuclear arms states to reduce the risk of nuclear blunder, and to cooperate to eliminate nuclear risks and threats.
As the CTBT’s 25th anniversary year comes to a close, CTBTO Executive Secretary Dr Robert Floyd and a diverse set of leaders from the Treaty’s most recent ratifying states send a powerful message on the CTBT’s relevance and resilience in today’s world.
Current security guarantees for Ukraine range from unavailable to ineffective, writes Sascha Ostanina. She proposes a middle-ground solution to provide collective security for Ukraine through a binding self-defence agreement between the EU and Ukraine. Such an agreement would provide Ukraine with access to weapons and ammunition in the event of Russian aggression.
Pros and cons: Options for security guarantees for Ukraine and their impact on Euro-Atlantic security
Tetiana Melnyk explores the viability of several security guarantees for Ukraine. A lasting resolution to the conflict would require a more systematic integration of Ukraine, and potentially other Eastern European states, into as many Western structures and organisations as possible, she writes.
To avoid making post-war Ukraine’s public sentiments grow anti-Western or isolationist, Denys Karlovskyi writes that NATO must build a mutually beneficial framework of security cooperation with Ukraine’s government and maintain the current level of Ukrainian public support for NATO and the EU. One way of achieving this is for NATO member states to engage with the Ukrainian public in a way that is on par with the government.
Policy briefs & reports
The nuclear-weapons states China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are increasingly recognising the implications of integrating AI into nuclear weapons command, control, and communication systems. Exploring the risks inherent to today’s advanced AI systems, this report sheds light on characteristics and risks across different branches of this technology and establishes the basis for a general purpose risk assessment framework.
Chinese thinking on AI integration and interaction with nuclear command and control, force structure, and decision-making
Fei Su and Jingdong Yuan analyse Chinese-language literature to present Chinese perspectives on AI and its military applications. The paper offers recommendations to mitigate the risks associated with the military use of AI in nuclear C2 systems, particularly focusing on the steps that China could consider to enhance its practices.
Russian thinking on AI integration and interaction with nuclear command and control, force structure, and decision-making
Oleg Shakirov analyses Russian-language literature on the Russian debate on AI and the nuclear field and offers recommendations for P5 states to advance dialogue on AI integration into nuclear C2, force structure and decision-making.