To prevent a further erosion of the effectiveness and efficiency of the current review cycle of the NPT, there is an urgent need for action. Michael Biontino looks at what pragmatic proposals could be taken up from the 2023 PrepCom Chair’s recommendations and the working paper from the Chair of the working group on further strengthening the review process of the NPT.
The Humanitarian Initiative’s successful shift to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) has spotlighted deficiencies in the operational methods and practices of the NPT Review Process. Konstantin Larionov assesses specific aspects of the UNGA’s proceedings that could enhance the performance of NPT meetings. He argues that expanding the roles and functions of the UNGA is crucial for advancing non-proliferation and disarmament commitments, which have faced decades-long obstacles within the NPT.
Noah Mayhew, Senior Research Associate at the Vienna Centre for Peace and Disarmament, reflects on how the political debate around the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) partnership is evolving at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and offers insights on potential productive steps forward.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has exposed critical flaws in the international nuclear realm. Valeriia Hesse writes that to prevent the total erosion of the non-proliferation norm, a realistic and pragmatic approach towards gradual nuclear arms reductions must be pursued. Ahead of the NPT PrepCom, she outlines concrete steps that the international community can take to build a stronger and more resilient nuclear order.
The integration of neural networks into NC3 poses a multitude of risks to global security. Alice Saltini writes that to pave the way for a moratorium, NPT State Parties should use the PrepCom to focus discussions on understanding the risks associated with integrating deep learning models into nuclear decision-making.
Ahead of the 2023 NPT Preparatory Committee, this policy brief examines how nuclear threats have changed with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, how to define a ‘nuclear threat’, and how NPT member states should react to nuclear threats. It sets out recommendations for how State Parties can strengthen the NPT and the nuclear taboo in the current Review Cycle.