Strategic risk assessment in East Asia: A Japanese view
Nobumasa Akiyama discusses Japanese perspectives of strategic risks in East Asia, including the North Korean threat and navigating Japan’s relationship with China amid great power rivalry.
Nobumasa Akiyama discusses Japanese perspectives of strategic risks in East Asia, including the North Korean threat and navigating Japan’s relationship with China amid great power rivalry.
Tanya Ogilvie-White writes that South Korea is becoming increasingly isolated from its Asia-Pacific security partners – Japan, Australia, the US, and the UK – in the way that it views the threat from North Korea. South Korea’s regional security partners’ increased focus on China and lessened attention on North Korea’s nuclear programme, risks isolating South Korea and undermining proliferation norms. Ogilvie-White argues that heightened collaborations are needed to avoid this.
In our latest New European Voices on Existential Risk (NEVER) commentary, Nicolò Miotto explores the potential existential risks stemming from the terrorist use of large language models (LLMs) and AI to manufacture chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. In the commentary he explores how LLMs and AI have enabled terrorist groups to enhance their capabilities so far, and what governments, the private sector, and NGOs need to do to mitigate future risks.
As countries continue incorporating AI into conventional military systems, they should prepare themselves for the risk that adversaries are likely already working to exploit weaknesses in AI models by threatening datasets at the core of AI. To address this, Alice Saltini writes that states should develop metrics to assess how cyber vulnerabilities could impact AI integration.
Former and serving senior officials, military leaders, and experts from across the Euro-Atlantic region put forward seven principles for Euro-Atlantic Security and the Global Nuclear Order.
YGLN members Maren Vieluf and Ananya Agustin Malhotra argue that NPT states need to start talking about whether or not “defensive” and “offensive” nuclear threats can be distinguished. If NPT states can find agreement on this matter, it could bridge the gap between states condemning any and all nuclear threats under any circumstances and those states that stand firmly behind “defensive” nuclear threats and allow for further progress to be made in the 11th NPT Review Cycle.