New and emerging technologies can and have revolutionised many aspects of society, bringing about positive change and innovation. Nonetheless, their potential misuse by both state and non-state actors poses unprecedented challenges to global security. Amongst other cutting-edge technologies, advances in additive manufacturing, commonly known as 3D printing, should be closely monitored due to their potential use by terrorists to acquire and create weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
3D printing and terrorism
3D printing is a set of technologies that can produce objects from diverse materials such as plastics, metals, polymers, and other components. Using a digital file made through computer-aided design (CAD) software, a 3D printer lays down successive layers of material until the object is created. This revolutionary technology is being employed in diverse areas for civilian purposes, including the production of rockets, medical devices, and equipment for humanitarian aid. However, since 2013, when the online open-source hardware organisation Defence Distributed released the digital files for the world’s first almost entirely 3D printed gun, the Liberator, observers have warned against the dual-use nature of 3D printing and its potential terrorist use.
What were considered hypothetical threats materialised in 2019, when a far-right terrorist used a partially 3D printed firearm to conduct a deadly attack in Halle, Germany. Since then, numerous other cases of terrorist use of 3D printing to produce firearms have been recorded in the United Kingdom, Spain, Ireland, Sweden, and Finland. While evidence suggests that terrorists are primarily interested in the 3D printing of firearms, some researchers have called attention to its potential terrorist use to develop WMD capabilities.
While evidence suggests that terrorists are primarily interested in the 3D printing of firearms, some researchers have called attention to its potential terrorist use to develop WMD capabilities. Nicolò Miotto
3D printing and WMD proliferation
Diverse hypotheses on the potential intersection between 3D printing and WMD have been made. 3D printing could develop gas centrifuges out of carbon fibre for uranium enrichment or to produce explosives for radiological dispersal devices. It could also be used to make laboratory equipment for the development of bio-weapons or to bio-print tissue samples to assess their effectiveness. It could aid the creation of miniaturised fluidic reaction ware devices for synthesising chemical agents and producing WMD means of delivery, especially drones capable of dispersing chemical agents and pathogens.
Nonetheless, these scenarios have been argued to be unlikely. Indeed, 3D printing high-functioning gas centrifuges in the large quantities needed to produce Uranium-235 would be time and material-consuming. Hence, other means of acquisition (e.g., theft and illicit procurement) would represent more viable options for a terrorist organisation. Furthermore, the highly technical expertise necessary for bio-printing tissue samples would be difficult to acquire for terrorists. Moreover, 3D printed laboratory equipment might not be resistant enough to corrosive reactions, thus constraining the production of chemical agents. Due to these technical limitations, it was estimated that the threat of the terrorist use of 3 printing to acquire WMD capabilities remained low overall.
A changing threat landscape
This assessment, however, may prove to have underestimated the potential threats as the technology further develops and the expertise required for additive manufacturing is increasingly democratised. Experiments in the fields of chemistry and biology have already showcased technical improvements in 3D printing. For instance, 3D printing is being tested to produce laboratory equipment for measuring the mechanical-physical properties of bulk materials and creating heat exchangers. Similarly, research is being conducted on bacterial 3D bioprinting.
This assessment, however, may prove to have underestimated the potential threats as the technology further develops and the expertise required for additive manufacturing is increasingly democratised. Nicolò Miotto
As per the 3D printing of firearms, knowledge of 3D bioprinting processes is widely circulating across the so-called do-it-yourself (DIY) online communities. Not only do DIY communities disseminate theoretical knowledge, but they also provide tips on the practical use of 3D printing. The diffusion of theoretical expertise is also accelerated by the development of large language models, which provide new learning opportunities by making dual-use scientific information more easily researchable.
In the immediate term, the most significant challenge concerns the 3D printing of drones as WMD delivery systems. Indeed, in January 2023, the West Midlands Police arrested a Birmingham University PhD student who successfully 3D printed a drone capable of delivering a chemical weapon for self-styled Islamic State. The PhD student had expertise in mechanical and chemical engineering and is said to have researched chemical agents like mustard gases and sarin. While this terrorism case can be regarded as an isolated event, it might testify to terrorist organisations’ increased interest in additive manufacturing and in recruiting individuals with the technical expertise needed to employ it successfully.
Potential responses to recent trends
Technological advances and new criminal evidence suggest the need to monitor future trends in the potential intersection between additive manufacturing and WMD proliferation. 3D printing has featured in high-level WMD-related discussions at the international level, including at Spiez Convergence conferences in 2014 and 2016, at the Australian Group in 2019, and at the thirty-fourth session of the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board in 2022.
Nonetheless, further actions should be taken to raise awareness of the WMD proliferation risks stemming from 3D printing. A first step could be holding a dedicated international symposium, which follows the example of the 2022 International Conference on 3D Printed Firearms organised by Europol. By involving diverse stakeholders, including governments, private companies, and academics, such a symposium could raise awareness of 3D printing’s security implications for WMD terrorism and pave the way for future initiatives.
Further actions should be taken to raise awareness of the WMD proliferation risks stemming from 3D printing. Nicolò Miotto
Discussions could also occur during the outreach events that the 1540 Committee was mandated to organise to address specific issues pertaining to the implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004). For instance, a conference on the potential 3D printing of drones capable of delivering WMDs could be co-convened by the 1540 Committee and the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), which has developed a Global Counter-Terrorism Programme on Autonomous and Remotely Operated Systems (AROS Programme).
Conclusions
The threat of the terrorist use of 3D printing to produce and use WMD capabilities remains low overall. However, as innovation continues at a fast pace, there is a need to monitor additive manufacturing’s developments and assess their security implications. Raising awareness of the potential threats stemming from 3D printing in coordination with key stakeholders, such as the private sector and academia, can help to empower governments to act swiftly if any of these threats become tangible. This can help prevent the misuse of this cutting-edge technology and to ensure that advances in this technology are instead used for the benefit of people and the planet.
The opinions articulated above represent the views of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the European Leadership Network or any of its members. The ELN’s aim is to encourage debates that will help develop Europe’s capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence, and security policy challenges of our time.
Image credit: Wikimedia Commons / Graph+sas and digitalboyare
