This report looks at how the complex interactions of emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) could impact nuclear decision-making, particularly in an escalating regional conventional conflict. In some scenarios, EDTs could exacerbate nuclear escalation, while in other circumstances they could encourage nuclear restraint.
The recent P5 affirmation that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” as well as the incorporation of strategic risk reduction into the nuclear doctrines and dialogues working group are impactful and are welcome first measures. The P5 must now build on this momentum to discuss a substantive programme of work which must will lead to the implementation of concrete risk reduction measures within the eleventh review cycle.
A revival of arms control will not be possible by going back to old approaches. Instead, arms control needs to adapt to new circumstances. A new report from the Center for Security Studies in Zurich sets out a transatlantic approach on how to build a political strategy for arms control in a new landscape.
Network members share their views on the joint statement of the leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States, Jan 2022.
In the recent years, the ELN’s work on the P5 Process has focused on the call for the P5 states to set up a working group to advance strategic risk reduction. In the aftermath of the P5 statement reaffirming the Reagan-Gorbachev formula, the ELN will continue to keep open the space for engagement with the P5 Process to help provide the ideas and encouragement for further progress.
The EASLG welcomes the leadership shown by the leaders of China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US in their January 3rd 2022 Joint Statement on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races.